587 A.2d 124
(14084)Supreme Court of Connecticut
PETERS, C.J., SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO and BORDEN, Js.
Consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed on an individual for criminal offenses are, by statute (18-7), to be aggregated and construed as one continuous term of imprisonment for the purpose of calculating the good time credits to which that individual may be entitled, regardless of when any of the sentences was imposed.
Argued October 31, 1990
Decision released February 26, 1991
Amended petition, in each case, for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the cases were consolidated and tried to the court, Axelrod, J.; judgment granting the petitions, from which the respondent, on the granting of certification, appealed. Affirmed.
Madeline A. Bontatibus, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Clarine Nardi Riddle, then attorney general, for the appellant (respondent).
John W. Watson, assistant public defender, for the appellees (petitioners).
CALLAHAN, J.
The petitioner, Robin Elliott, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight to sixteen years in 1974, and was later sentenced to a term of three to six years for escape in 1977. The two sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Elliott claims that under General Statutes 18-7[1] the three to six year
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sentence that was imposed in 1977 should be aggregated with his eight to sixteen year sentence and construed as one continuous term of imprisonment of eleven to twenty-two years. If so construed, he argues, he is entitled to receive good time credit at the rate of fifteen days per month under General Statutes 18-7a
(a)[2] on his three to six year sentence immediately upon his discharge from his initial eight to
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sixteen year term. The respondent commissioner of correction, on the other hand, contends that 18-7 has no application to Elliott’s three to six year sentence because that sentence was imposed after October 1, 1976. The respondent consequently has refused to aggregate Elliott’s sentences. The respondent, rather, has required that Elliott serve his consecutive sentences as two separate and distinct terms and that he be released or paroled from his eight to sixteen year sentence before commencing to serve his three to six year sentence. As a result, Elliott will receive good time credit pursuant to 18-7a (a) at the rate of only ten days per month for the first five years of his three to six year sentence instead of the fifteen days per month he would receive if his sentences were aggregated.
The petitioner, Edward Boyle, was sentenced on January 4, 1982, in the judicial district of Hartford, to a term of imprisonment of six to twelve years and on July 20, 1983, was sentenced in the judicial district of Tolland to a term of fifteen to thirty years.[3]
Boyle’s fifteen to thirty year sentence was ordered by the sentencing judge in Tolland to be served consecutively to his initial six to twelve year term.[4] In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Boyle claims that under 18-7
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his sentences should be construed as one continuous term of imprisonment of twenty-one to forty-two years. The respondent maintains, however, that 18-7 has no application to Boyle because he was sentenced after October 1, 1976, and therefore is not entitled to have his sentences aggregated. The respondent instead has treated Boyle’s consecutive sentences as two separate and distinct terms. That treatment of his sentences requires that he be released or paroled from his six to twelve year sentence before he, in effect, starts over and begins serving his fifteen to thirty year sentence. If the respondent is correct, Boyle will serve the first five years of his fifteen to thirty year sentence receiving good time credit at the rate of only ten days per month. If Boyle is correct and his sentences are construed as one continuous term, he will be entitled to receive good time credit for the sixth and subsequent years of his aggregated sentences at the rate of fifteen days per month under 18-7a (a).
Both of these cases are controlled by our decision published this same date in McCarthy v. Warden, 217 Conn. 568, 587 A.2d 116 (1991). In McCarthy, we concluded that 18-7 mandates the aggregation of consecutive sentences imposed subsequent to October 1, 1976, as well as those imposed before that date. Id. That conclusion requires that the petitioners’ consecutive sentences be aggregated under 18-7 and that their sentences be construed, as to each petitioners as one continuous term of imprisonment for the purpose of calculating good time credits.
In view of our disposition of the petitioners’ principal claim, it is unnecessary to consider their constitutional arguments. Manchester Sand Gravel Co. v. South Windsor, 203 Conn. 267, 270, 524 A.2d 621
(1987); State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 322,
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511 A.2d 1000 (1986); Alexander v. Robinson, 185 Conn. 540, 548, 441 A.2d 166 (1981).
The judgment is affirmed in both cases.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.