2003 Ct. Sup. 5703
No. FA 01 009 54 06Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown
April 30, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
PARKER, JUDGE.
Plaintiff, Diane L. Abood, seeks a dissolution of her marriage of almost 20 years to the defendant, John J. Abood, Jr. The parties were married in East Woodstock, Connecticut on May 14, 1983. Both have lived in Connecticut since then. The court has jurisdiction.
There are two children of the marriage, twins, John J. Abood, III, and Patricia Abood, both born on February 26, 1986.
No other children have been born to the plaintiff wife since the date of the marriage.
Neither the State of Connecticut or any town is contributing to the support of either party or the children.
Plaintiff is 47; defendant is 53.
Plaintiff states she is in good health. During much of the marriage term, she suffered from depression for which she was medicated. As of trial, she no longer was depressed and had not been for some five months. She has not used medication for depression for that period. The depression was caused, or at least largely fed, by the defendant’s attitude and conduct which caused the marriage breakdown.
The defendant has no known health problems; he apparently is in good health.
Plaintiff has a high school education. She also has a two-year degree as an executive secretary. She has not worked in such a role. She has no special skills for office work in today’s world. Plaintiff has worked periodically as a store clerk, done house cleaning and waitressing. She also has done babysitting for which she earned $130 per week; in 2001 she earned over $6,000 babysitting. CT Page 5704
Defendant is a college graduate. He is experienced in business and has run his own business for many years.
The marriage has not been a happy one almost from its beginning. Defendant is controlling and domineering and a poor communicator. He was not amenable to discussion of the issues which arose during the marriage. When matters did not go his way, he made it abundantly clear that he did not like it and made life miserable for the family. This promoted his getting his way because plaintiff and the children succumbed to his wishes to avoid the inevitable unpleasantness resulting from his not getting his way.
Finances were a problem. Defendant dominated the parties’ finances. Plaintiff was given little control. She was kept largely in the dark about the finances. Defendant was secretive. He kept the family’s financial records in a locked desk; plaintiff only had access if she happened to find the key. Defendant would move the location of the key and not tell plaintiff where he had placed the key. For example, he prepared the income tax returns and usually had plaintiff sign the returns before all the necessary entries had been made. When plaintiff asked to see a completed return, defendant told her to come to his office. Plaintiff did not know what her husband earned.
Plaintiff was given a weekly sum for groceries, children’s expenses, etc. Defendant often reviewed the shopping lists plaintiff prepared and then had her delete items which he did not think should be purchased. What should or should not be purchased became the subject of contention occasioning further unpleasantness.
Defendant was often critical of the children and his verbal criticisms demoralized them. The children would not have dinner with their parents because of the inevitable hurt which occurred because of defendant’s criticisms, often sarcastic and degrading, of the children.
The court finds defendant’s attitude and conduct were by far the substantial cause of the breakdown of the marriage.
Determining defendant’s income has been difficult. He is self-employed as an “executive recruiter.” He owns Triad Resources, a company through which he conducts his business as an “executive recruiter.”
Plaintiff urges the court to find defendant has an income or earning capacity of well over $70,000 per year. Plaintiff says: “As recently as 1998, [defendant] reported $73,000 in taxable income.” [Underscoring added.] Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Amended Claims CT Page 5705 For Relief, May 15, 2002, p. 2. [118] As evidence thereof, plaintiff points to the parties’ 1998 federal income tax return. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5. The 1998 federal tax return shows the “taxable income” as $16,975! Exhibit 5, Form 1040 (1998), Line 39. In that return, Schedule C, Line 1, defendant reported gross receipts of $72,950. Of course, gross income is not the measure for alimony or child support. Morris v. Morris, 262 Conn. 299, 305-07 (January 14, 2003); and, Lefebve v. Lefebve, 75 Conn. App. 662, 666 (March 25, 2003).
Moreover, the 1998 income tax return, Exhibit 5, shows, on Schedule C, Line 31, the net profit as $33,202. Net Profit is the amount of earnings realized by defendant as reported to the Internal Revenue Service.
The court cannot predicate a finding regarding defendant’s income solely on the 1998 federal tax return.
The federal tax returns for other years which are in evidence, 1999, 2000, and 2001, show far lower gross receipts and net profits. For example, the 1999 return shows a gross receipts of only $23,500 and a net profit of $15. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6. In 2000, the gross receipts were reported as $20,500; the gross profit $23. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7. For 2001, the return shows $39,290 for gross receipts and a net profit of $8,315. Defendant’s Exhibit I.
The court is well aware that Schedule C entries are readily susceptible to manipulation and contrivance. The court finds the federal tax returns in evidence do not provide evidence reliable enough to predicate a finding of defendant’s earnings or earning capacity as of the time of trial.
Plaintiff, in order to show defendant’s income or earning capacity, introduced an exhibit which purports to show the monthly expenses. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 22. It was handwritten by defendant sometime in the year 2000. The expenses were itemized and came to $6,000 per month. Notations are to the effect that the parties would need pre-tax income of $100,000 per year to cover expenses. Plaintiff argues that this exhibit proves defendant had an income of $100,000 per year. Defendant testified that the parties discussed what would be needed after their divorce; their expenditures were listed. Defendant was the source of these expense figures; plaintiff had no knowledge of them. Based on these expenses, according to defendant, he estimated he would need a pre-tax income of $100,000 annually. He denied that the entries indicate he had earnings of $100,000 annually. Plaintiff’s testimony about Exhibit 22 demonstrates at best a muddled understanding and/or recollection of the exhibit. (4/17/02, pp. 8-13) Plaintiff was asked: “Where did that figure, CT Page 5706 $100,000, come from for gross income?” She responded: “I don’t know. I don’t know.” (4/17/02, p. 12.) Plaintiff did not testify she thought he made that much. Plaintiff never testified defendant told her he made $100,000 per year; she was not asked that question! And, the expenses appear too inflated. There is no evidence defendant ever earned anywhere near $100,000 per year, the amount needed to support family/household expenditures of $6,000 per month.
The court believes defendant’s explanation of the origins and purpose of Exhibit 22. The court cannot find on the basis of the evidence, including Exhibit 22, that defendant earned, or had an earning capacity of $100,000 per year.
In affidavits filed earlier in this action, defendant reported employment gross weekly income of $756 per week, and a net of $544. Exhibits 23 (9/22/01) and 24 (1/9/02). However, on the day of trial, his affidavit disclosed a gross weekly employment income of only $230.77, interest and dividend income of $71.35 ($71.55). He reported a net weekly income of $272.24. Affidavit of defendant dated April 16, 2002. [114] The court does not believe this.
Defendant has proposed paying initially $100 per week alimony. Defendant’s Proposed Orders, April 16, 2002, ¶ 8. And, he also proposes to pay child support in accordance with the child support guidelines and to continue to carry the medical insurance for the children. Id., ¶ s 2 and 3. Defendant’s Post-Trial Memorandum, June 10, 2002, had attached a child support guidelines worksheet. In this worksheet, defendant represented he should pay $190 per week child support and 65% of any unreimbursed medical expense. The court treats this as a judicial admission that he is capable of and can afford to pay these amounts. Defendant cannot expect the court to believe he can pay this alimony ($100 per week), child support (at least $190 per week), and support himself on the income reported on the April 16, 2002 affidavit, a net weekly income of $272.24. The obvious inference is that defendant knows he has an income or earning capacity in excess of the amount shown on his April 16, 2002 affidavit.
The difficulty lies in finding his actual income or earning capacity.
The court finds that defendant’s employment income is at the least, $755 per week gross, and $544 net. See Defendant’s Financial Affidavit, January 9, 2002. Exhibit 24. With the interest and dividend income of $71.35 reported on his April 16, 2002 affidavit, the court finds defendant has a net weekly income in the order of $615. The court uses this amount in setting alimony and child support. CT Page 5707
Plaintiff also submitted a child support guidelines worksheet dated April 16, 2002. The court cannot not accept it as meaningful. The important constituent numbers have little or no foundation in the evidence.
Plaintiff reports she has no income. However, she testified she had been making in the order of $130 per week from babysitting. The court uses that figure as her gross weekly income for the purposes of determining the child support and alimony.
The court finds the weekly gross income of the plaintiff to be $130 and the defendant $755. The plaintiff’s net weekly income is $110 and the defendant’s is $615. According to the guidelines, the combined income of $725 calls for a joint obligation of $253 per week. Defendant’s portion is 81.45% or $206. Defendant’s portion of the unremimbursed medical expenses is 56%, plaintiff’s is 44%.
Defendant’s management and control of the finances was marked by machinations designed to obfuscate and deceive.
Plaintiff says his mother gave him well over $400,000 before she died. This money was held in an account or accounts at Smith Barney (or at times Salomon Smith Barney). Defendant managed that money for her and paid her expenses. When his mother died, according to defendant, as per instructions from his mother, he kept the money for his and his three siblings’ benefit. Again according to defendant this money was to be shared by the four children equally. His mother died years ago. Defendant has not even suggested why he had not distributed the shares to each of siblings soon after her death. For many years, defendant reported the income therefrom to the taxing authorities on his and his wife’s joint income tax returns. Thus, plaintiff and defendant were liable for the income tax from this income. Plaintiff and defendant paid the income taxes on the income generated by the fund. Defendant says he took enough money from the fund to cover the taxes. Defendant has not pointed out where in the voluminous records before the court the withdrawals from the fund were made to him to cover the taxes. There are no intelligible records in evidence to corroborate defendant’s claim that he withdrew money from the fund to pay the income taxes arising by virtue of the parties’ apparent ownership of the fund.
Defendant has been deceptive, indeed fraudulent, about the money he received from his mother. This money, over $400,000, had been held by plaintiff and defendant jointly. Then, unbeknownst to plaintiff, defendant transferred it all to his brother to put same out of his (defendant’s) CT Page 5708 estate. Later, his brother transferred it back to defendant alone; this when the brother thought he was in some kind of financial trouble which might expose these funds to his creditor (s). In 2001, defendant had the monthly statements from Smith Barney sent to his office so plaintiff could not see them. And, more recently, April 2001, defendant directed Smith Barney to transfer all of the funds to his brother. At that time, the fund amounted to approximately $388,000. The broker (Smith Barney) transferred most of the fund — approximately $327,000 to the brother in April 2001 and the remainder in July 2001. Defendant acknowledged he caused the transfer in order to circumvent the automatic orders which would prohibit such transfers. Plaintiff seeks an order directing that one-half of the fund so transferred be set over to her. The transfer of the funds, if they were owned by the parties, or by the defendant alone, should be set aside.
However, the court believes the defendant’s testimony that the funds after his mother’s death actually belonged to the four siblings equally. The record does not reveal when the mother died.
Defendant claims his share was $127,000 and that he had received his share before he had the remaining funds transferred to his brother. Defendant prepared an exhibit showing the withdrawals from the Smith Barney account and to whom these were disbursed, i.e., his mother, his brother, himself, his sister, and a niece. Exhibit D. That exhibit shows defendant received $127,803. It also shows that he had received $111,274 as of the end of 2000. And, according to the exhibit, the withdrawals paid to all the recipients as of the end of 2000 totaled $383,804. Yet, a Salomon Smith Barney statement shows the net value of the account as of December 31, 2000, was $419,650.98. See Salomon Smith Barney Preferred Client FMA Statement November 27 December 31, 2000. Defendant’s Exhibit D shows withdrawals/disbursements of $20,052 to defendant and his niece during the period January through May 31, 2001. Yet, the Salomon Smith Barney statement for the period ending May 31, 2001 shows the portfolio’s net value as $69,937.18. Exhibit H. The court recognizes the fund was subject to market fluctuations. However, the court has been unable to make sense of these figures. This tends to cast doubt on defendant’s evidence regarding the Smith Barney funds.
After the close of the evidence, the court realized the evidence, particularly about the money received from defendant’s mother and placed in the Smith Barney account was confusing. It had been placed in evidence during the afternoon of the previous day, April 16, 2002. The court therefore asked the parties to submit briefs detailing the evidentiary basis, transcript cites and exhibits. The court stated: CT Page 5709
THE COURT: Now I will. One of you, I think it was Attorney Gillin, indicated she wanted oral argument. I’m going to need a lot of help on this case, far beyond oral argument. I’d like briefs and proposed findings of facts and I want an evidentiary base.
I mean, at this point, I have no idea what to put down for the incomes of these people. They’re all over the lot. For instance, is his income, do I have an evidentiary base to find his income is $100,000 a year?
I mean, that’s the type of thing. The gut facts here. And then this whole megillah of the Smith Barney accounts and the other ones, Alliance and whatever they are. The evidence is plenty clear that the parties told the United States Government for a number of years it was their money. Is that binding on the Court even though there’s been some other evidence that it wasn’t their money or all of it wasn’t?
These questions just don’t come out of my imagination. They’re the gut issues in this case.
So having given you — how much time do you want for briefs? I’m going to need chapter and verse. The evidentiary base for the findings you want me to make.
Transcript of Proceedings, April 12, 2002, p. 14.
The parties thereafter submitted briefs. Plaintiff claims $194,000 should be set over to her as her share of the Smith Barney money. Yet plaintiff did not challenge or analyze the exhibit evidence introduced by the defendant which showed the disposition of the funds. Plaintiff continued to claim that all of the Smith Barney funds belonged to plaintiff and defendant jointly. The court finds that defendant’s mother entrusted her funds to defendant and that he was to distribute same to her four children equally. The evidence shows substantial money was distributed to defendant’s siblings well before this dissolution action was in the offing. And, plaintiff’s testimony regarding the ownership of the Smith Barney funds was less than resolute. The court infers that plaintiff, by not setting forth an analysis of the evidence relating to the Smith Barney account in her briefs, conceded, at least implicitly, that defendant’s evidence on the ownership of the money received from his mother could not be refuted.
The court finds that neither plaintiff nor defendant had an interest in Smith Barney funds after May 2001. The transfer to his brother of the funds did not violate the court’s automatic orders since he was not served until June 4, 2000. See Return of Service, June 4, 2001. The CT Page 5710 authorization to transfer took place before the service of the automatic orders. Most of the funds were actually transferred before the date of service. However, since the defendant admittedly authorized the transfer to circumvent the automatic orders, the transfer could be nullified if the funds belonged to the plaintiff and defendant or the defendant alone. Since the court has found neither party had any right or interest in the funds when transferred, nothing is gained by ordering a revocation of the transfer and a return of the funds to defendant or to plaintiff and defendant. Nothing said here should be taken as any approval by the court of defendant’s actions. Those actions have done much to lessen his credibility in the eyes of the court.
Defendant has proposed he pay alimony of $100 per week for 30 months, and $150 per week for the following 30 months. This is an acknowledgment by defendant that he is capable of paying these amounts. The court will set alimony in these amounts but not for the terms defendant proposes. A considerably greater period of time is justified because of the relatively small estate which will pass to plaintiff under the terms of this judgment. The amount available for distribution to plaintiff is far less than that which it should be. In the court’s view, the defendant has manipulated — depleted — the parties’ finances deliberately so the amount available has been lessened significantly. In the last few years, and since it became evident that a dissolution action was imminent, defendant’s business income has dried up. The court is skeptical of defendant’s reasons for this.
In the same vein, the parties’ principal assets have been depleted. The accounts held at various banks and the like have been consumed since the initiation of this action. Plaintiff appears to have assented to this but hers was not an informed decision. Plaintiff is quite unsophisticated about financial matters and totally naive in such matters. Plaintiff did not realize the extent to which these funds were being depleted. Defendant well knew what was being done.
As required by statute, the court has considered “the opportunity of each [of the parties] for future acquisition of capital assets and income.” Plaintiff has but a limited prospect for significant earnings in the future. Nothing else, being on the horizon, it is unlikely she will acquire significant capitol assets in the future.
Defendant, on the other hand, has the capacity to earn far more than he claims he earned in 2001 and the first three and a half months of 2002. No good reason has been shown why he cannot earn at a level at least equal to what he had until a few years ago. Correspondingly, his opportunity to acquire capitol assets is relatively good. CT Page 5711
Defendant had made in the order of $78,000 per year. This dissolution had been in the offing for some years including 1998. Defendant’s earnings have gone way down since 1998. The reasons defendant has advanced for the decline in earnings are not entirely credible. The court believes the sharp decline in defendant’s income is directly related to the financial prospects of the dissolution action. His low earnings enabled the scheme to consume assets to leave plaintiff penniless.
The value of the parties’ residence has been disputed. Plaintiff claims it is worth only $145,000. Plaintiff has presented abundant credible evidence that the property is rundown from lack of maintenance and is in severe disrepair. The evidence strongly demonstrates it would supply Bob Villa with material for show episodes for many months.
At trial, defendant claims the property had a fair market value of $225,000. Defendant’s Financial Affidavit, April 16, 2002. [114] In earlier affidavits filed in this action, he had valued the property at $175,000, Exhibit 23, d. 9/22/2001, and, $225,000. Exhibit 24, d. 1/9/2002 [114].
Defendant attempts to explain this lately enhanced value; a real estate agent had made an appraisal and told him it was worth $225,000. The “agent” did not testify; there is no report or the like from the “agent” in evidence. Nor is the “agent” identified. The court rejects the defendant’s claim regarding the value of the real estate.
The court finds the value of the parties’ residence is in the order of $145,000.
Defendant contributed generously to his retirement account; $7,000 in 1998, $5,000 in 1999, and $5,000 in 2000. Exhibits 5, 6, and 7.
When plaintiff told defendant she wanted a divorce, she wasn’t concerned about the financial aspects. “Because at that time, we had a lot of money in the bank and I wasn’t worried about it. We had a ton of money that I — or at least I assumed we did. I never thought twice about it. “I don’t know what bills are.” And I don’t have any idea what our bills are because I never opened the envelopes.” [Transcript of Proceedings, April 17, 2002, p. 11]
The parties had savings investments; three certificates of deposit at the First Union Bank and the Alliance Capital Mutual Fund account. These were, for the most part, if not all, funded by money received from the Smith Barney account. CT Page 5712
Near the time this action was begun, defendant told plaintiff they would have to invade their savings to live on. He said they should initially draw upon the three First Union Bank certificates of deposit; then if needed to use the Alliance Capital mutual fund money.
Plaintiff testified she told defendant “if he needed to, take money out of the bank — to pay household expenses.” (Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 2002, 74.) When asked if that included certificates of deposit, plaintiff said: “I told him to do what he needed to do.” (Id., 75.)
At the time of these discussions plaintiff thought that defendant might take “two or three weeks worth, two or three thousand dollars.” Plaintiff acknowledges she was naive. (Id., p. 76.) Clearly, she did not anticipate the extent to which the funds were withdrawn and consumed. Defendant probably knew plaintiff would not realize the extent.
Defendant then withdrew all the money represented by the three certificates of deposit. He withdrew $13,960.14 on October 1, 2001; $14,078.97 on December 7, 2001, and then $7,054.62 on January 7, 2002. The withdrawals from the certificates of deposit totaled $35,093.73. Exhibits 17, 15, and 19. These withdrawals were deposited into a Liberty Bank checking account, an account defendant used for both his business and personal banking. [Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 2002, p. 158.]
The Alliance account as of June 30, 2001 had a balance of $52,768.95. Exhibit 13. As of December 30, 2001 it was down to $46,306.58 due to the market. Exhibit C.
At trial defendant said the Alliance account had a then value of approximately $24,000. [Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 2002, p. 113.] Defendant acknowledged that $30,000 had been taken from the Alliance account. (Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 2001, p. 131.) Therefore, between January 1, 2002 and April 16, 2002, three and a half months, defendant withdrew $30,000 from the Alliance Capital Fund.
According to defendant the proceeds of First Union certificate of deposits ($35,091.73) and the Alliance Fund withdrawals ($30,000) were deposited to the account (s) at the Liberty Bank.
As of September 12, 2001, there was approximately $24,000 at the Liberty Bank. [Exhibit 23; Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 2002, p. 136.] As of trial, according to defendant’s estimate, only $7,500 CT Page 5713 remained in the Liberty Bank account (s). Between September 12, 2001 and April 16, 2002, defendant withdrew some $16,500 of the Liberty Bank money which had been there on September 12, 2001.
The court of limited wisdom is unable to fathom how $24,000 in the Liberty Bank on September 12, 2001, $35,093.73 from the certificates of deposit, and $30,000 from the Alliance Fund, became only $7,500 at the time of trial in April 2002. The court does not know just when the $16,500 was taken from the Liberty Bank except that it was during the period between September 12, 2001 and April 16, 2002.
The court was told by defendant the household expenses were $2,000 a month. [Transcript of Proceedings, April 16, 2002, p. .] There was $24,000 in the Liberty Bank on September 12, 2001. The first invasion of the certificate of deposit was on October 1, 2001. So by April 16, 2002, a period of barely seven months (September 12, 2001 to April 16, 2002), $81,593.73 had been dissipated. [$35,093.73 (certificates of deposit) + $30,000 (Alliance Fund) + $24,000 (Liberty Bank) $7,500 (Liberty Bank).]
Defendant said he used the Liberty Bank for his business expenses too. But even this hardly accounts for the money. His total business expenses for all of 2001 were slightly under $31,000. Exhibit 11. Household expenses paid by plaintiff amounted to $2,000 per month for seven months or $14,000. Business expenses for half a year would be roughly $16,000 at most. Thus, only $30,000 of $81,593.73 is even remotely “accounted for.” The court realizes there may have been other legitimate expenditures during this critical seven-month period. Defendant has not been forthcoming about the other roughly $51,000.
The court acknowledges its arithmetic does not have decimal place accuracy. But its finding of a discrepancy of $51,000 ±, warrants some explanation. Defendant could and should have been source of the explanation. He has not produced it or even given a pass at doing so.
Had he wanted to, defendant could have. He certainly knows how to. He presented a detailed exposition of the expenditures from mid-1999 to mid-2001. He presented all the bank statements and copies of the checks for that period. He prepared a synopsis of same. See Exhibits E, F, and G. This was done to convince the court how the Smith Barney funds were used and who got that money. He has not done anything like that for the relevant period — the time elapsing from the time he was served with the complaint (and related papers initiating this action (June 4, 2001) and the trial (April 2002). Why? CT Page 5714
Plaintiff testified: “. . . A long time ago John told me that if I ever divorced him, he would leave me penniless.” (Tr. 4/16/2002, p. 69.) The court believes defendant said this to plaintiff. And, he did his level best to do so. The court is not inclined to believe the dissipation of the parties’ funds in roughly seven months is the product of innocent coincidence. Defendant controlled the funds, he had the knowledge of their use, etc. He had the means and knowledge to inform the court of this important information. He did not. The court wondered why. But not forever. The court infers the missing information would not have favored the defendant.
The following orders shall enter:
ORDERS
The judgment shall provide:
1. The marriage of the parties is dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown.
2. The parties shall have joint custody of the two children; primary residence shall be with the plaintiff wife.
3. Defendant shall have reasonable rights of visitation.
4. Defendant shall pay child support to plaintiff in the amount of $191 per week.
5. Defendant shall maintain medical insurance for the children in the same form as was in effect at the time of trial, April 2002, or at least equal thereto. Unreimbursed medical expenses beyond $200 per year shall be paid by the parties as follows: plaintiff — 47%; defendant — 53%.
6. Defendant shall transfer all his right title and interest in the marital home, 56 Ironworks Road, Clinton, to the plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter shall be solely responsible for the first mortgage current taxes, insurance, etc., and shall hold defendant harmless thereon. If any of the above are not current as of this time, an application may be made to the court for a determination of the parties’ respective responsibility for the amounts overdue or arrearage (s). Defendant shall be solely responsible for the second mortgage and shall hold plaintiff harmless thereon. Defendant shall be liable to plaintiff for any and all loss occasioned to her by reason of the second mortgage and any failure to satisfy the obligations of the second mortgage. CT Page 5715
7. Defendant shall vacate the residence forthwith and in no event by later than 10 days from the date of this judgment.
8. Defendant shall pay plaintiff alimony of $100 per week through June 2004. Thereafter, defendant shall pay plaintiff alimony of $150 per week. This alimony obligation shall not terminate on plaintiff’s remarriage. It shall not be modifiable as to term. It shall be modifiable only to increase the amount of the alimony to be paid plaintiff.
9. Each party shall retain the automobile he/she is presently using and shall have sole ownership thereof. Each party shall execute any and all papers necessary to effect same.
10. Plaintiff shall retain sole ownership of the Equi-Vest IRA retirement account shown on her April 16, 2002 financial affidavit, Section 4. G. [113]
11. Defendant shall transfer to plaintiff all his right, title and interest in the “Equitable Retirement Plan (as of last statement, a value of $149,707.72” shown on his April 16, 2002 financial affidavit, Section 4. G. [114] Defendant shall pay plaintiff, in addition, any diminution in value thereof resulting from anything other than that due to market fluctuations. Defendant shall execute and deliver forthwith any and all documents necessary to effect same forthwith.
12. The parties shall share equally the amounts in the Alliance Fund. If the parties cannot agree on the amount thereof or, if either party claims that some or all of such funds have been expended for household expenses since the time of trial, either party may apply to the court for a determination of an equitable resolution of the provisions of this paragraph.
13. The parties shall share equally amounts, if any, held in the Liberty Bank as of April 17, 2002. If the parties cannot agree on the amount thereof or, if either party claims that some or all of such funds have been expended for household expenses since the time of trial, either party may apply to the court for a determination of an equitable resolution of the provisions of this paragraph.
14. The defendant shall own free and clear of any claim of plaintiff his business known as Triad Resources. However this provision shall not prevent plaintiff from pursuing this asset if necessary to enforce any provision of this judgment. CT Page 5716
15. Defendant shall hold plaintiff harmless for any and all federal and state income tax liability, including principal, interest, penalties, etc. for all years when the parties filed jointly.
16. Defendant shall be solely liable between the parties for the debts shown on their affidavits to the Peoples Bank (VISA), Capital One Bank, CitiBank, and Bank America. Defendant shall hold plaintiff harmless thereon.
18. Defendant shall provide plaintiff with a copy of each tax return including each schedule and other appendices, and all other material sent to a taxing authority, submitted to any taxing authority within one week of his sending same to the taxing authority. Defendant shall also account to plaintiff on a semi-annual basis for all his financial transactions. This must be done by August 1st for the period ending the preceding July 31 and by February 1 for the period ending the preceding December 31. These accountings will include, at the least, tax returns, etc., business profit and loss statements, including supporting documents, wage documents and the like, personal and business income and expense statements (including supporting documentation), and any and all material and information reasonably necessary for a determination of defendant’s financial situation.
19. Counsel shall prepare the judgment file.
Parker, J. CT Page 5717