2005 Ct. Sup. 11400
No. CV 02 0562799Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New London at New London
July 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE SPECIAL DEFENSES ALLEGING JUSTIFICATION FOR BROADCASTING MENTAL HEALTH CONDITION OF INMATE
JONES, JUDGE.
On January 2, 2003, plaintiff Carolyn Adams filed a two-count amended complaint against the defendant, Lin Television Corp., alleging in count one invasion of privacy[1] and in count two intentional infliction of emotional distress. In response to the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant filed an amended answer and three special defenses. The plaintiff has moved to strike the defendant’s special defenses on the grounds that: “(1) all said [s]pecial [d]efenses fail to state the facts which are relied upon and (2) all said [s]pecial [d]efenses otherwise fail as a matter of law. The court shall now review count two, the special defenses, and the merits of the arguments in the motion to strike.
In count two of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges inter alia, that the defendant, through its agents, knew that it wrongfully obtained a department of corrections photograph of her, and, nevertheless, intentionally broadcast the photograph throughout Connecticut during a news report. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress upon her, or that the defendant knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of broadcasting her picture, name and mental health status across Connecticut. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, that said conduct caused her distress, and that the emotional distress which she sustained was severe.
The defendant’s first special defense alleges, inter alia,
that the plaintiff was incarcerated at the York Correctional Institute (York) in Niantic, Connecticut. During the plaintiff’s incarceration, the prison conditions and mental health treatment of inmates at York were the subject of court proceedings, media CT Page 11401 coverage, and demonstrations and protests conducted by correctional officers. These conditions at York, the defendant alleges, are matters of public concern. Furthermore, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff’s husband publicly disclosed the mental health status of the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff’s claims and damages are barred by the guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article First, Sections 4 and 5 of the Connecticut Constitution, and the common law.
In the second special defense the defendant alleges, inter alia, that the news broadcast addressed matters of legitimate public concern which included the conditions and mental health services provided at the York facility, and the plaintiff’s husband’s public statements concerning the plaintiff’s inadequate receipt of mental health services. The third special defense alleges that the plaintiff’s claims of invasion of privacy are barred because, as a prisoner, her privacy rights were severely limited and/or the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Standard for deciding Motion to Strike
“A motion to strike is the proper procedural vehicle to attack the validity of the special defenses. Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint . . . including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof . . . The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action . . . In ruling on a motion to strike a special defense, the trial court [is obligated] to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Abrams v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 04 4001003 (May 11, 2005, Hartmere, J.).
Review of Substantive Arguments
The plaintiff argues in support of its motion to strike that the defendant is not constitutionally protected when it broadcasts a private person’s private facts unless the defendant CT Page 11402 can prove that the said facts are “newsworthy.” The plaintiff argues that the defendant has not alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of newsworthiness, and that the defendant has not alleged a single fact tending to prove the social value in broadcasting the plaintiff’s mental health status. The plaintiff further argues that mental illness is a deeply private affair and that there are no facts alleged that suggest that the plaintiff “voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety.” Moreover, the plaintiff argues that although a prisoner’s right to privacy may be limited, it, nevertheless, does not vanish altogether. Therefore, the plaintiff contends that it is absurd to argue that she, while a prisoner, gave up her right to maintain the privacy of her mental health status.
In its first special defense, the defendant alleges, inter alia, that the plaintiff was an inmate at the York Connecticut Correctional Institution in Niantic, Connecticut, and that during her incarceration, the mental health treatment at York was a matter of public concern. The defendant also alleges that the plaintiff’s husband publicly disclosed the plaintiff’s mental health status, and sought mental health treatment for her. The defendant also alleges that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by both federal and state constitutional guarantees, as well as the common law. In its second special defense, the defendant alleges inter alia, that news broadcast addressed legitimate public concerns, namely: (1) the conditions at York; (2) the mental health services provided to inmates; (3) the findings of court-appointed psychiatrists; and (4) the plaintiff’s husband’s public statement that the plaintiff was not receiving sufficient psychiatric services. In the third special defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claims are barred because as a prisoner her rights were severely limited and she did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
“[T]he conditions in this Nation’s prisons are a matter that is both newsworthy and of great public importance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “[a] prisoner becomes a public figure by virtue of his crime and subsequent trial . . . He remains a public figure during his imprisonment or until he has reverted to the lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travers v. Paton, 261 F.Sup. 110, 117 (D.Conn. 1966). See also Fuller v. Day Publishing Co., 89 Conn.App. 237, 240, 872 A.2d 925 (2005) CT Page 11403 (where court found commentary relating to a prisoner’s criminal trial was a matter of public interest).
Conclusion
In construing the special defenses in favor of sustaining their legal sufficiency, the court finds that the defendant has alleged sufficient facts in all three of its special defenses to withstand a motion to strike. These special defenses apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, and they are a legal challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.
For all the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion to Strike should be and hereby is denied.
Clarance J. Jones
CT Page 11404