COLLINS v. JIFFY AUTO RADIATOR, INC., 993 CRD-3-90-3 (10-30-91)

PATRICK COLLINS, CLAIMANT-APPELLANT v. JIFFY AUTO RADIATOR, INC., EMPLOYER and AETNA LIFE CASUALTY, INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

CASE NO. 993 CRD-3-90-3Workers’ Compensation Commission
OCTOBER 30, 1991

The claimant was represented by Bryan LeClerc, Esq., Brayton
Mengacci.

The respondents were represented by Anne Kelly Zovas, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.

This Petition for Review from the March 14, 1990 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner for the Third District was heard March 22, 1991 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr. and James Metro.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

Claimant’s appeal does not dispute the Third District finding that no written notice of claim was given within a year of the July 15, 1986 back injury. However, he argues that the employer furnished medical care and that the claim therefore is compensable under the constructive notice exceptions of Sec. 31-294, C.G.S.[1]

Claimant contends that the payment of his medical bills by his group health insurance and the fact that he informed his employer orally of the injury entitles him to the medical care exception. Further, he argues the employer was under an obligation to provide medical care and that the employer’s obligation for medical care was fulfilled by the group health insurance carrier.

Directly on point is Clapps v. Waterbury Iron Works, Inc., 38 Conn. Sup. 644 (1983). Clapps held that claims submitted to a group health insurance for a work related injury did not constitute the furnishing of medical care under Sec. 31-294
C.G.S. The Clapps court stated:

To “provide” means “to supply what is needed.” Webster, Third New International Dictionary . . . . The defendant’s sole relationship to the medical services provided here was the employer’s . . . contribution to the fund. The circumstances under which the medical care was “provided” are simply too remote to meet the terms of the exception to the statutory rule.

Id. at 648. See also, Janco v. Town of Fairfield, 39 Conn. Sup. 403
(1983)[.]

The above two cited cases are therefore dispositive of the issue on the furnished medical care exception.

We affirm the Third District decision and dismiss the appeal.

Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr. and James Metro concur.

[1] Sec. 31-294. Notice of injury and of claim for compensation. No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, . . . Such notice may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting therefrom, or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of such disease, as the case may be, and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed . . . . or if within the applicable period an employee has been furnished, for the injury with respect to which compensation is claimed, with medical or surgical care as hereafter provided in this section, no want of such notice of claim shall be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings and in no case shall any defect or inaccuracy of such notice of claim be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings and in no case shall any defect or inaccuracy of such notice of claim be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings unless the employer shows that he was ignorant of the facts concerning such personal injury and was prejudiced by the defect or inaccuracy of such notice.