JANCO v. TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, 102-CRD-4-81 (9-13-82)


ROBERT P. JANCO, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE vs. TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT

CASE NO. 102-CRD-4-81Workers’ Compensation Commission
SEPTEMBER 13, 1982

The Claimant-Appellee was represented by Charles L. Flynn, Esq.

The Respondent-Appellant was represented by Noel Newman, Esq.

This Petition for Review from the October 27, 1981 Decision of the Commissioner for the Fourth District was argued May 21, 1982 before a Compensation Review Division Panel consisting of Commissioners John Arcudi, Edward Bradley and Gerald Kolinsky.

John Arcudi, Chairman John Arcudi Chairman

Edward Bradley, Commissioner Edward Bradley, Commissioner
Gerald Kolinsky, Commissioner Gerald Kolinsky, Commissioner

FINDING AWARD

1. The Finding and Award of the Commissioner is affirmed and adopted as the Finding and Award of this Division.

OPINION

Respondent-Appellant does not dispute the Finding of the Commissioner. It agrees that Claimant Janco passed a pre-employment physical evidencing no hypertension or heart disease and that he was then hired as a regular member of Fairfield’s paid police department October 2, 1956. Claimant while still so employed suffered a disabling heart condition January 21, 1977. He was retired on a disability retirement due to this heart condition November 1, 1977.

It is the Appellant Municipality’s contention however that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to award Section 7-433c
benefits as no written notice was sent the Town pursuant to Section 31-294 within a year of the injury. The Claimant-Appellee argues first that Chapter 568 procedures were not carried over into 7-433c when the General Assembly enacted that section in 1971 and that therefore the one year written notice requirement of Section 31-294 is not applicable. Appellee then argues that even if Section 31-294 were applicable, its requirements have been satisfied since the Town furnished medical attention within a year of the January, 1977 injury.

It is conceded that the Town did furnish medical attention through a fully financed Blue Cross and Blue Shield program. It also is true that within a year of the January, 1977 injury the claimant filed for a disability retirement pension because of his disabling heart condition, this filing being by written application. DeLeon vs. Jacob Brothers, 23-CRD-4-80, 7 C.L.T. No 52, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 18, affirmed by the Appellate Session Superior Court, 38 Conn. Sup. 331,[1] and Ciotti vs. Marani Tile Company, 35-CRD-4-80, (July 29, 1982) speak to the problem of furnishing medical attention through employer financed medical insurance plans. In both those cases a Commissioner’s finding that medical services within a year under such plans constituted the furnishing of medical attention was affirmed by the appellate tribunals. Those cases are therefore dispositive of the Appeal.

We do not therefore reach the more complex issue of whether all Chapter 568 procedural and liminal jurisdictional requirements are incorporated into the Section 7-433c language “shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same [manner as that provided under Chapter 568].”[**] What does [manner][**]
mean if it does not refer to the administrative and procedural parts of Chapter 568? Can it be that the General Assembly only meant by [manner] the weekly method of payment provided for in Chapter 568? Can it be that the legislature intended to permit a policeman or fireman to file a claim ten or twenty or more years after the disabling event? We will not here answer the question, but we do permit ourselves some strong doubts.

The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

[1] The Connecticut Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
[**] [EDITORS’ NOTE: THE TEXT CONTAINED WITHIN THE BRACKETS WAS UNDERLINED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT.]