Timothy Townsend v. Lisa Fontano
CV 105033495
Decided: January 13, 2012
The plaintiff, Timothy Townsend, Jr. is representing himself in this matter. ? He seeks a Prejudgment Remedy Attachment against property owned by Lisa Fontana. ? Fontana is a corrections officer, and Townsend alleges that his claims against her are only in her individual capacity. ? Fontana now moves to dismiss the present action on the grounds of sovereign immunity and statutory immunity.1??By way of an amended complaint, which was served on Fontana and filed in May 2011, Townsend alleges the following relevant facts which occurred on or about October 2009. ? The plaintiff, an incarcerated individual, was transferred from MacDougall?Walker Correctional Institution to Cheshire Correctional Institution. ? At the time he was transferred, the defendant was working as a property officer in the Cheshire Correctional Institution. ? The defendant deprived him of his property after he initially refused to sign incomplete inventory forms and illegal ?Release from R.H.U.? (restrictive housing unit) forms. ? The property of which the plaintiff was deprived included clean clothing, medication and toiletries. ? He was therefore unable to shower for several days, and he suffered severe stomach problems, because he was unable to take his medication. ? The plaintiff eventually signed an inventory form and a ?Release from R.H.U.? form in order to receive his property, although he wrote the following disclaimer on the latter: ??I did not get to check my property myself so I reserve the right to claim missing item if the matrix is incorrect.?
The present action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ??1983,2?and alleges that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments by intentionally withholding his ?basic human needs and medication? in order to force him to sign incomplete and illegal forms. ? The defendant filed the present motion to dismiss and a memorandum of law in support thereof, seeking to dismiss ?the complaint in its entirety,? on August 23, 2011. ? The plaintiff, in turn, filed his objection to the present motion on September 22, 2011. ? The matter was heard at short calendar on September 26, 2011. ? During short calendar, the plaintiff submitted several exhibits in support of his objection to the court.
The defendant argues that the court must evaluate the present motion in accordance with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), in which the Supreme Court determined: ??To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face ? A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged ? The plausibility standard is not akin to the ?probability requirement,? but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully ? Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.? ?(Citations omitted; ?internal quotation marks omitted.) ? The defendant relies upon Ashcroft v. Iqbal for the proposition that the court is ?not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.? ?Id., 1950.
The motion to dismiss at issue in Ashcroft v. Iqbal however, was filed in federal court. ? Therefore, the complaint was evaluated in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that ?a pleading must contain a ?short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.? ?? Id., 1949. ? In contrast, at issue in the present motion is not whether the plaintiff has met the applicable pleading requirements but rather whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present action. ??A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.? ?(Internal quotation marks omitted.) ?Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009). ??Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.? ?St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). ??Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] ??4?165, implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.? ?(Internal quotation marks omitted.) ?Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). ??When a ? court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ? In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.? ?(Internal quotation marks omitted.) ?Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 211, 897 A.2d 71 (2006).
The defendant argues that sovereign immunity bars the present action because the defendant was acting in her official capacity and within the scope of her employment at all times relevant to the present action, and because ?a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state,? which ?cannot be sued without its consent.? ?(Internal quotation marks omitted.) ?Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). ? The defendant also argues that statutory immunity bars the present action because General Statutes ??4?165(a) provides: ??No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment. ? Any person having a complaint for such injury or damage shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter.? ? The complaint alleges that ?[t]his lawsuit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [??]1983? and that the plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the defendant ?in her Individual Capacity Only.?
In Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133, 913 A.2d 415 (2007), a former inmate filed a ??1983 action against a former warden in his individual capacity, and the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds because ?federal sovereign immunity law, rather than state sovereign immunity law, applies to actions under ??1983.? ? In affirming the trial court decision, the Supreme Court noted: ??The United States Supreme Court has asserted that [f]ederal law is enforceable in state courts ? because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature ? State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under ??1983 ? Nevertheless, [c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under ? ??1983 ? cannot be immunized by state law. ? A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; ?and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced ? The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law ? We have embraced these principles in our decisions as well.? ?(Citations omitted; ?internal quotation marks omitted.) ?Id., 133?34.
The court then considered whether ?the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint [were] insufficient to defeat [the defendant’s sovereign immunity] defense.? ?Id., 138?39. ? It concluded: ??[S]tate officials sued for money damages in their official capacities are not ?persons’ within the meaning of ??1983 because the action against them is one against the office and, thus, no different from an action against the state itself ? State officials are, however, ?persons’ within the meaning of ??1983 and may be personally liable when sued as individuals for actions taken in their official capacities and, thus, under color of law ? In this case, the plaintiff’s complaint is unambiguous. ? It states that the defendant ?is sued in his individual capacity.? ? Such an articulation of the defendant’s capacity is sufficient to commence a ??1983 claim against a state officer in his individual capacity ? We therefore conclude that the plaintiff’s action is against the defendant in his individual capacity, and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff’s claim.? ?(Citations omitted.) ?Id., 141. ? The court further rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court should have ?analyze[d] the plaintiff’s complaint to determine if, in fact, the state was the real party in interest? because ?the plaintiff’s alleged failure to state a claim? and the imposition of ?sovereign immunity as a bar to that claim? were ?separate and distinct claims,? the former of which was ?best saved for the merits of the plaintiff’s case.? ?Id., 145, 146?47.
Applying the reasoning in Sullins v. Rodriguez, this court denies the present motion for the reason that state sovereign immunity law, which is the only stated basis for the present motion, does not bar the present action. ? In this action, the plaintiff alleges a violation of ??1983 against the defendant in her individual capacity only. ??Whether the pleaded facts are sufficient to establish liability does not bear upon our analysis of whether, under federal substantive law, the defendant has been sued in his individual capacity.? ?Id., 147. ? The defendant’s argument that she was acting in her official capacity and within the scope of her employment at all times relevant to the present action is therefore irrelevant to the resolution of the present motion. ? Furthermore, the court will not presently consider whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under federal law, because ?[i]t is for the official to claim that his conduct was justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was lawful,? by way of an affirmative defense. ? Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). ? See also Crooker v. Allen, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5011602 (March 27, 2008, Dubay, J.); ? Townsend v. Fedes, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 4032993 (February 20, 2008, Bentivegna, J.).
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Robinson, A., J.
FOOTNOTES
FN1.?The defendant initially moved to dismiss the present action on three grounds, but she withdrew the third ground?that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies?during the September 26, 2011 oral argument on the matter..??FN1.?The defendant initially moved to dismiss the present action on three grounds, but she withdrew the third ground?that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies?during the September 26, 2011 oral argument on the matter.
FN2.?Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: ??Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ?.??FN2.?Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: ??Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ?
Robinson, Angela C., J.