BRUNET v. UNC/AEROSPACE NORWICH DIVISION, 1204 CRD-2-91-3 (12-17-92)


GERARD BRUNET, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE v. UNC/AEROSPACE NORWICH DIVISION, EMPLOYER and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS

CASE NO. 1204 CRD-2-91-3Workers’ Compensation Commission
DECEMBER 17, 1992

The claimant was represented by Lindalea Ludwick, Esq., Sklarz, Early Avallone, P.C.

The respondents were represented by Robert S. Cullen, Esq., Law offices of Robert S. Cullen.

The respondent employer was also represented at the trial level by Patricia Hill, Esq., Bingham, Dana
Gould.

This Petition for Review from the March 15, 1991 Finding and Award of Compensation and Dismissal of Claim of the Commissioner for the Second District was heard March 13, 1992 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the then Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald H. Doyle.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, COMMISSIONER.

Respondents’ appeal contests the Second District award in which claimant was ruled to have suffered a compensable stress injury between March 1 and April 26, 1988. The commissioner found claimant was totally disabled from April 26 until May 9, 1988 and partially disabled until December 1, 1989.

The appeal contends it was error to award partial incapacity benefits from May 11, 1988 to December 1, 1989.[1]
Respondents attack paragraph #14 of the Finding and Award as having been found without any evidentiary basis. Paragraph #14 states, “He [the claimant] visited Dr. Ahola again on May 3, 1988 who noted continuing anxiety resulting in disability caused by job related stress. He returned him to work on May 9, 1988 at a less stressful job.”

In actuality Dr. Ahola returned claimant to work in the first weeks of May, 1988. He did note that “hopefully job stress can be reduced.” (Claimant’s Exhibits E and L-3) But unbeknownst to the claimant or the doctor and apparently due to economic conditions, a contemplated reduction in force by the employer occurred simultaneously with claimant’s absence from work. Therefore there was no position to which claimant could return on May 11. Respondents argue if there was any stress, it was due to the layoff and not to what may have happened on the job before April 26. Hence, the argument holds, the alleged stress was not compensable under the Act.

After the May 9 layoff the employer paid claimant salary continuation benefits for six months. Dr. Ahola in his May 3, 1988 note to which Finding, #14 refers, placed no restrictions on claimant’s return to work as of May 11. He simply expressed a hope that the job might prove to be less stressful. The May 3 note cannot provide a basis for the commissioner’s conclusion that claimant was partially disabled due to job stress from May 11, 1988 until December 1, 1989.

During the period after May 11, 1988 there are in evidence the May 28, 1988, June 4, 1988, June 25, 1988 and July 23, 1988 reports of Dr. Joel Becker, a psychologist, to whom Dr. Ahola had referred the claimant. See Claimant’s Exhibit G. Dr. Becker’s evidence indicates that when claimant was last examined (July 23, 1988) he was improved and in fact the claimant did not keep his September 10, 1988 appointment. Thus there really exists no evidence supporting the trier’s conclusion that claimant was partially disabled after July 23, 1988.

Claimant may have indeed suffered a relapse or recurrence of disabling stress after May 11, 1988. However nothing in the evidentiary record supports this contention, i.e., the layoff involved a relapse or recurrence of the disabling stress experienced earlier. Consequently the matter needs to be remanded to the Second District as “No case under this Act should be finally determined when . . . through inadvertence, or otherwise, the facts have not been sufficiently found to render a just judgment.” Cormican v. McMahon, 102 Conn. 234, 238 (1925).

We sustain respondents appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald H. Doyle concur.

[1] All other issues were withdrawn at oral argument.