478 A.2d 601
(12353)Supreme Court of Connecticut
SPEZIALE, C.J., PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY and SHEA, Js.
A motion to transfer a matter from the small claims docket to the regular docket of the Superior Court must be granted where a defendant satisfies one of the conditions for transfer set out in the rules of practice (572). The plaintiff instituted a small claims proceeding to recover an amount allegedly owed to it by the defendant for services it had rendered for her. A default judgment was rendered in its favor following that court’s denial both of the defendant’s motion to transfer the matter to the regular docket of the Superior Court and of her motion to reargue the motion to transfer. She thereafter brought a writ of error to this court. Held: 1. This court had jurisdiction over the defendant’s writ of error; a party against whom a default judgment has been rendered may bring a writ of error where, as here, no statutory right of appeal exists, and this court may entertain writs of error in small claims matters, the statute (51-197a, as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 1983, No. 83-29, 3) forbidding appeals from small claims judgments notwithstanding. 2. The trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to transfer since, by filing an affidavit which stated that a good defense existed and which specified the nature of that defense, she satisfied one of the grounds for transfer set out in 572.
Argued May 1, 1984
Decision released July 24, 1984
Action to recover damages for services rendered, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, Small Claims Session at geographical area No. 18 at Winsted, where the defendant’s motion to transfer the case to the regular docket was denied by
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the court, Byrne, J.; a default judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant brought a writ of error to this court. Error; remanded with direction.
Mark E. Lowell, for the appellant (defendant).
Joseph S. Cannavo, pro se, the appellee (plaintiff).
SHEA, J.
The defendant has filed a writ of error with this court, claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion to transfer the case from the Small Claims docket to the regular docket of the Superior Court.
The record[1] before us reveals the following: On June 14, 1983, the plaintiff brought suit in Small Claims Court alleging that the defendant owed it $246.14 for services rendered. Thereafter the defendant filed a motion pursuant to Practice Book 572[2] to transfer
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the case to the regular docket. The trial court denied the motion.[3] A motion to reargue the motion to transfer was denied and a default judgment[4] was rendered against the defendant in the amount sought in the complaint. The defendant then filed a writ of error.
I
Before addressing the propriety of the trial court’s ruling, we must first decide whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ of error. Our jurisdiction is arguably impaired because (1) the defendant may not be sufficiently aggrieved by a default judgment to be entitled to bring a writ of error; and (2) the defendant may be precluded from bringing the writ of error by the language of General Statutes 51-197a, as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 1983, No. 83-29, 3 forbidding appeals from Small Claims judgments. We conclude that we have jurisdiction.
General Statutes 52-272[5] provides in part: “Writs of error for errors in matters of law only may be brought from the judgments of the superior court to the supreme court . . . .” In Taff v. State, 39 Conn. 82, 83 (1872), and Alling v. Shelton, 16 Conn. 436, 442
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(1844), we construed predecessors of this statute to require that the litigant bringing the writ of error be aggrieved. See also Practice Book 3090.[6] Thereafter, in Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 217, 175 A. 582 (1934), We acknowledged that “[i]t may be that ordinarily a defendant who suffers a judgment by default is precluded from attacking that judgment by appeal or writ of error”; Id., 221, citing 3 C.J. 604; but went on to find a limited exception for a trustee, where the default judgment adversely affected a beneficiary’s interest in a trust res. Id. See also Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 237; cf. Sidney Novelty Co. v. Hanlon, 79 Conn. 79, 63 A. 727 (1906). The rationale underlying this general rule concerning writs of error brought from default judgments was that by failing to appear and contest the action, the defendant implicitly consented to the judgment and, therefore, was not aggrieved. See 3 C.J. 449, cited in Reilly v. State, supra. See also Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., supra.[7]
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Upon reconsideration we now hold that a party suffering from a default judgment may bring a writ of error where no statutory right of appeal exists.[8] We reach this conclusion relying upon our test, now well established, for determining when a party is aggrieved: “The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, `the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.’ . . .” (Citations omitted.) Local 1303 Local 1378 v. FOIC, 191 Conn. 173, 176, 463 A.2d 613 (1983).[9] See Kulmacz v. Kulmacz, 177 Conn. 410, 418 A.2d 76 (1979).
There can be no question that the defendant has a personal and legal interest in the subject matter of this default judgment, i.e., whether she is liable for services rendered by the plaintiff. Nor can it be successfully maintained that her legal interest has not been “injuriously affected.” A default judgment establishes the defendant’s liability, and like any other judgment, may be executed according to statute. See General Statutes 52-347 et seq. It makes no difference for purposes of aggrievement that the judgment was rendered
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because the defendant was defaulted rather than after the conclusion of a trial. We have recognized that a defendant may directly appeal from a default judgment where a statutory right of appeal exists. See, e.g., Meinket v. Levinson, 193 Conn. 110, 112-14, 474 A.2d 454 (1984). It would be inconsistent to preclude a party suffering a default judgment from bringing a writ of error where no statutory right of appeal exists. Such a decision would result in insulating the judgment from all appellate review. We decline to construe our requirement of aggrievement in this manner where to do so would deprive a litigant of all appellate review. Cf. State v. Assuntino, 173 Conn. 104, 106, 376 A.2d 1091 (1977) (statute construed as not abrogating common law right of appellate review by writ of error).
Nor does the fact that the writ lies from the Small Claims division of the Superior Court, where no statutory right of appeal exists; General Statutes 51-197a
as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 1983, No. 83-29, 3; preclude a more limited appellate review by writ of error. See General Statutes 52-272. Certainly, the General Assembly could conclude that limited appellate review was all that was necessary for Small Claims cases. Construing our statutes as one consistent body of law, as we must; Vartuli v. Sotire, 192 Conn. 353, 472 A.2d 336 (1984); we conclude that General Statutes 51-197a as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 1983, No. 83-29, 3 does not preclude us from entertaining a writ of error pursuant to General Statutes 52-272 from the Small Claims division of the Superior Court and that we therefore have jurisdiction.
II
The defendant’s claim of error concerns the trial court’s refusal to grant her motion to transfer the case to the regular docket. That motion was filed on July
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15, 1983, and, pursuant to Practice Book 572, was accompanied by an affidavit stating that a good defense to the claim existed.[10]
Practice Book 572[11] was adopted pursuant to General Statutes 51-15,[12] which provides in part that “the judges of the superior court shall make such orders and rules as they deem necessary or advisable concerning the hearing and determination of small claims At that time the Small Claims Court was a legislative court to which the general rulemaking authority of the Superior Court would not apply in the absence of such a statutory provision. Although the incorporation of the Small Claims Court into the Superior Court by the court unification act; General Statutes 51-164s; now makes the rulemaking power of
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the Superior Court applicable to Small Claims matters, it should be noted that the General Assembly clearly anticipated that the right to transfer would exist. Section 51-15 states that “[i]f a motion is granted to transfer a small claims matter to the regular docket in the court, the moving party shall pay the same fee as is paid for entering a civil action in the court.” See also General Statutes 52-259 (establishing the fee for transfer).
The defendant claims that she satisfied one of the grounds for transfer set forth in Practice Book 572 by filing an affidavit that a good defense exists and specifying its nature. We agree and conclude that the court should, therefore, have granted her motion.
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We note at the outset that the language of Practice Book 572, “shall transfer,” is generally construed as mandatory rather than permissive. See Hossan v. Hudiakoff 178 Conn. 381, 383, 423 A.2d 108 (1979). A trial court passing upon a motion made pursuant to a mandatory Practice Book rule can exercise no discretion other than in determining whether there is compliance with the rule. Moreover, Practice Book 572 serves as a means for defendants to avoid the informal procedure of Small Claims Court and to opt for the more structured procedure of the regular docket, including the right of jury trial and appeal. Compare Practice Book 547 through 591 to Practice Book 63 through 394. A Practice Book rule that protects important rights such as the right of jury trial and of appeal is generally construed as mandatory not directory. See State v. Cook, 183 Conn. 520, 441 A.2d 41
(1981); Finley v. Manson, 1 Conn. App. 260, 470 A.2d 1234 (1984).
We hold, therefore, that where a defendant satisfies one of the conditions for a transfer set out in Practice Book 572, his motion to transfer must be granted. In the present case the defendant alleged by affidavit that a good defense existed and requested a transfer. We find no deficiency in that affidavit which would render it insufficient to satisfy the requirement of Practice Book 572(2)(b) that the affidavit accompanying a motion to transfer state “that a good defense exists to the claim and [set] forth with specificity the nature of the defense . . . .`, Under these circumstances, the trial court had no discretion to deny the request.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to grant the defendant’s motion to transfer.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
(1983), we held that our standard for establishing aggrievement for the purposes of an administrative appeal applied with equal force to an appeal filed pursuant to General Statutes 52-263, the statute that then provided this court with general appellate jurisdiction. We believe that that standard is “compatible with traditional notions for appellate practice”; Id., 175; concerning writs of error as well.
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