2007 Ct. Sup. 13772
No. FA 06-4021189SConnecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
August 6, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
CONSTANCE L. EPSTEIN, J.
This action for dissolution of marriage and other relief was brought to the judicial district of Hartford with a return date of February 21, 2006. At the trial of this matter, the court heard and observed the witnesses and reviewed and considered this evidence, as well as the exhibits. In addition, the court considered and applied the criteria, mandates and directives set forth in all of the statutes applicable to the issues in these matters, as well as the common-law interpretative thereof, in reaching the findings and orders set forth below.
The parties married on May 9, 1970, in Hartford, Connecticut. The plaintiff has lived in the state of Connecticut for twelve consecutive months prior to the filing of this action. All statutory stays have expired. Neither party has received, for himself or herself, or on behalf of their children, any financial assistance from the state of Connecticut or any municipality of the state during their marriage. The court has jurisdiction in this matter.
Plaintiff wife is 60 years of age (date of birth: May 15, 1947) and works as a pension specialist. She has a Masters degree in accounting, procured in 2003. She has also passed both of the tests required for her to qualify as a certified public accountant, but she has not as yet procured a license. She has worked outside the home for almost all of her married life, except for brief periods of time around the birth of the parties’ children. Wife is presently earning $90,480 gross/$61,000 net per annum.
Defendant husband is 61 years of age (date of birth: January 2, 1946) and presently works as a security guard for one employer and as a driver for another employer. His present income from this employment is $16,224 gross/$12,272 net per annum. Defendant completed high school and procured a couple of college credits. He served in the Navy and was honorably discharged for medical reasons pertaining to his left foot. The defendant had worked as a police officer for the town of East CT Page 13773 Hartford, having commenced that employment in 1969. Defendant husband left the police department after having served 27 years in that job. He was earning about $45,000 to $50,000 gross per year, without overtime and about $60,000 gross with overtime. He would have been eligible for full retirement benefits if he remained at work for 30 years, however, he began to fear that he would not find other employment if he held out, and he got a lead on the job that he procured at Hartford Hospital. The parties agreed as to the decision for the husband to leave at the 27-year mark and he retired upon his attaining the age of 50 (1996). Thereafter, Mr. Abronze worked full-time as a security officer at Hartford Hospital for nine and one-half years, an evening shift. As is discussed below, he has now retired from that job as well.
Each of the parties is also collecting benefits from retirement plans. Husband is receiving a total of $857 gross/$666 net per week from the East Hartford Police pension and the Hartford Hospital pension. Wife is receiving $124 gross/$88 net from a CIGNA pension.
The parties have two grown children, a son born in 1974 and a daughter born in 1977. Both parties actively participated in the care and upbringing of their children and in maintaining their home. Their accounts of spending time together during the marriage were in accord as to the demands of their schedules (different working shifts), but different in terms of perceptions of spending quality time with one another and sharing leisure activities. Wife claims that she devoted her time to the family, work, and then her continued schooling, leaving no time for leisure activities or hobbies. Husband asserts numerous interests and laments the lack of similar interests in his spouse, especially in light of the fact that he saw his police-officer job as a stressful and dangerous one, from which he needed relief in other activities.
The parties are at considerable odds in their estimation of the state of their marriage in the last decade of that marriage. According to the plaintiff, the parties’ marriage was a good one for more than thirty years. In approximately December 2004, defendant husband became more and more irritable and engaged in behavior that plaintiff considered different and strange. By the end of January 2005, defendant admitted to the plaintiff that he was having an affair with a woman he had met in his job at Hartford Hospital. Mr. and Mrs. Abronze began to see a marriage counselor, and defendant promised that the affair had ended. Nevertheless, plaintiff learned in June that defendant had resumed his relationship with the other woman. The parties went to another counselor and in October 2005, the parties renewed their marital vows in a church ceremony. Unfortunately, plaintiff again learned that the affair was CT Page 13774 continuing. Defendant left the home again, but returned in December 2005, declaring that he had left the other woman. In January 2006, the plaintiff learned that this was not the truth, and defendant again moved out of the marital home. Defendant also quit his job at Hartford Hospital, at the request of his wife, because of that fact that the defendant’s girlfriend also worked at the hospital.
The parties have seen three different marriage counselors. The plaintiff asserts that she has been humiliated, demeaned and hurt in many ways. Because of husband’s admission as to the nature of his relationship with the other woman, wife felt it was necessary for the parties to procure medical examination and testing. Defendant also criticized plaintiff for her choice of clothing, and encouraged her, during the course of their counseling, to wear brighter and more revealing apparel.
Defendant husband contends that there has not been anything other than a shell of a marriage for a long time in that the parties have not had any real communication, nor have they participated meaningfully in any activities together.
Both parties are presently in relatively good health, although they are not on a par. Wife has been treating with a professional for the emotional distress she asserts that she is suffering from the events in the last years of the parties’ marriage and is also on blood pressure medication. Husband has had surgery in the past (a right hip replacement in December 2001; repair of a ruptured disc, 1986; and repair of a shoulder dislocation, date unknown). He contends that he is currently experiencing difficulty with his left hip, persistent problems with his deformed left foot, and aches in his knee and back. Husband further contends that, due to the fact that he can only perform physical labor, his employment possibilities are limited because of his conditions, and he contends that he is experiencing difficulties in his present employment.
During the period of time that he was working for the East Hartford Police Department, the defendant was not able to participate in the Social Security contributions, and because of this, his social security benefits will be less than those for which his wife will be eligible. The Benefits Administrator for the Town of East Hartford, Sandra Franklin, testified that, although police officers do not make Social Security contributions, there is a increase of 2.5% every year they work in order to make up for loss of Social Security benefits. Plaintiff’s expert, James Gobes, opined that the present value of the East Hartford Police benefit is $532,313 and that the present value of the Hartford CT Page 13775 Hospital benefit is $99,431. Mrs. Abronze will not be able to receive a “survivor benefit” under the police pension once the couple is divorced, however, she will be able to procure a 50% survivor benefit under the Hartford Hospital plan in the amount of $7,949. If the Social Security factor were taken into account in valuing the East Hartford Pension plan, the amount would be approximately $389,253. The evidence reveals that the Social Security projection for the parties is:
One of the major issues addressed by the parties in this matter is whether or not the Social Security entitlement of each of the parties should be considered by the court as a property interest in the division of the parties’ marital property assets. Plaintiff argues that this expectation is too speculative in light of the fact that the existence and the benefits paid through the Social Security program “is at the whim of the legislature.” Plaintiff does not cite to any authority specifically addressing this issue, but directs the court to the decisions such as those in which the Connecticut Supreme Court has determined that the interest was a mere expectancy that was too speculative to constitute property to be subject to equitable distribution, i.e. Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158 (1998) — potential income from a medical degree; Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265 (1999) — an expected interest in a family trust; and Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224 (1987) — an inheritance. The court is not convinced. The claimed uncertainty upon which plaintiff premises her argument is speculation itself and amounts to an inappropriate labeling and categorizing of Social Security benefits. Social Security benefits do not constitute a speculative expectancy. They are benefits which are already earned, the receipt of which is delayed to another time, with varying amounts to be received dependent upon the age at which receipt commences. They are existing property interests, granted but not yet exercisable. Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 745, 746 (2001), Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 (1995).
CT Page 13776
Considering all of the evidence and the applicable, governing law, the court finds and orders:
The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably, without the possibility of reconciliation, and, therefore, the marriage is dissolved.
The court finds that some fault rests with the defendant husband in the final stages of this already disintegrating relationship, however, in balancing all of the factors set forth in C.G.S. Sec. 46b-81, including, but not limited to the issue of fault, as well as health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, skills and employability, etc., the following orders are issued.
The parties’ marital home is worth approximately $240,000 and the equity is approximately $160,000. The parties’ marital home will be owned solely by the plaintiff wife, with her holding the husband harmless for any and all expenditures and obligations associated with the home. The defendant husband is to immediately execute a quit claim deed to the plaintiff wife, and the plaintiff wife is to refinance the home, no later than six months from the date of this decision, so as to exclude the husband from the mortgage obligations.
In the parties’ pendente lite agreement of June 14, 2006, the parties agreed that, to the extent that the plaintiff had reduced the amount of the first mortgage, she was to be given credit for that at the time of the dissolution, and to the extent that the defendant had paid the $600 monthly payment to the Bank of America, he was to receive credit for that at the time of the dissolution. Any credit due to the plaintiff is included in the court’s award to her of considerably more than that in that she is awarded all of the equity in the home, save for the following. Any credit due to defendant for his Bank of America payments should be paid to him on or before the date of the refinancing of the marital home.
Each party is to maintain his or her own health insurance.
All bank account balances, stocks, and cash values of life insurance policies are to be split equally.
The pensions are to be split as follows: To the defendant husband, the Town of East Hartford Pension and 65% of the Hartford Hospital pension. To the wife, 35% of the Hartford Hospital pension and all other retirement and pension benefits, including Hooker Holcombe 401k, Prudential 401k, CIGNA 401k, Ameriprise IRA, CIGNA Defined Benefit plan, CT Page 13777 Hooker Holcombe Defined Benefit Plan, Ameriprise Money Market, Ameriprise Managed Cash, and Ameriprise IRA.
As to personal property, the wife is to retain the 2003 Ford Explorer and the Husband is to retain the 1988 Jeep. The parties are to cooperate in transferring title, registration and insurance coverage. All other vehicles are to be sold, with the proceeds split equally. Husband is to retain ownership of the canoe and his tools. The jewelry, the household furnishings and the mower are to be retained by the wife.
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