CASE NO. 261 CRD-3-83Workers’ Compensation Commission
DECEMBER 23, 1986
The claimant was represented by Daniel Shepro, Esq., and Lorraine W. Osborne, Esq., Goldman, Rosen
Willinger, P.C.
Respondents were represented by Douglas L. Drayton, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.
This Petition for Review from the September 1, 1983 Decision On Motion To Reopen Order of Compensation of the Third District Commissioner was heard May 25, 1984 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners Robin Waller and Andrew Denuzze.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.
This claim by an alleged dependent spouse arises out of the employment related death of Charles Collier May 3, 1978. At that time there survived his common law spouse, the claimant here, and their daughter Fontella Rudene Williams. A Finding and Award was rendered January 7, 1980 by the Third District Commissioner awarding benefits to that daughter who had been born to the decedent and the present claimant October 19, 1966.
As the daughter approached eighteen years of age when her benefits would terminate, the mother moved to reopen the January 7, 1980 decision in order that she as a dependent common law spouse might present evidence of entitlement to dependency benefits under the law. It appears that the Third District may have been cognizant of that potential claim as Fontella resided with her mother. However, the Commissioner’s 1980 Finding and Award made no mention of the common law spouse’s claim. It may be that claimant should not have been here seeking to reopen an award which granted dependency benefits to her daughter. Rather she might better have sought an adjudication of her own dependency claim which had never been addressed in 1980.
But in whatever guise the claim is presented we must affirm the Commissioner’s denial. The claim rests on an appeal to equitable considerations. Its alleged legal basis relies on the annual trips of several weeks duration which the decedent and the claimant made to Alabama and South Carolina, states which recognize common law marriages. In those states during those visits to relatives they held themselves out to be and did live as man and wife. They did this for several years after the present claimant’s first husband died.
Claimant argues from those facts that such holding out and such living together constituted the legalization of the relationship in those states and that under the doctrine of lex loci contractus followed in Delaney v. Delaney, 29 Conn. Sup. 41
(1979) the arrangement thus became a legal marriage which Connecticut must recognize in accordance with the constitutional Full Faith and Credit clause and conflict of law doctrines.
The theory is an ingenious one imaginatively crafted by claimant’s counsel. But much as we would like to do equity, we cannot follow it. Delaney, a decision at the trial court level is not binding precedent. Besides the instant fact situation is not on all fours with Delaney. Their relationship was contracted in Connecticut, the state of the parties domicile and not in Alabama and South Carolina which they visited temporarily. In Delaney the relationship was contracted in Rhode Island, their domiciliary state, a jurisdiction which recognized common law marriages. Here, Connecticut does not recognize such marriages.
For these reasons the claimant’s appeal is dismissed, and the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
Commissioners Robin Waller and Andrew Denuzze concur.