CASE NO. 1003 CRD-2-90-4Workers’ Compensation Commission
OCTOBER 1, 1991
The claimant was represented by Marvin M. Horwitz, Esq., Horwitz, Maruzo Benson.
The respondent was represented by Frank A. Manfredi, Esq., Cotter, Greenfield, Manfredi, P.C.
The Second Injury Fund was represented at the trial level by Gerard Rucci, Esq., Assistant Attorney General. The Fund did not provide a brief in this appeal. Oral argument was waived by the claimant and the respondent.
This Petition for Review from the April 6, 1990 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Second District was decided on the basis of papers submitted for the February 22, 1991 hearing before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.
The respondent Second Injury Fund has appealed the Second District Finding that claimant’s June 24, 1983 right ankle injury occurred in the course of employment. The appeal attacks the findings that (1) the respondent’s spouse “was cloaked with authority to direct the claimant to perform work on behalf of the respondent,” and (2) at the time of the injury claimant was performing work requested by the respondent’s spouse.
No Motion to Correct has been filed. Thus, the facts as found by the trial commissioner must stand. Mack v. Blake Drug Co., 152 Conn. 523 (1965). That omission alone would be a sufficient basis for us to affirm the commissioner’s ruling. But assuming that a Motion to Correct had been filed, the evidence supports the facts found.
Respondent owned a lawn and landscaping business in Norwich and had engaged the claimant at various times to perform work. Respondent’s wife, Sherry O’Connell, acted as part time bookkeeper for the business. She kept the motor vehicle registrations for the business vehicles and received cash payments from customers. On June 24, 1983 she telephoned claimant’s home and left a message that claimant and a co-worker were to finish some jobs already started. On that date respondent was incarcerated and was unable directly to supervise his business.
Therefore the trial commissioner found that respondent’s spouse was cloaked with apparent authority and was acting as respondent’s agent in directing claimant to perform that work. Our review may only determine whether the trial commissioner correctly applied the law to the facts as so found.
Apparent authority is “that semblance of authority which a principal, through his own act or inadvertences causes or allows third persons to believe his agent possesses.” Lewis v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Conn. 660, 665 (1967) (citation omitted). Further
Our cases make it clear that apparent authority is to be determined, not by the agent’s own acts, but by the acts of his principal. And the acts of the principal must be such that (1) the principal held the agent out as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the act in question, or knowingly permitted him to act as having such authority, and (2) in consequence thereof the person dealing with the agent, acting in good faith, reasonably believed, under all the circumstances, that the agent had the necessary authority.
Nowak v. Capitol Motors, Inc., 158 Conn. 65, 69 (1969) (citations omitted).
Those precedents support the legal conclusion which the commissioner drew from the facts and the evidence. We therefore affirm the Second District and dismiss the Fund’s appeal. Pursuant to Sec. 31-301c(b) we grant interest at the rate permitted by statute on any amount remaining unpaid during the pendency of the appeal.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle concur.