WILLIAM J. ANTALIK, JR. ET AL. v. THOMASTON BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.

2009 Ct. Sup. 4744
No. CV 07 5001762SConnecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Litchfield at Litchfield
March 12, 2009

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ROCHE, J.

The defendants move for summary judgment based upon the common law doctrine of governmental immunity, and, for their authority, the defendants rely on Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 587 A.2d 423
and Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 479 A.2d 793. The doctrine of governmental immunity pertains to the performance of a governmental duty and, therefore, the determination of whether a qualified immunity applies to a particular case is, generally, a question of law for the court. See Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 107, 708 A.2d 937
(1998).

In order to avoid the governmental immunity defense raised by the defendants, the plaintiffs must establish that their case falls under the identifiable person/imminent harm exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity. In the present case, there appears to be a pattern of physical conduct by the individual defendant student (Winkleman) against the female student. This physical conduct between them includes shoving, which occurred at various intervals that were not necessarily predictable or specifically foreseeable by the teachers and school administrators. There is sufficient testimony, however, that the individual defendant student would commit offensive acts of contact, which, in effect, rose to the level of bullying, against the female student at specific moments within the school yard during the school day.

The mere fact that the specific time and place of these physical acts by the individual defendant student cannot be pinpointed during any specific time frame, but were more likely during the recess periods or whenever the students were outside of the school building, but still on school grounds, does raise issues of fact.

The Court finds that there are sufficient questions of material fact concerning both the circumstances involving the particular incident in this case between the individual defendant student (Winkleman) and the CT Page 4745 female student as well as the alleged failure of the school officials and designees to oversee and prevent such actionable conduct from occurring.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the governmental immunity defense raised in the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is insufficient and, therefore, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

CT Page 4746