2006 Ct. Sup. 8116
No. CV 05-4010665Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
May 3, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE (#131)
LOIS TANZER, JUDGE.
In the plaintiff’s two-count substitute complaint he alleges that he purchased a tractor manufactured by the defendant and that after a year of use, the plaintiff questioned the pulling and towing strength of the tractor and has sought information from the defendant to answer his questions. In count one, the plaintiff is seeking as damages the fees to pay an engineer to answer his questions. In count two, the plaintiff is seeking damages which he did not receive in a prior action in small claims between the parties allegedly because the defendant gave false evidence upon which the magistrate based his award which was less than a full award. The defendant has moved to strike both counts.
“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).” A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 173, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004). “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004).
The defendant moves to strike the first count because the defendant claims the first count is a claim for expert fees in order to support the cost of litigation. The plaintiff in his memorandum counters that he is seeking damages to cover the cost CT Page 8117 to him of obtaining information about the load capacity of the tractor that he claims has not been supplied by the defendant — which is the “object of the litigation.” When read in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the first count states a viable claim.
Accordingly, the motion to strike the first count is denied.
The defendant moves to strike the second count because it fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for intentional misrepresentation. “A cause of action for intentional misrepresentation is essentially a claim of fraud.” Martinez v. Zovich, 87 Conn.App. 766, 778 (2005). “The essential elements of an action in fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are: (1) that a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) that it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) that it was made to induce the other party to act on it; and (4) that the latter did so act on it to his injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 643, 850 A.2d 145 (2004).
The second count does not state a claim for intentional misrepresentation because, even when read in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, elements three and four are not alleged. The claim as stated seems to be directed at the effect of the alleged misrepresentations or statements upon the small claims court, not upon the plaintiff herein.
Accordingly, the motion to strike the second count is granted. CT Page 8118