BLACK v. LONDON EGAZARIAN ASSOCIATES, INC., 483 CRD-7-86 (6-29-88)


RENATA BLACK, Depen. Widow of HOWARD BLACK (Deceased), CLAIMANT-APPELLANT vs. LONDON EGAZARIAN ASSOCIATES, INC., EMPLOYER and AETNA LIFE CASUALTY CO., INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

CASE NO. 483 CRD-7-86Workers’ Compensation Commission
JUNE 29, 1988

The claimant was represented at the trial level by Bernard S. Black, Esq., and on appeal by Judith Rosenberg, Esq., Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin
Kuriansky.

The respondent-employer was represented by John F. Slane Jr., Esq. The respondent-insurer was represented by Lucas D. Strunk, Esq. and Jason Dodge, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.

This Petition for Review from the May 9, 1986 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner for the Seventh District was heard October 2, 1987 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and A. Thomas White, Jr.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.

Claimant’s decedent Howard Black died of a heart attack October 5, 1984 at the office of his employer. On December 2, 1984 the dependent widow mailed a letter to the employer stating “I would like to advise you that I intend to file for Workmen’s Compensation with regard to the death of my husband, who died of heart attack while at work on October 5, 1984”. The Seventh District Commissioner in his May 9, 1986 ruling found that Claimant had taken the envelope containing the letter to a United States Post Office in Tarrytown, N.Y. where she paid a fee of $1.55 in order to mail it certified mail — receipt requested. The commissioner found the envelope presented in evidence did not bear a certified mail number sticker or any stamp indicating that a return receipt was requested, and the return receipt portion of the green card (PS Form 3811, July 1982) affixed to the envelope was not completed in any way on its reverse side. He therefore denied Claimant’s Motion to Preclude since the service of the notice did not comply with Sec. 31-321, C.G.S. He concluded further that the December 2, 1984 letter also failed to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 31-294, C.G.S. as it was merely a statement of intention to file a claim for compensation at some time in the future. Claimant has appealed both rulings.

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss argues that the appeal is not from a final judgment and therefore is not proper. Sec. 31-301(a), C.G.S. provides in pertinent part, “At any time within ten days . . . after a decision of the commissioner upon a motion . . . either party may appeal therefrom to the compensation review division. . . .”. Thus, Sec. 31-301(a) vests the Compensation Review Division with the authority to review rulings on motions. Respondents rely on the procedural holding of Timothy v. Upjohn, 3 Conn. App. 162 (1985). We think that case refers to a court review not a statutorily defined administrative review. For court purposes, there must be a final judgment before appellate review of a Compensation Review Division decision may lie. The statute does not similarly limit the C.R.D.

However, the substantive holding of Timothy v. Upjohn, 150 CRD-3-82, 2 Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1 (1983) is relevant to the issues here. We held in that case that forfeiture of defenses contemplated by Sec. 31-297(b), C.G.S. required a strict compliance with the technical procedures of Sec. 31-321. See also, Fuller v. Central Paving Company, 655 CRD-1-87
(decided June 2, 1988); Brusca v. Color Tech, Inc., 50 CRD-7-81, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 81 (1986); Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 338 CRD-3-84, 2 Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133 (1985). Whether such compliance exists is a matter of factual determination for the trial commissioner. We will not disturb his conclusions “unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them”, Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 117-118 (1979); Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988). We think there was no such incorrect application of law or illegal or unreasonable inference.

Given our holding supporting the commissioner’s first ruling in denying Claimant’s Motion to Preclude, we need not decide whether the December 2 letter was a sufficient notice Section 31-297b purposes.

We affirm the Seventh District’s denial of Claimant’s Motion to Preclude.

Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and A. Thomas White, Jr. concur.