CASE NO. 181 CRD-3-82Workers’ Compensation Commission
DECEMBER 1, 1986
The claimant was represented by Gerald F. Stevens, Esq.
The respondents were represented by Douglas L. Drayton, Esq.
This Petition for Review from the November 23, 1982 Finding and Award of the Third District Commissioner was heard December 9, 1983 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and Frank Verrilli.
FINDING AND AWARD
The Finding and Award of the Third District Commissioner is affirmed and adopted as the Finding and Award of this tribunal.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.
Claimant a volunteer fireman in the respondent City sought compensation for a fractured left ankle alleging that his injury occurred while engaged in “fire duty” activities as defined in 7-314 C.G.S. on September 12, 1981. On that day Milford had a parade of fire vehicles in conjunction with a muster sponsored by a private non-profit corporation, Engine Company 260. Claimant’s Engine Company 5 participated in these events as did the five other volunteer fire companies. The muster was held in a City park and was preceded by a morning parade of fire vehicles. After claimant participated in various competitive events at the muster he was asked by Lieutenant William Soda of volunteer Engine Company 1 to assist members of that company in returning an antique fire engine to its headquarters. Claimant acceded to the request, helped load the engine on a trailer and rode back with it. During the ride back, in the mid afternoon, he fell from the trailer and fractured his ankle. The Third District Commissioner found the injury compensable under Sections 7-314[1] and 7-322a[2] C.G.S.
It is clear that in the language of 7-322a claimant offered his services to the person in charge of another fire company. The issue in dispute is whether in offering those services the claimant was “returning directly from” a parade and therefore engaged in fire duties under 7-314. There is no Connecticut precedent on this particular point. Although the authorities cited in 1A LARSON, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW 27.34 (1985) are somewhat in conflict, we think Northwest Conejos Fire Prevention District v. Industrial Comm., 39 Colo. App. 367, 566 P.2d 717 (1977) and Village of Hilbert v. Department of Indus., Labor Human Relations, 40 Wis.2d 598, 162 N.W.2d 596 (1968) represent the better reasoning on the point.
The respondent municipality’s appeal contends that the adverb “directly” refers to directly in time. It argues that the return needed to be accomplished immediately or soon after the completion of the morning parade rather than in the afternoon in order to be considered “fire duties” within the meaning of the statute. It wishes “directly” to be interpreted in a temporal rather than a spatial or geometric sense. We hold rather to the latter meaning of the adverb as expressed in the Euclidian Axiom that “A straight line is the shortest distance between two points.
Therefore we agree with the Commissioner below. The finding of compensability is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and Frank Verrilli concur.