LEONARD DANIELS v. PATRICK J. MOHAN, JR. ET AL.

2007 Ct. Sup. 17831, 44 CLR 358
No. CV 07-5011554Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
October 24, 2007

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JERRY WAGNER, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.

This action arises from an alleged incident in which the plaintiff, Leonard Daniels, was injured in a motor vehicle collision, when the other defendant, John Derrico struck the rear of Patrick Mohan’s stopped motor vehicle, who in turn struck the rear of the plaintiff’s stopped motor vehicle.

Mohan has filed this motion for summary judgment with respect to all claims contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, dated June 8, 2007.

In count one of that complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of Mohan in the following ways: failing to keep a reasonable and proper lookout; failing to sound his horn or give warning of the impending collision; failing to turn his vehicle in order to avoid the collision; operating a vehicle with defective or inadequate brakes or failing to apply the brakes; failing to keep and operate his vehicle under proper control. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that Mohan violated General Statutes § 14-240, which provides in relevant part: “(a) No driver of a motor vehicle shall follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions . . .”

Mohan argues that he did not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff and was not negligent because he was at a complete stop behind the plaintiff’s vehicle, when he was struck in the rear by Derrico’s motor vehicle. Plaintiff claims that there is a genuine issue of material fact as demonstrated by Mohan’s affidavit in which he states that he was stopped behind the plaintiff, estimating that the vehicles were less than one foot apart, raising an issue of fact whether the distance between Mohan’s motor vehicle and the plaintiff’s motor vehicle was a reasonably safe distance.

CT Page 17832 In Wrinn v. State, our Supreme Court interpreted § 14-240 as follows: “[I]n the context of a motor vehicle statute, the term `follow’ implies movement of two vehicles: a leader and a follower. Thus, § 14-240, read in light of the plain meaning of the word `follow,’ requires that in order to prove a violation the plaintiff must show that: (1) the rear vehicle `followed’ the front vehicle; and (2) the distance between the vehicles was closer than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wrinn v. State, 234 Conn. 401, 406, 661 A.2d 1034 (1995).

Judge Holden has observed that “[i]n the context of multi-car accidents . . . judges of the Superior Court have consistently granted summary judgment where it is undisputed that the middle vehicle was stopped at the time of the accident and the plaintiff fails to submit any evidence that the driver of the middle vehicle operated his car negligently.” Corsi v. Pascal, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven. Docket No. CV 04-40045345 (June 13, 2007, Holden, J.).

In the present case, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mohan was at a complete stop prior to the occurrence of the accident; the plaintiff concedes this point in both his complaint and affidavit. To make his claim legally sufficient under § 14-240 would require the plaintiff to allege that the vehicles were actually moving, with one vehicle following behind another vehicle and that the distance between the vehicles was not reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. Moreover, the plaintiff has not presented any evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether Mohan was negligent in the operation of his vehicle at the time of the collision.

CT Page 17833