CASE NO. 1095 CRD-2-90-8Workers’ Compensation Commission
JUNE 25, 1991
The claimant was represented by Mark Oberlatz, Esq., and Nathan J. Shafner, Esq., both of O’Brien, Shafner, Bartinik, Stuart Kelly.
The respondents Cigna and Aetna were represented at the trial level by Jason Dodge, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick. The respondent, Cigna and Aetna did not participate in appellate proceedings.
The respondent employer’ was represented by John W. Greiner, Esq., National Employers Company, Murphy
Beane.
This Petition for Review from the May 5, 1990 Ruling on Motion to Preclude and August 3, 1990 Ruling on Claimant’s Motion to Correct Ruling on Motion to Preclude of the Commissioner for the Second District was heard December 14, 1990 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Angelo dos Santos.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.
This appeal by the respondent employer, arises because the Second District under Sec. 31-297 (b) granted claimant widow’s Motion to Preclude defenses thereby establishing an irrebuttable presumption of compensability. In earlier ruling the commissioner had denied the Motion, but he reversed his ruling when further stipulated facts were brought to his attention.
The claimant had filed a Notice of Claim with the employer by certified mail October 6, 1989. A similar certified mail notice was filed in the Second District October 10, 1989. One of the respondent insurers, Cigna, filed a disclaimer October 27 1989. The commissioner ruled that the disclaimer was not timely filed as Sec. 31-297 (b) then required a disclaimer to be filed within twenty days.
On appeal the respondent argues preclusion should not lie as (1) the widow’s October 6, 1989 Notice of Claim failed to list the address of the decedent employee and (2) the employer’s disclaimer was timely filed as it was within twenty days of the commissioner’s receipt of the Notice of Claim even if not within twenty days of the employer’s receipt of the same notice.
We have considered the first issue raised before. See, Fuller v. Central Paving, Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 92, 655 CRD-1-87 (1988), Dorsett on facts similar to the Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 805 CRD-2-88-12 (1990) aff’d 23 Conn. App. 827
(1990) (per curiam). Dorsett on facts similar to the present case held that Sec. 31-294 did not require the address of a deceased employee where the name and address of the person, the widow, in whose interest compensation was claimed appeared on the notice. Subsequently, the Appellate Court affirmed our decision. Hence Dorsett, is dispositive of this issue. Claimant’s Notice of Claim was legally sufficient to trigger the preclusive effects of Sec. 31-297 (b).
As to the timeliness argument. Sec. 31-297 (b) provides if, part:
Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the compensation commissioner, on or before the twentieth day after he has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the commissioners stating that the right to compensation is contested the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury or death and the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested, and a copy thereof shall be sent to the employee. (emphasis ours )
Respondent contends that the statutory language does not specify the antecedent of the second underlined “he” if, the excerpt cited above. Therefore, the argument runs, the second “he” could refer to the commissioner. If the law is so interpreted, then the October 27 disclaimer was filed within twenty days of October 10 and is therefore timely. We do not agree with this linguistic analysis. The subject of the sentence is the employer. The first “he” clearly refers to that subject.
“It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that where the same words are used in a statute two or more times they will ordinarily be given the same meaning in each instance.” State ex rel. Hyde. v. Dowe, 129 Conn. 266, 271 (1942). Here the statutory language makes it clear that the twenty day window for filing the disclaimer begins when the employer receives the notice of claim. If the respondent’s interpretation were correct, and the claim here had been filed with the commissioner October 6 and with the employer October 10, then the employer would have only sixteen days after receipt of notice in which to answer. The statute obviously contemplated that the employer had twenty days after its receipt of notice in which to file its response. In both instances the “he” in Sec. 31-297 (b) refers to the employer.
We therefore affirm the trial commissioner’s ruling granting the claimant’s Motion to Preclude and dismiss the appeal.
Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Angelo dos Santos concur.