COLLINS v. SEAL PRODUCTS, 702 CRD-5-88-3 (1-19-89)


EDWARD COLLINS, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE vs. SEAL PRODUCTS, EMPLOYER and AETNA LIFE CASUALTY, INSURER, RESPONDENT-APPELLANTS

CASE NO. 702 CRD-5-88-3Workers’ Compensation Commission
JANUARY 19, 1989

The claimant was represented by Edward T. Dodd Jr., Esq. and Ross T. Lessack, Esq.

The respondents were represented by Richard T. Stabnick, Esq. and Jason M. Dodge, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.

This Petition for Review from the February 26, 1988 Order Granting Motion to Preclude of the Commissioner for the Fifth District was heard August 19, 1988 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and A. Thomas White, Jr.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.

Claimant’s Motion to Preclude was granted by the Fifth District February 28, 1988. Respondents’ appeal alleges error in that (1) claimant’s notice of claim on which the Sec. 31-297(b), C.G.S. presumption was based did not conform to Sec. 31-294, C.G.S. requirements and (2) respondents’ disclaimer of liability was sufficiently specific to bar preclusion.

Claimant’s notice of claim dated October 21, 1986 received the next day states he “while in the employ of Seal, Inc. at Naugatuck, Conn. on 7/11/86 sustained injuries to his back”. On its face the notice does specify the date of injury and also the place and nature of injury. We do not agree with appellants that such notice fails to comply with Sec. 31-294. Moreover in the proceedings below, appellants never raised the issue. In fact, they seemed to have stipulated it was a proper notice. At any rate, we now rule the notice was sufficient, Yuknat v. State of Connecticut, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 274 CRD-2-83 (1986), aff’d, 9 Conn. App. 425 (1987) (per curiam).

Respondents’ second issue involves the specificity requirements under Sec. 31-297(b), Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338
(1973). This disclaimer received November 6, 1986 stated, “Alleged injuries sustained to back did not arise in and out of course of employment, no medicals to substantiate lost time”. This language is similar to the language employed in Wilcox v. Borough of Naugatuck, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 518 CRD-5-86 (1988), aff’d, 16 Conn. App. 676 (1988) (per curiam), which declared the grounds for contesting liability were “Employee did not sustain accidental injury as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Act. We deny the injury, and disability, and causal relation”. The instant language is also analogous to the language employed in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 617 CRD-4-87 (decided August 2, 1988), appeal filed, No. A.C. 7303 (App.Ct. August 16, 1988). In both Wilcox, supra, and Tovish, supra, we concluded that the grounds for the disclaimer lacked the specificity required under Menzies, supra. Based on those precedents we rule that respondents’ November 6, 1986 disclaimer is not sufficiently specific.

The appeal is dismissed and the Fifth District Order granting the claimant’s Motion to Preclude is affirmed.

Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and A. Thomas White, Jr. concur.