2010 Ct. Sup. 13303
No. HHB CV 08 5008274 SConnecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain
June 22, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
KREMSKI, J.T.R.
Plaintiff, Ace Truck Repair, Inc., brings this complaint dated April 16, 2008, as amended May 27, 2008, and by substituted complaint on September 15, 2008, against the defendant, Cascella Son Construction, Inc., seeking payment for truck repair services provided to the defendant.
The defendant responded with its answer and raised special defenses and counterclaims dated November 7, 2008.
The plaintiff alleges that on or about June 15, 1999, and for several years thereafter, it performed repair services to the defendant’s motorized construction equipment when requested to do so by the defendant through its authorized employees, under an oral agreement.
The defendant would contact the plaintiff by telephone that a particular item of its equipment needed repairing, with a description of the general problems being experienced, the site at which the equipment could be found, i.e., the town, address, and other necessary information helpful in locating the equipment. The plaintiff would take its repair truck with all needed tools and go to the site at which the broken-down equipment was located and make the repairs on site. The plaintiff would send an invoice to the defendant for the work performed and would receive payment by check. This arrangement was carried out by the parties for several years.
However, on or about September 19, 2001, after telephone requests by the defendant, the plaintiff proceeded to repair trucks located in the Stamford/Westport area off route I-91. He had been informed in general terms of the problem: for example, a U-joint that needed to be replaced or the back-up alarm was not working, etc. On arriving at the site, the plaintiff would consult with the project manager, a Ken Yoos, who would point out the vehicle(s) that needed repairing and what the problem was. If there were questions regarding the repairs or new parts, the plaintiff CT Page 13304 would attempt to contact Todd Cascella, the official in charge of the defendant’s various projects and the one the plaintiff would primarily deal with. However, since Todd Cascella was seldom on the site when questions about the repairs arose, the plaintiff would consult with the site manager who, if he thought it necessary, would contact Todd Cascella, the president of the defendant Cascella Son Construction, Inc., and discuss the issue raised by the plaintiff. The site manager would then convey to the plaintiff the actual authorization to proceed or not. Thus, the plaintiff received and acted on information received from the site manager acting on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiff would then proceed with the repair work consistent with the information he received from the site manager.
In the present case, the plaintiff provided repairs on two of the defendant’s vehicles. He replaced a fuel tank on a Mack truck and repaired a U-joint on a Volvo truck. He also determined that other repairs were required to make the truck operable. He consulted with the site foreman and received tacit approval to proceed. However, as the repairs progressed, he was not receiving payment by the defendant and eventually stopped working on the repairs.
During this working period of time, the plaintiff had telephonic contact with the defendant and repeatedly asked for and received assurances that payment would be made. When payment was not made, the plaintiff stopped work, although the Volvo truck was not yet operable.
Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this action to collect payment for his repair work by way of an amended complaint as revised.
The Court also finds that:
The parties entered into an oral contract whereby the defendant, who operated a site improvement construction business with various heavy duty earth-moving motor-powered vehicles, would contact the plaintiff, who operated a repair business for on-site repairs of large, heavy-duty motor vehicles. The defendant would inform the plaintiff of the problem developed by its motor vehicle and give an opinion as to the cause and the repairs needed.
The plaintiff would respond by going to the site where the vehicle was located, together with tools and equipment potentially necessary to make the repairs. At the site, a visual determination and cursory examination was performed and then the plaintiff would proceed with the repairs. During the course of the repair work, if other repairs CT Page 13305 were needed beyond that not connected to the initial determination, the plaintiff would inform the defendant and would be authorized to make the additional repairs by the defendant where it was agreed that it should be done.
Since Todd Cascella, the authorizing official for the defendant, was responsible for the work at various sites and could not be readily contacted, the plaintiff would usually contact the site manager who would then contact Todd Cascella and get an answer to whether the plaintiff should do the additional work that was proposed. This was then delivered by the site manager to the plaintiff, who would proceed based upon this information.
The Court also finds that the defendant, acting upon the oral contract of the parties, requested that the plaintiff make the repairs to the motor vehicles indicated in the plaintiff’s revised complaint; that the value of repair services had a reasonable value of $7,850.40, i.e. the total as set out in Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the sum of $8,277.66 less $427.26.
The Court finds that Exhibit 3 contains an item in the sum of $427.26, which was for a replacement fuel tank on the Volvo motor vehicle. This fuel tank replacement was in fact the replacement listed on Exhibit 1 for the Mack motor vehicle and is not due and owing from the defendant to the plaintiff for repairs to the Volvo.
Therefore, judgment may enter for the plaintiff on the first count of its revised complaint in the sum of $7,850.40, together with court costs, and for the defendant on the second and third counts of the revised complaint.
Further, judgment may enter for the plaintiff on all counts of the defendant’s counterclaim, without court costs.
CT Page 13306