2008 Ct. Sup. 15866
No. H12CP06-010892-AConnecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown
October 2, 2008
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
WILSON, J.
I STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is a proceeding initiated by the petitioner, commissioner of children and families, seeking to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother and respondent father, Rachel L., and Coleman S., to their minor child, Raul L. The petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondents was filed in accordance with General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. on June 25, 2007. Consolidated with these proceedings was a permanency plan with respect to Raul as formulated by the department of children and families (“DCF”). The permanency plan, filed on March 29, 2007, identified a plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. The respondent mother objected, and the matters were consolidated following the filing of the termination petitions. On July 24, 2007, the respondent father failed to appear for the plea on the termination of parental rights petition and a default was entered against him at that time. Trial of this matter took place on April 24, 25, and May 7, 2008. The respondent father failed to appear for trial. Proposed findings were due on June 6, 2008. The petitioner filed her proposed findings on June 6, 2008, and the respondent mother’s proposed findings were not filed until August 6, 2008. The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the rules of practice. The court further finds that the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Child Protection Session at Middletown has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the child.
II ISSUES
The petitioner seeks to terminate the parental rights of mother, Rachel CT Page 15867 L. on the sole ground that Raul has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and Rachel has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Raul she could assume a responsible position in his life. General Statutes §17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). The petitioner also seeks to terminate the parental rights of father, Coleman S. on grounds that he has abandoned Raul within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A); and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between father, Coleman S. and Raul within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). In addition, the petitioner seeks approval of the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption filed on March 29, 2007.
III PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner’s involvement in this case dates back to October 1, 2004, when DCF invoked a ninety-six-hour hold and removed Raul from his mother’s care. On October 4, 2004, DCF filed a petition of neglect and a motion for an ex parte order of temporary custody. The motion for the ex pane order of temporary custody was granted on October 4, 2004 and subsequently sustained on October 8, 2004. On February 15, 2005, Raul was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of DCF. Specific steps were signed by Rachel and ordered by the court at this time to facilitate Raul’s return home. The respondent mother was provided with and cooperated with Birth-to-Three services, parenting services, domestic violence services, mental health services and a substance abuse evaluation. In April 2005, Raul’s commitment was modified to six months of protective supervision and he was returned to the care of his mother.
On July 2, 2005, as a result of feeling frustrated and overwhelmed, Rachel contacted the DCF hotline and requested immediate help with Raul. DCF again invoked a ninety-six-hour hold and removed Raul. On July 5, 2005, DCF filed a motion to modify the disposition from protective supervision to commitment. The court granted the motion on July 14, 2005, and Raul was again committed to the care and custody of DCF. Services were again in place to address Rachel’s mental health issues, parenting issues and Raul’s special needs. On September 8, 2005, Raul was adjudicated neglected and was allowed to return to the care of Rachel for a second time under an order of protective supervision for a period of six months. Specific steps were again signed by Rachel and ordered by the court at this time. At the time of Raul’s adjudication in September 2005, Rachel moved to Hartford to be closer to family members that would CT Page 15868 help support her with caring for Raul. DCF paid for her security deposit at her apartment in Hartford and, with the assistance of DCF, services were transferred to the Hartford area upon her relocation. By October 2005, Rachel was receiving mental health services, Birth-to-Three services were in place for Raul, respite services were in place and parenting services were offered. On March 8, 2006, protective supervision was allowed to expire with the recommendation of DCF. Rachel was still involved with mental health services and Birth-to-Three Services. Respite services for Rachel also continued though the Y-US program.
On June 21, 2006, DCF invoked a ninety-six-hour hold and removed Raul for the third time from Rachel’s care after Rachel reported to her mental health worker that she could no longer care for Raul or meet his needs. Rachel exhibited aggressive behavior at this time in that she was screaming and throwing things and pushed Raul in the presence of the mental health workers. Raul was placed in foster care. On June 23, 2006, DCF filed a motion for a ex parte order of temporary custody along with a neglect petition. The ex parte motion was granted and on June 30, 2006, the order of temporary custody was sustained. On December 11, 2006, Rachel entered a plea of nolo contendere and Raul was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF. Specific steps were, for the third time signed by Rachel and ordered by the court. Services continued in an effort to reunite Raul with Rachel, however, to no avail. Thus, on March 29, 2007, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-129(k), DCF filed a permanency plan of termination and adoption.
On June 25, 2007, DCF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother and the respondent father. The matter was tried to the court over the course of three days. Witnesses for the petitioner included social workers Cassandra Bunkly, Amanda Beane, Christopher Padilla and Michael Walsh, Amanda Potara from Capital Regional Education Center (“CREC”), court appointed evaluator, Dr. Derek Franklin and William Meakim, developmental therapist, Department of Developmental Services, Early Connections. The petitioner also offered a number of exhibits that have been reviewed. The respondent mother did not call any witnesses, however, she offered several exhibits which have also been reviewed by the court. The respondent father failed to appear for trial. The child’s attorney did not call any witnesses nor offer any exhibits.
IV FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court, based on its review of the testimony and evidence, makes CT Page 15869 the following factual findings by clear and convincing evidence.
A MOTHER — RACHEL L.
Rachel L. was born on August 15, 1983 and is twenty-five years old. At the age of one, Rachel’s father removed her from the care of her mother and placed her with her paternal aunt because he was concerned about the way Rachel’s mother was caring for her. When father returned to maternal grandmother’s home to remove Rachel’s older sibling, he was murdered by maternal grandmother. Maternal grandmother is serving a life sentence in the state of Georgia and is presently incarcerated. Rachel attended Hartford public schools and remained in the care of her paternal aunt until the age of thirteen when she entered DCF care. While in DCF care, she was placed in a foster home, however due to her out of control behaviors she was placed at Riverview Hospital in 2000. There she was diagnosed as bi-polar and having PTSD with psychotic features and was treated with medication and therapeutic services. Subsequent to her hospitalization at Riverview, Rachel was placed in a group home. During her placement in the group home, Rachel ran away several times which lead to an arrest and a brief period of incarceration at York Correctional facility. After her incarceration, Rachel decided to accept services. At the age of eighteen, in 2001, Rachel received services from the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“DMHAS”) and was accepted into their Young Adult Services program. She participated in the DCF’s Independent Living Program, but decided to move to Norwich. It was during this time that she met respondent father, Coleman S. and they began a romantic relationship. Rachel and Coleman lived together on and off, however their relationship became “rocky” as a result of arguments and Coleman’s physical abuse toward Rachel. After Raul was removed in October 2004, domestic violence services, inter alia, were offered to both Rachel and Coleman, however the physical abuse continued. There were domestic violence incidents that occurred in April and July 2005. The incident in July 2005, led to Coleman’s arrest and a protective order. Rachel and Coleman’s relationship appeared to have ended after Rachel relocated to Hartford in September 2005. Rachel has had a very difficult time parenting Raul, particularly in light of his diagnosis of autism. Her mental health issues, apparent use of alcohol, inconsistency in taking medication, and her inability to parent Raul, given his special needs, have been major barriers to reunification. Rachel’s efforts at addressing these issues will be discussed.
B
CT Page 15870 FATHER — COLEMAN S.
Coleman S. is thirty years old. He was born in Delaware and at the age of two moved to Connecticut. He presently lives in New London and has been employed as a packer with a trucking company for more than four years. He acknowledged that he and Rachel were in a relationship for more than four years, and that there was domestic violence, however he minimized the issue. He has a criminal history that involves assault charges some of which stem from domestic violence incidents with Rachel. Coleman continues to reside in New London. He last saw Raul, prior to Raul’s removal in June 2006. He has contacted DCF to schedule visits with his son, however he failed to follow through with visitation. Coleman has another son, who he admits he rarely sees. Coleman’s last contact with DCF was in September 2007. Specific steps were ordered for Coleman in June 2006, when Raul was removed, however, due to his failure to maintain contact with DCF, appropriate services could not be identified for him. He has not provided any financial support for Raul, he has never sent cards, gifts or letters to Raul, he has never acknowledged Raul’s birthday or other special days, he has not inquired about Raul, nor has he followed through on visits. Coleman has not seen Raul since he was last in Rachel’s care prior to June 2006. Raul has no present memories of Coleman, and would not recognize him. Coleman is a stranger to Raul and they have never developed a parent-child relationship. Given the length of time that has elapsed and Coleman’s failure to reach out to his son, it is highly unlikely that such a relationship could develop within a reasonable period of time.
C CHILD — RAUL L.
Raul was born on September 29, 2004 and is soon to be four years old. This is the third removal for him. Raul is described by his social worker as a “happy toddler,” who expresses his affection through hugs and laughs. DCF had knowledge in June 2006, that Raul might be autistic, however the formal diagnosis was not made until November 2006. Raul began receiving Birth-to-Three services in May 2005. In November 2005, Bill Meakim was assigned as Raul’s service coordinator and developmental therapist though the Early Connections Birth-to-Three Services. Mr. Meakim coordinated services provided to Raul by the physical therapist and speech pathologist. As a developmental therapist, Mr. Meakim oversaw all of the services put in place to address Raul’s special needs, i.e., speech and physical therapy. During the course of Meakim’s tenure on the case, after testing, and Raul’s diagnosis of autism, services increased in the area of occupational therapy and speech to hone in on Raul’s CT Page 15871 language delays, feeding skills, fine motor skills and sensory issues. When Birth-to-Three Services ended in September 2007, Raul was three, and had made significant progress. His motor skills had improved, he was able to eat and drink on his own and there was a positive response to routine and consistency. By February 2008, Raul was speaking by making sounds that mimic words and by using baby sign language to communicate. His vocabulary had increased from approximately six words to thirty words. He was able to communicate by using three-word sentences, he was able to identify numbers, colors and shapes and could identify people. Raul does tend to have temper tantrums when he does not get his way. He does not like change and does not react well to change. Due to his autism, Raul follows a strict, exact routine and has a negative reaction when the routine is changed. As of February 2008, Raul was attending pre-school five times a week for a half day and a couple of days of week at a childcare center in the afternoon. Raul has been in five placements since his removal in June 2006. His current placement is in an Institute for Professional Practice (“IPP”) foster home. Raul has been in this placement since December 2007 and appears to be doing well. Raul’s adjustment to his current placement will be further discussed when the court addresses the best interest element of the petition.
D SPECIFIC STEPS
Specific steps were ordered for the respondents mother and father at the time of Raul’s initial removal in October 2004. The steps were signed by mother but not by father. Specific steps were also ordered in July and September 2005 and final steps were ordered in December 2006. The steps issued at this time were signed by mother but not father. Pursuant to the steps, DCF offered various case management services to facilitate reunification of mother and father with Raul.
1 Visitation
The specific steps required the respondents to visit Raul as often as DCF permits. Coleman’s last contact with Raul was when Raul was still in Rachel’s care, prior to his last removal in June 2006. Shortly after Raul’s removal in June 2006, DCF contacted Coleman to schedule a meeting and visits. Coleman would contact DCF with excuses as to why he was unable to visit with Raul. In September 2007, Coleman contacted DCF at which time he was informed of the status of Raul’s case and was offered visits. He failed to follow through with visits and has not contacted CT Page 15872 DCF since that time. During the time Coleman made limited contact with DCF, he did not inquire of Raul’s well being.
Rachel was having consistent visits with Raul until December 2007. Although Rachel’s visits were consistent during this time, she did not pursue visits with Raul in his foster home even though she had a relationship with his foster family. Since the beginning of January 2008, Rachel would give a myriad of excuses as to why she could not attend visits — the weather would be too cold, she did not want to leave her house, she was feeling ill, she wanted father to visit with her, or she simply failed to call at all to confirm the visit. It was also clearly evident from Rachel’s inappropriate comments during the visits that she did attend, that she did not understand the concept of parenting and had to be redirected. Rachel would also use inappropriate language and would often focus on the termination case rather than focus on Raul.
2 Individual Counseling
The specific steps signed by Rachel and issued for Coleman also included a requirement that they participate in individual and parenting counseling. The department attempted to refer Coleman for services to address these issues, however, his lack of contact with DCF made it impossible for them to make referrals. Rachel has been receiving mental health services since her placement at Riverview Hospital in 2000. At that time she was diagnosed with a bi-polar disorder, ADHD and having PTSD with psychotic features. She was prescribed medication to treat her mental health condition and also received therapeutic services. The services offered by DCF were discontinued when Rachel reached the age of majority at which time she refused services. At this time, Rachel received services from DMHAS and was accepted into their Young Adult Services program. From 2001 to 2004, she received services from the Southeastern Mental Health Authority (“SMHA”). During the last two years of that period, she declined to take prescribed medication and she continued to display a limited tolerance level, resulting in emotional outbursts which involved yelling, cursing and threatening to hurt herself or others. (Petitioner’s Ex. 4.) Rachel began taking her medication again in July 2005. When she moved to Hartford in September 2005 she began receiving mental health services from Capital Regional Mental Health Center (CRMHC).
During the period of time that social worker Padilla was assigned to the case, from November 2005, until September 2006, Rachel was not consistently taking her medication (Testimony of Padilla), however, she CT Page 15873 had been attending weekly individual therapy sessions on a fairly consistent basis since the commencement of CRMHC services in September 2005. The record demonstrates that at least as of November 2007 and February 2008, Rachel was taking her medication, however, she was very hesitant to exploring any changes in medication that would further alleviate her recurring symptoms of mood liability, irritability and anxiety. In accordance with the specific steps, Rachel was also referred to anger management at CRMHC in December 2006. She began her sessions at the end of December 2006 and attended only five out of the nine sessions offered. Functional assessments of Rachel from CRMHC dated November 2007 and February 2008, do not provide any indication if Rachel’s mental health status had improved. According to both assessments, she was still having difficulty with anger management, affect regulation, impulsivity, anxiety, self-esteem and substance abuse. In addition, Rachel’s anxiety has kept her from comfortably accessing public transportation which has limited her participation in services. Rachel’s refusal to explore changes in her medication has limited any improvement in her mental health status and eventual rehabilitation. The court acknowledges that Rachel is engaged in individual counseling and taking medication to address her mental health issues, however, the clear and convincing evidence does not demonstrate any real improvement in her mental health status to encourage the belief that she could care for Raul in the near future, given his age and significant special needs.
3 Parenting Counseling/Classes and In-Home Support Services
The specific steps also required Rachel and Coleman to cooperate with recommended service providers for parenting counseling and in-home support services and to understand and meet developmental and age appropriate specialized needs of Raul. Coleman’s minimal contact with DCF prevented DCF from making appropriate referrals for him. Since Raul’s initial removal in October 2004, various referrals were made for Rachel to participate in parenting counseling. In 2004, Rachel was referred to Madonna Place which is a nurturing program that provides parenting counseling. Al the end of January, beginning of February 2005, just prior to Raul’s return home in April 2005, Rachel received parenting counseling from Lighthouse Services which provided reunification services by going into the home and providing hands on parenting counseling. Lighthouse Services provided parenting services five hours per week. When Raul was removed in July 2005, Rachel was referred to the Family Life parenting program which was not suitable for her because she was too young. She was then referred to Mi Casa for parenting. Rachel refused to attend Mi Casa because she did not like taking public transportation or the med cab. CT Page 15874 Rachel’s reasons for not taking the bus or the med cab was that there were too many people on the bus and the med cab was dirty. DCF referred Rachel to Klingberg in December 2005, and the Institute for Hispanic Families in January 2006, for parenting classes. Rachel refused to participate in both of these services, stating that she did not want to take the bus, feared the bus and did not like group classes. DCF referred Rachel and Raul to Birth-to-Three Services, which began in the home in May 2005. When Rachel moved to Hartford in September 2005, Raul’s Birth-to-Three services were transferred to Hartford and William Meakim was assigned to Raul’s case as his service coordinator and developmental therapist through the Early Connections Birth-to-Three services. Meakim first met with Rachel and Raul on November 28, 2005, with the physical therapist to assess Raul’s needs. Services began with Meakim in January 2006. Meakim was scheduled to meet with Rachel and Raul once a week with an additional visit by the speech pathologist once a month. In January 2006, Rachel missed two home visits with Meakim. In February 2006, she missed three home visits, in March 2006, she missed two home visits, in April 2006, Meakim did not make any home visits because mother was not at home. In May 2006, Rachel missed two home visits with Meakim and in June 2006, there was one home visit with Meakim. During the missed visits in January 2006 through June 2006, Rachel did not provide Meakim with a reason as to why she missed the home visits.
DCF referred Rachel to the Parent Intervention Program (PIP) for hands-on parenting education in July 2006. PIP is the most intensive parenting program that DCF can offer parents in the Hartford area. PIP’s facility is set up like a one-room pre-school classroom with age appropriate toys and activities. Rachel was accepted into the PIP program in August 2006, and began in October 2006. Rachel attended the program once a week for two hours. This program continued working with Rachel and Raul until November 2007. During Rachel’s parenting session at PIP, there were only two other families at the facility. Rachel had the same parent educator the entire time she participated in the PIP program. Rachel did comply with the PIP program by attending the sessions however, her progress in the program was limited and she refused the PIP educator’s offer to invite Birth-to-Three to work with them. Although Raul’s formal diagnosis of autism was not made until November 2006 by DCF, Birth-to-Three and PIP were aware that Raul might have autism and therefore services were directed toward his limitations which were a result of the autism. The PIP educator also provided Rachel with additional resources regarding autism in the form of a handbook that contained programs for autistic children, however Rachel would leave the information behind. The PIP educator also offered Rachel transportation, and to attend autism workshops with Rachel, however Rachel refused the offer. Rachel failed to follow through with gaining knowledge about CT Page 15875 Raul’s autism.
4 Substance Abuse Evaluation and Treatment
The specific steps for Rachel and Coleman included the following with respect to substance abuse and treatment: (a) no substance abuse; (b) substance abuse assessment and treatment; and (c) random drug testing.
Coleman’s refusal to keep in contact with DCF on regular basis precluded DCF from providing services. DCF scheduled Coleman for a substance abuse evaluation which he failed to attend. A substance abuse referral was made for Rachel which she attended and the results were negative.
5 Involvement with the Criminal Justice System
The specific steps also required that mother and father have no/further involvement with the criminal justice system. There is no evidence that Rachel has had any recent involvement with the criminal justice system. There is evidence that Coleman was arrested for a domestic violence incident with Rachel in July 2005, however there is no evidence of any recent criminal activity by Coleman.
6 Releases
The specific steps required Rachel and Coleman to sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before the court. Due to Coleman’s failure to attend scheduled appointments with DCF and his lack of contact with DCF, releases were not obtainable. In the summer, 2007, Rachel revoked her release of information at CRMHC. Since that time, DCF has had limited access to information from CRMHC and has been unable to assess whether Rachel’s mental health needs are being adequately addressed through CRMHC.
7 Maintain Legal Income and Stable Housing
CT Page 15876
Rachel and Coleman both have stable housing. Rachel lives in Hartford in a two-bedroom apartment subsidized by Section 8. Coleman has had steady employment with the same trucking company for more than four years. Rachel did not complete highschool nor has she obtained her GED. She has a very limited employment history and presently is unemployed. Rachel’s income comes from Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits.
8 Keep All Appointments Set by or With the Department
The specific steps also required Rachel and Coleman to attend appointments at the department or elsewhere as may be required. In that regard, the department conducts treatment plan conferences and administrative case reviews on a periodic basis. Parents, among others, are notified of these meetings and are expected to attend. Given Coleman’s lack of interest in Raul, and Raul’s well being, in addition to his minimal contact with DCF, there is no credible evidence that he participated in any administrative case reviews or treatment plan conferences. Rachel did comply with this step, however she failed to attend PPT meetings held for Raul in September 2007 and February 2008.
9 Other Miscellaneous Steps
The specific steps included various other obligations, which required compliance by Rachel and Coleman. The steps required Rachel and Coleman to keep their whereabouts known to DCF. Rachel complied with this step and although Coleman complied, his contact with DCF was minimal. The steps required both Rachel and Coleman to cooperate with court-ordered evaluations. A court-ordered evaluation was not ordered for Coleman, however an evaluation was ordered for Rachel with Dr. Derek Franklin in October 2006. Although Rachel attended the evaluation and participated in the evaluation process, she made it clear to Dr. Franklin that she was in a bad mood, was annoyed and felt the exam was not necessary. An updated evaluation was ordered by the court on December 5, 2007 and scheduled for January 15, 2008. Rachel failed to attend the evaluation and when the social worker explained to Rachel the importance of attending the evaluation, she became irate with the social worker.
V LEGAL DISCUSSION
CT Page 15877 A ADJUDICATION
“`Termination of parental rights’ means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child’s parent or parents so that the child is free for adoption . . .” General Statutes § 45a-707(8). “[I]t is both a fundamental right and the policy of this State to maintain the integrity of the family. Where a fundamental right is involved, the burden of proof is always on the party seeking to interfere with that right.” In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 295, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). “[T]ermination of a parent’s rights to his or her children was unknown to the common law.” In re Eden F., 48 Conn.App. 290, 321, 710 A.2d 771 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 250 Conn. 674, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). The statutes creating procedures for the termination of parental rights are in derogation of common law. Id. Without the existence of such state statutes, the power of a juvenile court to terminate parental rights would not exist. Id. “The rights of children to protection from ham and to placement in a nurturing environment are core values of our society. So too, is the right of parents to raise their children without undue government interference . . . Since the severance by the state of a parent-child relationship implicates fundamental rights and the termination of a parent’s rights is a creature of statute, it is essential that a parental termination can be decreed only in both strict and literal compliance with the applicable state statutes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 43, 887 A.2d 415 (2005).
General Statutes § 17a-112(j) imposes upon DCF the clear and convincing evidence standard for the burden of proof. “In order to terminate rights under § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); (2) termination is in the best interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2); and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds fox termination delineated in § 17a-112(j)(3).” In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).
1 Reasonable Efforts to Locate and Reunify General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1)
CT Page 15878
For a child in the custody of DCF, the first requisite for termination of parental rights is the exhaustion of reasonable efforts by DCF to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). “[Section 17a-112(j)(1)] imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word effort is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.” In re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 632.
Pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(1), the court need not make a finding that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent, if the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding of reasonable efforts is not required if a court has previously determined at a permanency plan hearing that such efforts at reunification were no longer appropriate. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). Such findings were not made by the court as to the respondents, mother and father. In this matter, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify this family. Following Raul’s removal in June 2006, DCF located and was in contact with the respondent father, Coleman S., however, he failed to maintain contact with DCF so that services could be identified for him. DCF scheduled a substance abuse evaluation for Coleman to attend, he failed to attend. DCF scheduled a meeting with Coleman to discuss Raul and services, and to schedule visits with Raul, Coleman failed to show up for the meeting. Coleman’s failure to maintain contact with DCF and follow though with offered visits, made it impossible for DCF to reunify him with his son. Likewise, after Raul’s removal in June 2006, DCF made numerous referrals to service providers for Rachel. DCF referred Rachel to the PIP program for intensive hands on parenting education, Birth-to-Three Services were provided for Raul, and when Raul was formally diagnosed with autism by Dr. Greenstein in November 2006, Birth-to-Three Services were increased to one hour each day for developmental therapy; once a week for an hour for occupational therapy and speech therapy; and once a month in the foster home. Rachel claims that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts because “no service was offered to [her] to assist her in learning to care for an autistic child.” (Proposed Findings of respondent mother.) The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates just the opposite. Although DCF was aware that Raul might have autism at the time of his removal in June CT Page 15879 2006, he was not formally diagnosed until November 2006. In any event, Birth-to-Three Services were provided to him from the time Raul was born until he turned three, and, when Raul was diagnosed in November 2006, by Dr. Greenstein, per recommendation of Dr. Greenstein, Birth-to-Three Services were increased. Rachel was referred to the PIP program for hands on parenting education in July 2006. The PIP educator provided Rachel with information on autistic children, she also offered to provide Rachel with transportation and to accompany Rachel to autism workshops. Rachel would leave the information behind and refused the offer to attend the workshops. DCF also informed Rachel about the school specializing in autism that was located on the first floor of the CREC building where she attended the PIP program. Rachel was not interested in the school or any information that it may have to offer. Rachel wanted DCF to find a program that would work with her on autism on a one-on-one level in her home. DCF contacted the 211 information line and contacted Dr. Greenstein for such programs, but was informed that there were no one-on-one in home programs for autism education, only group education programs. DCF was unable to find a one-on-one educational program on autistic children as Rachel had requested, and Rachel had refused the PIP educator’s information on programs and workshops for parents with autistic children.
Raul was seen again by Dr. Greenstein for an updated evaluation regarding his autism diagnosis. Dr. Greenstein did not feel the need to complete another evaluation since it was his opinion that Raul was still autistic. Following this exam, Dr. Greenstein was in regular communication with the Director of Special Education Services in Wethersfield to discuss Raul’s educational needs. DCF was in contact with Raul’s school and confirmed that Dr. Greenstein had been in contact with them and was coordinating his education needs. Raul was again re-evaluated regarding his autism. The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that while DCF could not provide a specific autistic education program as requested by mother, Raul’s autistic needs were clearly being met and the services and information provided by PIP and Birth-to-Three were sufficient enough for Rachel to learn how to handle Raul and his autism. DCF’s inability to provide Rachel with a specific one-on-one in-home education program for autism does not defeat the proposition that reasonable efforts at reunification were made since DCF provided Rachel with a number of services to assist her in caring for Raul and his specialized needs. See, In re A., 55 Conn.App. 293, 738 A.2d 222
(1999) (court was aware of DCF’s failure to treat the respondent as a victim of domestic violence, however this did not defeat the proposition that DCF made reasonable efforts since counseling services were provided as well as other in-home services that were refused by respondent). Rachel simply failed to take advantage of the services offered. She CT Page 15880 missed appointments with Meakim, Raul’s developmental therapist who was working with Raul through Birth-to-Three, she refused to accept the information offered by the PIP educator regarding autistic programs, she refused the PIP educator’s offer to attend workshops on autism and she failed to look into the autistic school located in the PIP program building. DCF also provided Rachel with bus passes for transportation and visits with Raul, which after November 2007, became very inconsistent.
In sum, the clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that DCF did all that was reasonably necessary to reunite Rachel and Coleman with Raul. That those efforts did not succeed was the result of Coleman’s lack of interest in his son and failure to maintain contact with DCF so that services could be identified for him, and Rachel’s lack of motivation and willingness to gain knowledge about her son’s specialized needs.
2 Adjudicatory Findings
“To justify the termination of parental rights in the absence of consent, one or more of the grounds set forth in General Statutes § [17a-112(j)(3)] must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 118, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). “In contrast to custody proceedings, in which the best interests of the child are always the paramount consideration and in fact usually dictate the outcome, in termination proceedings the statutory criteria must be met before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings can begin. No all encompassing best interests standard vitiates the requirement of compliance with the statutory criteria.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 538, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). There must be “strict compliance with the statutory criteria [of § 17a-112(j)(3)] before termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption proceedings can occur.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 257, n. 9, 479 A.2d 1204
(1984).
The sole statutory ground upon which the petitioner relies to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother, Rachel L. is that Raul was found to be neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding and Rachel failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of General Statutes §17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). The grounds upon which the petitioner relies to terminate the parental rights of father, Coleman are that Raul was abandoned by Coleman in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest concern or responsibility as to the welfare of Raul, as defined in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A); and that no CT Page 15881 on going parent-child relationship exists between Coleman and Raul as defined in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). The petitioner claims that Coleman has abandoned Raul. “Abandonment focuses on the parent’s conduct . . . A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment . . . General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child’s welfare . . . Section 17a-112(j)(3)(A) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern. The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 839-40, 863 A.2d 720 (2005); In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185 193, 763 A.2d 37
(2000).
Respondent father, Coleman last saw Raul prior to June 2006 when Raul was still in Rachel’s care. He has not visited Raul, has not provided financial support, and has not maintained a reasonable degree of interest and concern for Raul’s welfare. Coleman has made no inquiries about Raul’s health, education or general well-being, he has not supplied him with food, clothing or medical care, he has failed to maintain adequate housing for Raul and has not furnished social and religious guidance to Raul. The evidence is clear and convincing that respondent father, Coleman S. has abandoned Raul.
The petitioner claims that Coleman S. has no ongoing parent-child relationship with Raul. “[Section 17a-112(j)(3)(D)] requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child’s best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of CT Page 15882 paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). Coleman S. last saw Raul before he was removed from mother, Rachel’s care in June 2006. Raul has no present feelings or memories of Coleman. He has not sought Coleman out for comfort or asked for Coleman. The evidence is clear and convincing that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists between the respondent father, Coleman, and Raul.
The petitioner claims that the respondent mother, Rachel’s rights to Raul should be terminated because “[Raul] has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take and facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.” General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). As Raul has been found to be neglected in a prior proceeding, the question to be determined is whether Rachel has achieved such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Raul, she could assume a responsible position in his life. The court finds in favor of the petitioner on this ground. “`Personal rehabilitation’ as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. [The statute] requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation that [Rachel has] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in [Raul’s] life.”In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). In assessing rehabilitative progress, the question is not simply how far has the parent come, but have they come far enough to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, the parent can assume her role in the life of the child. In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83
(2000); see also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 480, 771 A.2d 244
(2001). “What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.” In re Stanley D., supra, 231 citing In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745, A.2d 847 (2000). Given these legal standards, the clear and convincing evidence CT Page 15883 demonstrates that between June 21, 2006, the date on which Raul was removed from Rachel’s care, and the adjudicatory date of June 25, 2007, Rachel L. failed to achieve the level of rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in Raul’s life, given his age and needs, in the near future.
Although the operative time period for determining whether Rachel has rehabilitated commenced in June 2006, when Raul was removed, this court cannot ignore the numerous services put into place for Rachel prior to June 2006, and Raul’s previous removals from Rachel’s care. Rachel has been receiving services to address her mental health issues and parenting issues since Raul’s birth in October 2004. Despite receiving services, she has not been able to maintain an ability to care for Raul for any significant period of time. After his removal in October 2004, Raul was returned to Rachel under an order of six months protective supervision in April 2005. Three months later on July 2, 2005, at Rachel’s request, because she was frustrated and overwhelmed, Raul again had to be removed from her care. Services were in place at this time and Raul was returned home again in September 2005 under an order of six months protective supervision. Protective supervision was allowed to expire on March 8, 2006. On June 21, 2006, just three months after protective supervision expired, Raul was removed from Rachel’s care. Rachel called CRMHC and informed them that she wanted Raul removed because she could no longer care for him and meet his needs. On each occasion that Raul was removed from Rachel’s care, services were in place, i.e., Birth-to-Three for Raul, mental health services for Rachel, respite services through Y-US and parenting services. Rachel also refused services during this time. A referral was made to Mi Casa for parenting in September 2005. Rachel refused these services because she did not want to take the bus or a med cab. Rachel refused the transportation, citing as her reasons, the bus having too many people and the med cab being dirty. At the time of Raul’s removal in June 2006, Rachel was receiving mental health services, Raul was receiving Birth-to-Three services, and respite services were in place through Y-US. PIP services were put into place in October 2006. The evidence is clear and convincing that Rachel has made little progress in rehabilitating herself in the two years since Raul’s removal in June 2006. Rachel has been receiving mental health services through CRMHC since September 2005 when she moved to the Hartford area, and prior to that time with SEMHA when she was residing in Norwich. Her mental health status has not improved as evidenced in her functional assessments dated November 2007 and February 2008. According to both assessments, Rachel “continues to experience mood liability, irritability and anxiety. [She] has difficulty with anger management, affect regulation, impulsivity, anxiety, self esteem and substance abuse.” (Petitioner’s Exs. 13, 14.) In addition, although Rachel is prescribed medication for her mental health CT Page 15884 condition, she is reluctant to explore any changes in medication that may alleviate her symptoms. (Id.) Instead, Rachel self-medicates through drinking alcohol. (Id.) She reported using alcohol to decrease anxiety and to allow her to be more relaxed in the community. (Id.)
Dr. Derek Franklin, the court-appointed evaluator, evaluated Rachel in October 2006. He diagnosed Rachel with Bipolar Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Borderline Personality Traits. Dr. Franklin opined that Rachel’s diagnoses might be sufficiently influenced by alcohol and or cannabis abuse as well as a propensity to engage in prescription drug-seeking behaviors. This opinion is consistent with the functional assessments in 2007 and 2008, wherein Rachel reported using alcohol to decrease her anxiety. With regard to reunification, Dr. Franklin felt the prognosis was poor. He opined that “[g]iven the concerns specific to [Rachel’s] mental health, it is advised that supervised visits continue with [Raul] and that no consideration be made at this time with regards to unsupervised visits. [Rachel] will need to demonstrate a level of `behavioral’ proficiency, as well as increased insight regarding the care of her child as a precursor to any discussion regarding unsupervised visitation and ultimately reunification with Raul. Given the history of treatment noncompliance issues, around cannabis usage and what appears to be drug-seeking behaviors, the prognosis for short-term skills acquisition is viewed as poor.” (Petitioner’s Ex. 6, testimony of Dr. Franklin.) Dr. Franklin felt that this was “particularly relevant in that while [Rachel had] engaged in individual counseling, she had, [as of the date of his evaluation], refused concomitant services offered by [DCF].” Id. Dr. Franklin opined that “[p]arenting classes are viewed as a critical component to any discussion of reunification and in the absence of this, the Courts will be well advised to begin deliberations regarding the long-term placement of [Raul].” Id. Dr. Franklin opined that Rachel was capable of participating in services, however, he questioned her motivation, for example whether Rachel was having consistent visits with Raul, whether she accepted the available services for autistic children and whether she was allowing open communication between DCF and her therapist. Dr. Franklin concluded that Rachel required a full period of compliance with service providers for both herself and Raul before reunification could begin, none of which, he concluded, were present at the time of his evaluation in October 2006, or in April 2008, when he testified. (Emphasis added.) Id. The clear and convincing evidence bears this out. In October 2006, Rachel began an intensive parenting program at PIP. She attended PIP once a week for two hours. Rachel would on occasion leave the program early, she had difficulty dealing with Raul’s behaviors, she did not accept the PIP educator’s offer to have Birth-to-Three participate in the parenting program with herself and Raul, she failed to CT Page 15885 follow through on the educator’s offer of resources on autism and to attend workshops, and, she would get loud with Raul. The PIP educator noted that there was only one occasion in February 2007, that Rachel engaged Raul to talk. Rachel did not have a good understanding of Raul’s specialized needs. The PIP educator emphasized to Rachel the need for additional training and workshops on autism. As previously discussed, Rachel did not follow through on the resources given to her by the PIP educator on autism and workshops for parents with autistic children. Rachel did not follow through on modeling parenting techniques that were taught by the PIP educator. Each week the PIP educator had to review with Rachel the same behavior interventions to use with Raul.
The PIP educator used parallel play and role modeling as the parenting techniques to use with Raul. When the PIP educator implemented these techniques, Raul responded in a positive manner, however when Rachel attempted to use these techniques Raul did not respond. PIP established goals with Rachel and reviewed them with her, namely, setting rules and boundaries for Raul, setting a schedule and routine for Raul, implementing effective discipline techniques, engaging with staff, and gaining knowledge of Raul’s special needs. Although Rachel did accomplish the goal of setting a schedule and routine for Raul, she made limited progress with respect to the other goals, and, she did not make much progress at all in gaining knowledge about Raul’s autism and special needs. Rachel argues that DCF did not provide her with sufficient training to handle Raul’s autism and that “[t]he CREC Preschool Intervention Program [PIP] was the only service made available to the Mother . . . and was not a program to assist Mother or train Mother to deal with an autistic child.” (Respondent mother’s proposed findings.) Rachel’s motivation and performance in the PIP program clearly undermines this argument. The PIP educator offered Rachel resources to help Rachel acquire knowledge about Raul’s autism so that she would be better equipped to care for him. Rachel did not follow through with the PIP educator’s offer. Dr. Franklin, in his testimony, concluded that given Rachel’s inability to improve her parenting skills through PIP as evidenced by her lack of progress in meeting the treatment goals of the PIP program, the conditions for reunification between Rachel and Raul did not exist. Rachel has had ample opportunity and resources to rehabilitate herself to the level needed to care for Raul given his age and special needs. She has clearly failed to do so.
The statutory framework of § 17a-112(j)(B)(i) requires the court to analyze the parent’s rehabilitation “as it relates to the needs of the particular child” and consider if such rehabilitation is foreseeable “within a reasonable time.” In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722
(1989), In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366-67, 730 A.2d 106
CT Page 15886 (1999). Because of this requirement that the court predict what may happen within a “reasonable time” after the filing of the termination petition, the court must consider not only Rachel’s conduct prior to the filing of the petition, but also her conduct since that time. Since the filing of the petition in June 2007, Rachel showed little progress in dealing with her mental health issues and parenting ability. When PIP ended in November 2007, DCF continued to offer Rachel visits with Raul. Since January 2008, Rachel attended two visits with Raul, in March 2008 and May 2008. Rachel gave various excuses as to why she could not attend the visits, from the weather being too cold, to breaking her toe. At the visit in May 2008, Rachel arrived forty minutes late. At this visit, Rachel was distracted from her interaction with Raul because she was more focused on the friend she brought with her to the visit. In addition, Rachel was making inappropriate comments about the trial and, following the visit, when social worker Walsh was transporting Raul back to the foster home, the social worker rolled the car window down so that Rachel could say good-bye to Raul. She responded with profanity, loud enough for Raul to hear her. In August 2007, Rachel revoked her release of information at CRMHC. Since that time, DCF received limited information regarding Rachel’s mental health needs and whether those needs have been adequately addressed. In December 2007, the court, Bear, J., granted the petitioner’s motion for an updated psychological evaluation of Rachel and interactional with Raul. The court-ordered evaluation was scheduled for January 15, 2008, at the evaluator’s office near Rachel’s home in Wethersfield. Rachel failed to attend the evaluation and when the social worker attempted to explain to Rachel the importance of the evaluation, she became irate with the social worker. As previously discussed, Rachel’s functional assessments in November 2007 and February 2008 indicate that Rachel continues to experience mood liability, irritability, and anxiety. She continues to have difficulty with anger management, affect regulation, impulsivity, anxiety, her self-esteem and substance abuse. Instead of exploring any changes in her medication which could address some of her symptoms, Rachel self-medicates through drinking alcohol to decrease her anxiety and to feel more relaxed in the community. As of the last day of trial, Rachel was not employed. Rachel has not completed highschool and is ambivalent about exploring the idea of continuing her education. (Petitioner’s Exs. 13, 14.) She is hesitant about accessing educational services through the vocational rehabilitation coordinator at CRMHC. Id.
It has been two years since Raul’s removal and Rachel has not come close to the level of rehabilitation she needs to care for an autistic three-year-old child, despite the services that have been provided to her. Her limited progress in addressing her mental health issues and in the PIP parenting program gives this court little hope that she could, CT Page 15887 within a reasonably foreseeable period of time, reach a level of rehabilitation to care for Raul. Thus, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that Rachel lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in Raul’s life within a reasonably foreseeable time given his age and special needs.
B DISPOSITION 1 Mandatory Findings § 17a-112(k)
“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 835-37, 724 A.2d 546 (1999).
“In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [ § 17a-112(k)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). “The factors, however, serve simply as guidelines to assist the court in its determination of the child’s best interest, and each factor need not be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258-59, 829 A.2d 855
(2003). “The judicial authority may admit into evidence any testimony relevant and material to the issue of the disposition, including events occurring through the close of the evidentiary hearing, but no disposition may be made by the judicial authority until any mandated social study has been submitted to the judicial authority. Said study shall be marked as an exhibit subject to the right of any party to require that the author, if available, appear for cross-examination.” Practice Book § 35a-9.
The court, after having considered all testimony and documentary evidence relating to the issue of disposition, and, which evidence CT Page 15888 includes events occurring through the close of the trial, makes the following findings by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the respondents the court finds that DCF offered services including parenting education, individual counseling, Birth-to-Three Services, respite services through Y-US, resources regarding autistic children, substance abuse testing and treatment, visitation, and transportation services to and from visits. Father made minimal effort to contact DCF so that services could be identified for him. Visits were offered to father as well as a substance abuse evaluation and treatment, however he failed to follow through. Similar services were offered to Rachel, and as previously discussed, she has failed to sufficiently engage in such services to facilitate Raul’s return to her care.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the terms of an applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order(s), the court finds that specific steps were ordered as to both respondents, mother and father. As set forth previously, there was compliance by respondent mother with some steps but failure to fully engage with a number of the steps, particularly those steps which were essential to any prospect of her rehabilitation, namely, individual counseling, exploring a change in her psychiatric medication, parenting education, and gaining knowledge about Raul’s autism. Father failed to maintain contact with DCF so that services could be identified for him in accordance with the specific steps.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties the court finds as follows:
Father, Coleman last saw Raul prior to June 2006, when he was still in mother’s care. Since Raul’s removal, Coleman has not visited Raul, and has not inquired of Raul’s well-being. Coleman has absolutely no understanding of Raul’s specialized needs. There is no credible evidence of any kind of bond between Raul and Coleman. Raul has no present CT Page 15889 memories of Coleman and he has not reached out to Coleman. Coleman has not sent any cards, gifts or letters to Raul. He has not provided Raul with financial, emotional, social or religious support. Although there is evidence of a bond between mother Rachel and Raul, she clearly lacks the ability to care for him and she also lacks the knowledge and understanding of Raul’s specialized needs.
Raul is an autistic three-year-old soon to be four years old. His behavioral challenges are with peer interactions, appropriate-play with peers, routines and language. Raul’s behaviors are such that he needs consistency to ensure him what he can expect next. He responds best to structure and routine, and without it he becomes upset and falls apart. When Birth-to-Three Services ended in November 2007, Raul had made significant progress. He had improved motor skills, he was able to eat and drink on his own and he was responding positively to routine and consistency. Raul attends pre-school five times a week for a half day and a couple of days a week he attends a childcare center in the afternoon. At a PPT in February 2008, the pre-school noted that Raul had made improvements in his vocabulary, communication skills and social development. Raul is able to communicate by using three-word sentences; able to identify numbers, colors and shapes; able to identify people and has a vocabulary of twenty words. Raul has been placed in an IPP foster home and has been in this placement since December 2007. While Raul’s current foster parents have not committed to adopting him, he has adjusted well to this placement. The IPP foster home provides Raul with a daily routine and stability to which he has responded positively. When Raul’s daily routine is not followed, he tends to exhibit behavioral problems, becomes upset and irritable and cries for long periods of time. Raul’s current foster parents provide him with the stability, consistency and routine that he needs given his diagnosis of autism.
(5) As to the age of the child, the court finds that Raul is three years old and will soon be four. He has been in foster care for more than two years. He needs and deserves a sense of permanency and stability as he continues to bond with his current care givers, the uncertainty of not knowing if or when Rachel and Coleman might be in a position to care for him is of paramount importance. Foster care should be a strictly time-limited interval in the life of any child. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. See In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted that “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . .” (Emphasis added.) In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff’d, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992). CT Page 15890
The Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq., as amended, envisages that after twelve months in foster care a child deserves a permanent home. Given the length of time that Raul has been in foster care, he deserves a permanent home without further delay.
(6) As to the efforts each parent has made to adjust his or her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return home in the foreseeable future, including but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to the incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds as follows: Rachel and Coleman made little effort to adjust their circumstances so as to facilitate reunification with Raul. Coleman has had very little contact with Raul and has not asked about Raul’s well-being. Rachel, as previously discussed has failed to fully engage in individual therapy, failed to explore new medications that might help her to deal with her feelings of anxiety and anger management, failed to fully engage and make progress in parenting education, and failed to gain knowledge about Raul’s autism, all critical to her rehabilitation. Rachel has not visited Raul on a consistent basis since December 2007. Despite DCF’s efforts to provide Rachel and Coleman with the appropriate services to effectuate reunification, they have not made efforts to change their circumstances which lead to Raul’s removal.
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent the court finds that nothing has prevented respondents from maintaining a meaningful relationship with their child. The lack of a meaningful relationship is not due to any unreasonable interference by DCF, foster mother, or any other third party. The failure of this family to reunite falls squarely on the shoulders of Rachel and Coleman, who by their inability or unwillingness to engage in services have split this family apart. DCF has taken all reasonable steps to reunify Raul with Rachel and Coleman.
2 Best Interests
CT Page 15891 With respect to the best interests of the child as contemplated by General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2), based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Rachel L. and Coleman S. is in Raul’s best interest. Raul is in a clean, safe, healthy and loving environment. Raul is in a therapeutic foster home where he is developing appropriately, given his diagnosis of autism, and has no physical health problems. Raul has a sense of permanency, consistency and stability with his current caretakers which is crucial for him right now.
Raul requires a competent caretaker that can address his behaviors due to his diagnosis of autism by providing him with routine, structure and consistency. Rachel and Coleman are unable to provide any of this for Raul. Neither parent has an understanding of Raul’s specialized needs and neither of them are willing to change their circumstances in order to gain the skills required to meet Raul’s specialized needs. In view of the fact that respondents are not in a position to care for Raul right now or at any reasonably foreseeable time in the future, termination of their parental rights is in Raul’s best interest.
In finding that termination of the respondents’ parental rights would be in Raul’s best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including his interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment; his length of stay in foster care; the nature of his relationship with his foster parents, and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents; and his genetic bond to the respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced Raul’s intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with his biological parents. Se Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child’s physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establish that termination of respondents’ parental rights is in Raul’s best interest.
With regard to permanency, the court considers the social studies and the testimony of the social workers which clearly indicate that Raul is in a stable environment where he is provided with the consistency and routine he needs, in light of his autism. He also has a sense of permanency which is crucial for him right now. Raul is entitled to resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as his parents by terminating CT Page 15892 respondents’ parental rights. After considering Raul’s sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment, his need to avoid future placements, and the totality of the circumstances, the court concludes that termination of respondents’ parental rights is in his best interest.
C REVIEW OF PERMANENCY PLAN
Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) and Practice Book § 35a-14, on March 29, 2007, the petitioner filed a Motion to Review Permanency Plan of Raul L. In her motion, the petitioner requested the court to review and approve the plan for termination of parental rights and adoption of Raul. Raul was committed to DCF on December 11, 2006 and his commitment was maintained until further order of the court. On April 12, 2007, the respondent mother filed an objection to the permanency plan and on April 24, 2007, the court, Dannehy J., consolidated the hearing on the permanency plan and the respondent mother’s objection with the termination of parental rights trial. With regard to the permanency plan filed on March 29, 2007, based upon all of the evidence submitted at trial, including but not limited to the social studies submitted in support of termination, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption is in Raul’s best interest and hereby approves the plan. The court also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan. The court further finds, by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts towards reunification with respondents, mother and father are no longer required. All objections to the permanency plan are hereby overruled.
VI CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
Based on the findings that have been made by clear and convincing evidence and considering the seven factors set forth in the previous section, it is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of the respondent mother, Rachel L., because she has failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i); and respondent father Coleman S., because he has abandoned Raul within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A); and has no ongoing parent-child relationship with Raul within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(D), be and hereby are terminated, and that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the purpose of placing the child in CT Page 15893 adoption. A permanency plan shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoption is finalized.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ORDERED this October 2, 2008.
CT Page 15894