2008 Ct. Sup. 6454
No. CV-08 5006942 SConnecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Waterbury at Waterbury
April 18, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
DENNIS G. EVELEIGH, JUDGE.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The above-entitled matter was instituted by way of Complaint and Application for Temporary Injunction dated November 28, 2007. The matter was returned to Court on December 26, 2007. The parties appeared and tried the Application for Temporary Injunction before the Court on March 7, 2008. On March 31, the Court received both the Plaintiff’s and the Defendants’ Reply Memoranda.
II. FACTS
Prior to September 24, 2005, defendants Wallace Smith and Jahaira Torres were employed by the plaintiff Leroy Addison in the capacity of assisting the plaintiff in his business as a bail bondsman. Both employees were paid by the hour and received W-2 statements from the plaintiff. Both defendants were also covered by the plaintiff’s insurance.
On or about September 24, 2005, both defendants were required by the plaintiff to sign a contract entitled: “Independent Contractor’s Agreement Re: Bail Bonds” which they both signed on that date. Plaintiff told the defendants that they would be fired if they did not sign the contract. The contract indicated, in relevant part, that the defendants were deemed to be independent contractors responsible for their own taxes and insurance. They were to be paid on the basis of each bond produced. The contract further provided that, in the event of termination by either party, the defendants agreed not to compete with the plaintiff in the Judicial Districts of Danbury, Waterbury and Litchfield for a three-year period.
In August 2006 both defendants terminated their employment with the plaintiff. Both defendants set up practice in the Waterbury area as bail bonds-people. CT Page 6455
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in November 2007 to enjoin the defendants from acting as bail bonds-people in the Waterbury area, in accordance with the terms of the contract.
III. DISCUSSION
The standard for a temporary injunction requires that the moving party must establish: “(1) the plaintiff ha[s] no adequate legal remedy; (2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury absent [the injunction]; (3) the plaintiff [is] likely to prevail . . .; and (4) the balance of the equities favor[s] [the issuance of the injunction.]” Waterbury Teachers Ass’n. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 230 Conn. 441, 446, 645 A.2d 978 (1994). “The request for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In exercising its discretion, the court, in a proper case, may consider and balance the injury complained of with that which will result from interference by injunction. The issuance of an injunction and the scope and quantum of injunctive relief rests in the sound discretion of the trier.”Tomasso Bros., Inc. v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., 230 Conn. 641, 648, 646 A.2d 133 (1994). “Restraining the action of an individual or a corporation by injunction is an extraordinary power, always to be exercised with caution, never without the most satisfactory reasons. Not the applicant only, but the court, must be satisfied that a wrong is about to be done, or an injury is about to be sustained, which practically, will be irreparable, before resort should be had to this extreme power.” Crouchley v. Pambianchi, 152 Conn. 224, 226-27, 205 A.2d 492 (1964).
A. Irreparable Injury
Our courts have defined the term “irreparable injury” in the following terms:
Where an injury is of such nature that it cannot be adequately compensated in damages, or cannot be measured by any pecuniary standard, it is irreparable. Whether damages are to be viewed by a court of equity as “irreparable” or not depends more upon the nature of the right which is injuriously affected than upon the pecuniary measure of the loss suffered.
Connecticut Association of Clinical Laboratories v. Connecticut Blue Cross, Inc., 31 Conn.Sup. 110, 113-14, 324 A.2d 288 (1973). CT Page 6456
In the present action the plaintiff has not incurred an irreparable injury. The defendants left his employ over nineteen months ago and he is still considered the highest volume bail bondsman in Waterbury. There is no allegation that the defendants stole any customer lists or important proprietary information. His losses can easily be computed in an action for damages. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof with regard to the issue of irreparable injury.
B. Adequate Remedy
The plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. His suit for damages based upon a breach of the contract may continue.
There is no showing that the plaintiff has no remedy at law. Se Stocker v. City of Waterbury, 154 Conn. 446, 226 A.2d 514 (1967).
C. Likelihood of Success at Trial
The Court has serious reservations about the plaintiff’s likelihood of success at a trial of this case. The validity of the contracts in question are dubious at best. There are several areas which pose problems for the Court:
1. Meeting of the Minds
It does not appear that the elemental `meeting of the minds’ was met in this case. The contract provides that the defendants were to be independent contractors, yet they continued to be treated as employees and received W-2 forms. The contract provides that the defendants were to provide their own insurance, yet the plaintiff continued to cover them on his policy. The contract provides that the defendants were to be paid on the basis of the number of bonds produced, yet they were still compensated on an hourly basis. The performance of the contract appears to be an absolute nullity by the actions of the parties.
2. Consideration for the Covenant not to Compete
Plaintiff argues that it was necessary for the plaintiff to have the contract executed because he was changing the nature of his business to an LLC form of business. However, the contracts with the defendants were signed by the plaintiff individually. Continued employment, as opposed to new employment, is not adequate consideration. Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 224, 355 A.2d 110 (1974). There may have been some force to plaintiff’s argument that this was new employment if the contract had CT Page 6457 been signed by the LLC. In view of the fact that the plaintiff signed individually, it is the Court’s view that the covenant not to compete will ultimately fail at trial.
3. Reasonableness of the Covenant
The Covenant not to Compete attempts to restrict the defendants in areas where the plaintiff does not work. It covers a geographical area of approximately thirty miles. There is no rational basis presented for such a large area, and the Court believes that, at trial, it will be considered to be invalid.
On the basis of the above observations, the Court believes that the plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success at trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Application for Temporary Injunction is denied.
CT Page 6458