2010 Ct. Sup. 12407
No. FST CV 07 5004187Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford
June 11, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR STAY #147
BRAZZEL-MASSARO, J.
BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2007, the plaintiff, General Electric Capital Corporation of Puerto Rico (GE Capital), filed an application for prejudgment remedy, as well as a one count complaint against the defendants, Suhail Rizvi a/k/a Suhail R. Rizvi and Patti Jean Blanchard a/k/a PattiJean Rizvi. This action arises out of an alleged breach of an aircraft lease agreement (Lease) executed between the plaintiff and Inter-Island Air, Inc. (Inter-Island), for which the defendants signed an individual guaranty (Guaranty) for any payments becoming due on behalf of Inter-Island pursuant to the Lease. The court, Downey, J., granted the plaintiff’s application for prejudgment remedy on June 2, 2008, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court, 113 Conn.App. 673, 971 A.2d 41 (2009). On February 10, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to stay, in response to which the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition. The matter was heard at short calendar on April 19, 2010.
DISCUSSION
“In the absence of a statutory mandate, the granting of an application or a motion for a stay of an action or proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial court . . . [T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams and Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn.App. 289, 311-12, 975 A.2d 715 (2009).
“The court has the inherent power to stay proceedings before it in the interest of the just resolution of controversies.” Kutcher v. Connecticut Vascular Thoratic Surgical Associates, P.C., Superior Court, judicial CT Page 12408 district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 09 5026130 (January 7, 2010, Gilardi, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 137, 138). “An order staying proceedings does not terminate the action but merely postpones its disposition. It may be modified or vacated by the court whenever, in the exercise of a sound discretion, it is considered necessary or proper to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Success Centers, Inc. v. Huntington Learning Centers, Inc., 223 Conn. 761, 613 A.2d 1320 (1992). “Motions to stay proceedings are interlocutory.” State v. Spandolino, 189 Conn. 92, 96, 454 A.2d 720 (1983).
“A stay leaves the court in a position to monitor the progress in the parallel litigation, and to reassert its jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute if the interests of justice so dictate or require. It is abundantly clear that allowing parallel actions to proceed will require needless additional expenditures of time and resources of the litigants, counsel and the courts, will not further or promote judicial economy, and may tend to encourage forum shopping and condone procedural gamesmanship at the expense of the interest of justice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pellecchia v. The Connecticut Light and Power Co., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Hartford, Docket No. X04 CV 09 6004337 (January 20, 2010, Shapiro, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 249, 249).
The defendants argue that a stay of the present action is warranted, pending the resolution of the civil action still pending in Puerto Rico, as the claims made against the defendants are identical in both cases, and a stay of the present action is necessary to avoid both the expense of litigating two cases with identical factual and legal issues, and to avoid the possibility of inconsistent results. Further, the defendants argue that the plaintiff will suffer no prejudice from the granting of a stay, as the plaintiff has obtained a prejudgment remedy in the present action.
The plaintiff responds that the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendants has been joined and extensively litigated before this court since June 2007, including a substantive prejudgment remedy hearing at which this court heard evidence over a period lasting two and one-half days. The plaintiff further argues that this late filed motion to stay, which comes on the heels of multiple unsuccessful attempts by the defendants to dismiss this case, including an appeal, is clearly an eleventh-hour ploy to prevent this court from entering summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on its complaint herein.
The factual background, as alleged is as follows. Inter-Island executed and delivered to the plaintiff the Lease, dated September 3, 1999. Inter-Island defaulted on the Lease, in response to which the plaintiff CT Page 12409 filed suit in Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico action) against Inter-Island on the Lease, against the defendants on the Guaranty, and against Electronic Manufacturing Services, Inc. (EMS) on a separate guaranty. That action, bearing Civil No. KCD2007-0257 (903), remains pending. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed the present action against the defendants in Connecticut, in which the court Downey, J., granted the plaintiff’s prejudgment remedy. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed for summary judgment in the present action, which is still pending before the court. The defendants then filed a motion for stay of the proceedings in Connecticut, citing the pending Puerto Rico action.
The plaintiff explains that it filed the Connecticut action against the defendants upon discovering that neither Inter-Island nor EMS operated or had assets in Puerto Rico, and that the defendants were Connecticut residents. Accordingly, the two actions arise from the same factual circumstances, with the only difference being that the present action was not filed against all of the defendants in the Puerto Rico action. Specifically, the action in Puerto Rico contains claims against the present defendants as to the Guaranty, which are the same or similar claims as in the present action.[1] Although the plaintiff further argues that the present action is an independent action on the Guaranty, and was not brought in reliance of the Puerto Rico action, the issue is whether ruling on the subsequently filed action could cause res judicata or collateral estoppel complications. Addressing why the Puerto Rico action is still pending as against the present defendants, the plaintiff argues that it has attempted to withdraw the Puerto Rico action, albeit unsuccessfully, due to the objections of the defendants in the Puerto Rico action. The plaintiff, however, provides no details as to why this is the case, leaving the court to deal with the predicament of two similar pending actions. The plaintiff further states that it does not attempt to proceed in the Puerto Rico action, however procedurally, absent a stay, dismissal or withdrawal of the Puerto Rico action, it is not prevented from doing so. Accordingly, regardless of what the reason is for the pending Puerto Rico action, it was filed first in time, and should, due to overlapping issues and factual circumstances, be resolved first, before entering final and potentially contradicting judgment in the present action. The court has the discretionary power to grant the defendants’ motion to stay, and in the present case, the overwhelming arguments appear to show that the issues and parties are similar, if not the same, in both cases, that the Puerto Rico action was filed first in time and remains pending.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, as the Puerto Rico action was filed prior to the CT Page 12410 Connecticut action and remains pending, the court grants the defendants’ motion to stay the present action.
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