FELIA v. TOWN OF WESTPORT, 703 CRD-4-88-3 (9-25-89)

STEPHEN FELIA CLAIMANT-APPELLEE vs. TOWN OF WESTPORT EMPLOYER INSURER RESPONDENT-APPELLANT

CASE NO. 703 CRD-4-88-3Workers’ Compensation Commission
SEPTEMBER 25, 1989

The claimant was represented by Gerald F. Stevens, Esq.

The respondent was represented by Stephen L. Savarese, Esq., and Michael S. Lynch, Esq., both of Bai, Pollock Dunnigan.

This Petition for Review from the February 26, 1988 Supplemental Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Fourth District was heard May 19, 1989 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John Arcudi and Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Robin Waller.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

Respondent’s appeal argues that specific award is not payable under Sec. 7-433c[1] heart and hypertension legislation. The municipality seeks to rely on Morgan v. East Haven, 208 Conn. 576 (1988), an opinion containing language stating that Sec. 7-433c benefits “were more similar to special benefits than to specific benefits under the workers’ compensation statute,” Id. at 585.

In Morgan, the decedent, a former East Haven fire chief received a specific award for 75 per cent permanent partial impairment of his cardiovascular system, or 585 weeks of specific benefits. He received some of those specific benefits during his lifetime. On his death his dependent widow continued to receive part of the unexpired weekly portion of the specific award. However the widow died before all the 585 weeks had transpired. The issue before the court, absent any other surviving dependents, was whether the estates of William and Doris Morgan, the decedent and his widow, were entitled to the unpaid portion of the 585 weekly benefits specific award.

Nowhere in the Morgan opinion is there any intimation that the original award for specific benefits to the decedent was incorrect. In fact the court declares if the period for which benefits were to be paid had transpired or if the specific award had been commuted and not yet paid, then the Doris Morgan estate would be entitled to it.

Thus the Morgan holding is that when there are no eligible surviving dependents under Sec. 31-306, the unexpired and unmatured portion of the specific award does not become an asset of the estates of the decedent or the decedent’s dependent. The language in the opinion about special benefits and economic loss only has to do with that issue. Morgan does not reverse or distinguish Middletown v. Local 1073, 1 Conn. App. 58
(1983), cert. dismissed 192 Conn. 803 (1984). In fact, it reiterates the court’s praise for “the sound reasoning” of that Appellate Court opinion. Middletown holds that Sec. 7-433c benefits are not workers’ compensation benefits for the purposes of determining liability. However they are Chapter 568 benefits for the purposes of calculating benefits due. As specific benefits are payable for heart and hypertension disabilities under Sec. 31-308(d) of Chapter 568, then the commissioner’s ruling here was correct, Griffin v. Town of Groton, 5 Conn. Workers Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 425 CRD-2-85 (1988).

We therefore affirm the Finding and Award.

Commissioner’s Gerald Kolinsky and Robin Waller concur.

[1] Sec. 7-433c preamble provides: In recognition of the peculiar problems of uniformed members of paid fire departments and regular members of paid police departments, and in recognition of the unusual risks attendant upon these occupations, including an unusual high degree of susceptibility to heart disease and hypertension, and in recognition that the enactment of a statute which protects such fire department and police department members against economic loss resulting from disability or death caused by hypertension or heart disease would act as an inducement in attracting and securing persons for such employment, and in recognition, that the public interest and welfare will be promoted by providing such protection for such fire department and police department members, municipal employers shall provide compensation as follows: “Had the commuted payment been outstanding at the time of Doris Morgan’s death, there is little dispute that the outstanding balance of the commuted amount would be due and payable to the estate. At the time of commutation, that portion of the compensation that was commuted became mature and, thus, immediately due and owing. See General Statutes Sec. 31-302. The remainder of the award, however, still was payable weekly and remained unmatured. Therefore, the holding in Bassett controls, and the weekly compensation that remains unpaid does not have to be paid to the estate of the deceased recipient.” Morgan v. East Haven, supra, 587-588.