2007 Ct. Sup. 3438
No. HHB-CV-06 4011617Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain
February 26, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
HENRY S. COHN, JUDGE.
The plaintiff appeals from a final decision dated December 21, 2005, of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) substantiating sexual abuse by the plaintiff and placing the plaintiff’s name on the central registry.[1] General Statutes §§ 17a-101g(b); 17a-101k.[2]
Pursuant to § 17a-101k(c)(4), a hearing was held by DCF prior to placing the plaintiff’s name on the central registry. On December 21, 2005, the hearing officer made findings of fact that may be summarized as follows:
1. S.G. was a student at Weaver High School during the 2004-2005 school year.
2. The plaintiff was employed as a special education teacher at Weaver during the 2004-2005 school year.
3. The plaintiff was not one of S.G’s teachers, but he had met her the summer before starting Weaver. S.G. was walking down the street when the plaintiff stopped his car, got out and engaged her in a conversation.
4. On October 28, 2004, according to S.G., she entered the plaintiff’s classroom to use the telephone. While she was in the plaintiff’s room, the plaintiff made several sexual references to S.G. and also placed her hand in his groin area. He also used the epithet “nigger” several times in his conversation with S.G.
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5. A student present in the room reported that the plaintiff had made an inappropriate comment to S.G. regarding sexy lips and saw him grab her hand. Due to the student’s location in the classroom, he could not see if the plaintiff had placed S.G.’s hand in his crotch.
6. The plaintiff denied making the statements or making any sexual contact with S.G.
7. The plaintiff had previously been reprimanded by the Hartford Board of Education about inappropriate contact with students and had been warned not to be alone with female students.
8. The plaintiff was dismissed by the Hartford Board of Education after a hearing. He was also arrested, but acquitted of all charges.
Based on these findings, the hearing officer concluded that DCF had substantiated the sexual abuse of the plaintiff by a fair preponderance of the evidence.[3] S.G. had disclosed the incident consistently to her mother, the police, the school principal, a DCF investigator, and at a Board of Education hearing. The fellow student gave evidence supportive of S.G.’s version of the events. The plaintiff gave contradictory statements regarding S.G.’s allegations, indicating that he was an unreliable reporter.
The hearing officer also approved DCF’s recommendation that the plaintiff be placed on the central registry. The hearing officer found that the substantiated charges were serious and life-affecting; the plaintiff had access to other students who could be future victims, and he had been warned by his employer regarding boundary issues with female students.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, the plaintiff has taken an administrative appeal from the final decision and, because of the substantiation of sexual abuse and the plaintiff’s placement on the central registry, he is aggrieved. Rucci v. Dept of Children Families, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 02 0516990 (November 5, 2003, Peck, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 7, 10) (noting serious consequences to plaintiff’s reputation and employment possibilities that result from the placement of plaintiff’s name on child abuse registry). CT Page 3440
In the appeal the plaintiff argues that the hearing officer’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and is arbitrary. The plaintiff also contends that the decision did not take into account that he was acquitted of criminal charges related to the same events as this appeal.[4]
The standard of court review of the plaintiff’s claims has been stated as follows: “Judicial review of [an administrative agency’s] action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act . . . and the scope of that review is very restricted . . . With regard to questions of fact, it is . . . [not] the function of the trial court . . . to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency . . . The substantial evidence rule governs judicial review of administrative fact-finding under UAPA . . . Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred . . . This substantial evidence standard is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review . . . The burden is on the [plaintiff] to demonstrate that the [agency’s] factual conclusions were not supported by the weight of substantial evidence on the whole record . . . Even as to questions of law, [t]he court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of discretion. Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 136-37 (2001).
The MacDermid standards were recently reiterated in Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 279 Conn. 584, 592-93, 906 A.2d 1 (2006). These standards have been applied to an administrative appeal from a final decision of DCF in Dailey v. Department of Children and Families, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 98 0492670S (January 11, 2000, Hartmere, J.). In Dailey, the judge concluded: “[O]n the basis of [the court’s] review of the record . . . there is substantial evidence in the record to support the DCF decision. The fact that there is contrary evidence in the record and that the plaintiffs disagree with the weight accorded to the evidence, does not affect the validity of the DCF decision.”
Based on the above principles, the plaintiff does not directly contend CT Page 3441 that this court might find that there was a lack of substantial evidence in the record. There is in the record, that the hearing officer was justified in relying upon, the consistent statements of S.G. and the partially corroborating, and not contradictory, statement of the fellow student. (Return of Record (ROR), Exhibits 14, 15, 49.) These statements are sufficient evidence that an incident involving sexual abuse occurred.
Rather, the plaintiff argues that the hearing officer did not take into account the fact that the plaintiff was tried in the criminal court and acquitted by the jury after a short deliberation. The plaintiff does not contend that the hearing officer should have relied on this outcome directly, but should have realized that only at the criminal trial did all the witnesses, including S.G., testify. S.G. did not testify at the DCF hearing; the hearing officer had in the DCF record only her statement and findings of fact containing S.G.’s statements at the disciplinary hearing before the Hartford Board of Education. (ROR, Exhibits 14, 19.) The plaintiff’s argument is that only the criminal trial with its jury review provided the best test of the truthfulness of S.G.’s accusations and that that proceeding gave the best opportunity to judge S.G.’s credibility.
Nevertheless the hearing officer made her decision after hearing from the plaintiff, in addition to reviewing the documentary exhibits. The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff was less credible than S.G. Final Decision, page 6.[5] The court may not interfere with the well-considered judgments of the hearing officer. See MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, supra, 257 Conn. 136.
The plaintiff further argues that the hearing officer wrongly inserted in her decision a discussion of a prior incident involving one C.A. to justify placing the plaintiff’s name on the central registry. The hearing officer stated at page 7 of the final decision: “In addition, [the plaintiff] has a history of inappropriate contact with students. In 2003, [the plaintiff] was reprimanded and disciplined by the Hartford Board of Education for exercising poor judgment in regards to boundaries with female students. He was warned not to be alone with female students. Yet, in the summer of 2004, [the plaintiff] initiated contact with two female students outside of the school setting, stopping his car and approaching [S.G.] and another female student from Weaver. While his intentions during this summer encounter may have been innocuous, [the plaintiff] demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the school board’s warning concerning his behavior with students.” CT Page 3442
The plaintiff introduced testimony from C.A. at the DCF hearing that no “improprieties” occurred between them in the 2003 incident. Based upon this, the plaintiff argues that the hearing officer erred in using a “history of inappropriate contact with students” to support his placement on the central registry. A correct reading of the paragraph quoted above indicates, however, that the “inappropriate conduct” was the finding by the Hartford Board of Education that the plaintiff had . . . used “poor judgment in regards to boundaries with female students.”
The record shows that the plaintiff’s mistake with C.A. was to go to her home to discuss her psychological issues, rather than seeking help for her through the school authorities or DCF. (ROR, Exhibit 19, page 7.) The hearing officer was thus using the term “inappropriate conduct” correctly. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, defining “inappropriate” to mean “unsuitable.”
The plaintiff’s final ground of appeal arises from an amendment by DCF to the charges in this case, allowed by the hearing officer on December 15, 2005. ROR, Exhibit 36. In addition to the already stated charge of sexual abuse, the DCF added the charge that S.G. had been emotionally abused or neglected. In her final decision, the hearing office concluded that DCF had failed to prove emotional abuse or neglect by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Final Decision, page 6.
The plaintiff contends that the hearing officer was “arbitrary,” in finding sexual abuse and not emotional abuse, citing Rucci v. Dept. of Children Families, supra, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 7. In Rucci, the court concluded that the hearing officer had inconsistently made a finding that the alleged perpetrator had acted both “intentionally” and “reflexively.” Id., 10. The appeal in Rucci succeeded because the hearing officer should have made “clear and consistent” findings. Se id.
The situation here is not like Rucci. The hearing officer set forth in her final decision at pages 4-5 the sections of the DCF policy manual defining both sexual abuse and emotional abuse. Sexual abuse involves “contact,” while emotional abuse involves an “adverse impact” on the child. It was not arbitrary for the hearing officer to find that the record indicated that the plaintiff had “contact” with the child, but that the record did not establish that the plaintiff “adversely impacted” the child. The severity of an adverse impact is something left CT Page 3443 to the determination of the hearing officer. See DCF Policy Manual, 34-2-7, operational definitions, quoted in Final Decision, page 5.
In sum, the hearing officer’s substantiation of abuse by the plaintiff and her findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court finds that the hearing officer did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or in abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances, this court is not allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer. For the above reasons, the administrative appeal is dismissed. See Doe v. Dept. of Children Families, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Juvenile Matters, Docket No. CV T11 CP04011883 (October 12, 2004, Taylor, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 90).
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