CASE NO. 358 CRD-1-84Workers’ Compensation Commission
MARCH 29, 1988
The claimant was represented at the trial level by Richard K. O’Neil, Esq., and at the appellate level by Michael Budlong, Esq.
The respondents were represented by James Pomeranz, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.
This Petition for Review from the October 15, 1984 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the First District was heard May 2, 1986 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Robin Waller and Frank Verrilli.
FINDING AND AWARD
The First District Finding and Award of October 15, 1984 is hereby affirmed and adopted as the Finding and Award of this Division.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.
In the matter below, the parties stipulated to Paragraphs 2 through 12 of the Finding. Claimant was a regular paid Enfield policeman. On December 12, 1983 at about 7:00 a.m. Claimant, in full police uniform, left his house in order to report for the start of his 7:45 a.m. shift. While walking from the house to his car parked in the driveway, he slipped on some ice and was injured.
Respondents’ appeal from the First District October 15, 1984 Finding and Award is based on a narrow reading of Sec. 31-275
(12)(A), C.G.S.. That section states, “In the case of a policeman and a fireman in the course of his employment’ shall encompass his departure from his place of abode to duty, his duty, and his return to his piece of abode after duty” Respondents argue that the policeman had not left his place of abode and that therefore the Commissioner should not have granted benefits.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines abode as “One’s home, habitation, place of dwelling or residence”, Black’s Law Dictionary 7 (5th ed. 1979). Considerable Connecticut decisional law concerning “place of abode” has evolved in the interpretation of Sec. 52-57 (a)[1] C.G.S., the statute describing the manner of service in civil actions. Those decisions have defined abode as the actual residence or dwelling place of the individual to be served, e.g. Cugno v. Kaelin, 138 Conn. 341
(1951), Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin and Kuriansky, 40 Conn. Sup. 1 (1984). We think that the trial Commissioner’s conclusion that the driveway was not a “place of abode” is consistent with Black Law Dictionary definition cited and with the decisions involving manner of service.
Therefore, the decision of the First District Commissioner is affirmed.
Commissioners Robin Waller and Frank Verrilli concur.