CROCETTO v. LYNN DEVELOPMENT CORP., 979 CRD-5-90-2 (8-29-91)

FRANK CROCETTO, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE v. LYNN DEVELOPMENT CORP., EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT

CASE NO. 979 CRD-5-90-2Workers’ Compensation Commission
AUGUST 29, 1991

The claimant was represented by Deborah M. DelBuono, Esq.

The respondent was represented by Edward T. Dodd, Jr.

This Petition for Review from the February 5, 1990 Finding and Award and March 26, 1990 Supplemental Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Fifth District was heard February 22, 1991 before a Compensation in Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

Respondent seeks to overturn the Fifth District holdings in the February 5, 1990 Finding and Award and the March 26, 1990 Supplemental Finding and Award. In both awards the commissioner ordered respondent to provide claimant and his family with group health insurance benefits pursuant to Sec. 31-284b.

The parties Voluntary Agreement approved June 23, 1986 stated claimant had suffered a ten per cent (10%) permanent partial back disability. Maximum medical improvement was reached October 21, 1985. At the time of claimant’s injury there was in place an employer financed group health insurance for employees and their families. The employer discontinued this employee’s group health insurance in October, 1986 when the fifty-two weeks specific benefits ran out. But claimant continued to receive Sec. 31-308a C.G.S. benefits after October, 1986. Also claimant received Division of Workers’ Rehabilitation benefits tuition payments and weekly subsistence vocational rehabilitation allowances, from September 1987 to August 25, 1989. The commissioner therefore found that claimant was eligible for chapter 568 payments until august 25, 1989. Consequently he ordered the respondent to provide equivalent group health insurance coverage and to defray casts of any medical expenses incurred during the period claimant and his family should have been covered under Sec. 31-284b.

Section 31-284b[1] requires an employer to continue equivalent health insurance “while the employee is eligible to receive or is receiving workers’ compensation payments pursuant to this chapter.” Respondent argues that receipt of subsistence payments from the Division of Workers’ Rehabilitation after January 14, 1987 is not a receipt of workers’ compensation payments under this chapter. We disagree.

Shallcross v. New London, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 150, 935 CR-2-89-10 (1990) held that a claimant entitled to Sec. 7-433c benefits was eligible to receive Sec. 31-283a
rehabilitation benefits. Our opinion relied on Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181 (1990) and Deschnow v. Stamford, 214 Conn. 394 (1990) which held that a claimant under Sec. 7-433c was entitled to all benefits available under chapter 568. The Deschnow court reviewed its holding in Felia, and stated, “We construed Sec. 7-433c to require that, once Sec. 7-433c coverage is established the measurement of an employee’s economic benefits must be the same as the measure of damages for economic benefits provided to a disabled employee under chapter 568. Id, 185.” Deschnow, supra at 397. Shallcross, Felia and Deschnow together indicate that all chapter 568 benefits, including the Sec. 31-283a
vocational rehabilitation benefits here, are to be considered included in the Sec. 31-284b formula “eligible to receive or is receiving workers’ compensation payments pursuant to this chapter.”

Sec. 1-1 C.G.S. mandates that statutes are to “construed according to commonly approved usage of the language; and technical works and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.” “Payment” has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as:

The fulfillment of a promise, or the performance of an agreement. A discharge of an obligation or debt. . . . In a more restricted legal sense payment is this performance of a duty, promise, or obligation, or discharge of a debt or liability, by the delivery of money or other valuable thing . . . payment is a delivery of money or its equivalent in either specific property or services by one person from whom it is due to another person to whom it is due. . . .

Black’s Law Dictionary, 1016 (5th ed. 1979).

A subsistence allowance provided to a claimant during the period of his vocational rehabilitation under Sec. 31-283a
satisfies the definition of “payment.” That “payment’ arose under a program and funding procedure which is a part of chapter 568. Sec. 31-284b(a) as thus construed requires continuation of the claimant’s health insurance.

Our holding is also consistent with the public policy expressed in, Sec. 31-284b (a), “In order to maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees who suffer employment-related injuries, any employer . . . who provides . . . health insurance . . . shall provide to such employee equivalent insurance coverage . . . while the employee is eligible to receive or is receiving workers’ compensation payments pursuant to this chapter. . . .” (emphasis ours). Beyond the principles of statutory construction cited, the broad social policy expressed by the legislature over the past eight decades dictates that the Workers Compensation Act is to be liberally construed. Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 558
(1972). See also, Tufaro v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 234, 238 (1991) quoting Klapproth v. Turner, 156, Conn. 276, 279 (1968) (citation omitted).

Tufaro, supra, is also dispositive of the second issue presented in the appeal, whether the law requires the employer to continue health insurance for the claimant’s family. The commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s continued health insurance coverage includes coverage for this family was correct

We therefore affirm the Fifth District: and dismiss the Appeal.

Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle concur.