2007 Ct. Sup. 9795
No. CV 06-4025739Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
March 14, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE SPECIAL DEFENSES
RITTENBAND, RICHARD M., J.T.R.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is a woman who is deaf and mute. She is limited in her life activities because of her disability. She is required to read lips in order to reasonably understand and comprehend others when they speak to her. The plaintiff worked for the defendant as an operations associate on a full-time basis from December 27, 1999 through the date of the termination of her employment with the defendant on April 15, 2005. Plaintiff claims that she did not receive adequate training similar to other employees of her unit. She further claims that the defendant embarked upon a course of discrimination in that the plaintiff was subjected to continuous and daily false accusations and retaliation which caused plaintiff to experience severe and emotional difficulties including sleepless nights. As a result of these working conditions, plaintiff was ultimately forced to resign from the defendant on April 15, 2005. The plaintiff also claims that she was subject to discrimination on the basis of her disability, subject to retaliation, subject to age discrimination, all in violation of state statutes. The plaintiff further claims constructive discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Defendant filed thirteen special defenses on January 19, 2007. On January 23, 2007, the plaintiff filed the instant motion to strike some of the special defenses. A hearing was to be held before this Court on March 5, 2007 on short calendar. The defense attorney was unable to be present due to an emergency, and the parties subsequently agreed to have the Court take the motion to strike and the accompanying memoranda on the papers.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal CT Page 9796 insufficiency of the allegation of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 825, 676 A.2d 357 (1996). These principles of law apply equally to special defenses.
ISSUES AND FINDINGS:
The Court will address the motion to strike as to each individual special defense. The special defenses of which some are lengthy are set forth in Schedule A attached hereto and made a part hereof.
1. The first special defense stating that the plaintiff has failed to state claim upon which relief can be granted is not a proper special defense. It should have been challenged by a motion to strike. The motion to strike this special defense is granted.
2. The second special defense has not been challenged.
3. The third special defense is failure to mitigate damages in that the plaintiff did not seek other employment. Based upon Preston v. Keith, 20 Conn.App. 656, 664 (1990) the party may plead this issue as a special defense. It also has to have a factual basis and by claiming that the plaintiff did not seek other employment that factor is pleaded. The motion to strike this special defense is denied.
4. The special defense that the plaintiff voluntarily resigned her position is a legal conclusion, not supported by facts and should have been pleaded as part of a general denial. “The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, none the less, that the plaintiff has no cause of action.” Federal Deposit Insur. Corp. v. Napert-Boyer Part. 40 Conn.App. 434, 445 (1996). The motion to strike the fourth special defense is granted.
5. 6. These special defenses have not been challenged.
7. The special defense that individuals cannot be held liable must be stricken for two reasons. First, the defendant refers to applicable federal, state and/or local statutes, but does not cite these statutes as required to do. Further, that issue can be handled by a general denial because it is in direct contradiction to the complaint. Se Coghlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487 at 501 (2004). The motion to strike CT Page 9797 the seventh special defense is granted.
8. The eighth special defense that the plaintiff engaged in misconduct is devoid of a factual basis. Further, this can be brought to issue by a general denial. It is a contradiction of `the plaintiff’s allegations. Accordingly, the motion to strike the eighth special defense is granted.
9. Plaintiff has not challenged this special defense.
10. The claim that the plaintiff’s action is barred by the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Act is proper. It states that even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true, they are barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Ramos v. Branford, 63 Conn.App. 671, 675 (2001). “The court reasoned that the defense must be raised by pleading a special defense.” The motion to strike the tenth special defense is denied.
11. The eleventh special defense has not been challenged.
12. The claim that the plaintiff’s resignation was voluntary should have been pleaded as a general denial. Further, it is duplicative of the fourth special defense. The motion to strike the twelfth special defense is granted.
13. The thirteenth special defense has not been challenged.
14. It is not proper to set forth a prayer for relief following special defenses. Accordingly, the motion to strike the prayer for relief on page 10 of the defendant’s answer and special defenses is granted.
SCHEDULE A AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AS FOR A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
AS FOR A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant on information and belief and on that basis, alleges that Plaintiff’s claims against any individuals, if any, are barred or diminished by the doctrine’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Plaintiff failed to name any individual respondent in her charge CT Page 9798 of discrimination before the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities.
AS FOR A THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant on information and belief and on that basis, alleges that Plaintiff failed to mitigate her alleged damages because she failed to look for comparable work or work providing comparable pay.
AS FOR A FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant has no obligation to pay Plaintiff any amount of her alleged losses or damages because she voluntarily resigned her employment and Defendant has not violated the law.
AS FOR A FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Any and all job actions and conduct taken against Plaintiff were undertaken for legitimate, non-discriminatory business reasons related to Plaintiff’s performance and her voluntary resignation of’ her employment. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant acted in good faith and did not violate any rights which Plaintiff may be entitled to under state laws, rules, regulations or guidelines, and therefore Plaintiff cannot establish the essential elements of her claims.
AS FOR A SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent that Plaintiff suffered any alleged damages, such damages were caused by someone for whose conduct Defendant was not and is not legally responsible, namely Plaintiff who voluntarily resigned her employment with Defendant and who failed to perform her job duties to the employer’s standards.
AS FOR A SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Individuals cannot be individually liable under the applicable federal, state and/or local statutes and/or common law, and therefore any claims against any individuals are barred.
AS FOR A EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent that Plaintiff engaged in misconduct during her employment that would have resulted in her termination had Defendant been aware of said misconduct, the Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for her having engaged in said misconduct. CT Page 9799
AS FOR A NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, because Defendant maintained a policy prohibiting discrimination in the workplace and a procedure for the resolution of complaints alleging discrimination, Defendant exercised reasonable care through its policies and procedures to prevent and correct promptly any discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, and because Plaintiff unreasonably failed to properly take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the Defendant or to avoid harm otherwise and failed to provide Defendant with adequate and timely notice of alleged discrimination.
AS FOR A TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the exclusive remedies provisions of the State of Connecticut Workers’ Compensation statute.
AS FOR A ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant is not liable on any claim for failure to accommodate because Plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her position.
AS FOR THE TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant is not liable for constructive discharge because Plaintiff’s resignation was voluntary and Plaintiff’s working conditions were not so intolerable that they would have caused a reasonable person to resign rather than continue to serve under them.
AS FOR THE THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity prior to her discipline and resignation, as she did not assert her rights and did not complain to Defendant or to any government agency about alleged discrimination or unlawful conduct and therefore she cannot maintain a claim for retaliation under the relevant statutes.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the Plaintiff have and recover nothing; that this action be dismissed with prejudice; and that Defendant have and recover from the Plaintiff its court costs and litigation expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees; and that the CT Page 9800 Court grant such other and further relief as is just and proper.
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