645 A.2d 1050
(12304)Appellate Court of Connecticut
LANDAU, SCHALLER and SPEAR, Js.
The defendant division of special revenue of the department of revenue services appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff’s appeal from the defendant’s decision revoking the plaintiff’s temporary license to play jai alai at licensed jai alai frontons in this state. Held that the trial court exceeded its restricted power by weighing the evidence presented to the defendant and ruling on it, and by entertaining new arguments and applying a new regulatory scheme to the facts of the case; accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was set aside and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Argued April 4, 1994
Decision released August 2, 1994
Appeal from a decision by the defendant revoking the plaintiff’s license to play jai alai at licensed jai alai frontons in this state, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the court, Aurigemma, J.; judgment sustaining the appeal, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Richard M. Sheridan, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).
James J. Ruane, with whom, on the brief, was R. Joseph Gribko, certified legal intern, for the appellee (plaintiff).
LANDAU, J.
The defendant, the division of special revenue of the department of revenue services (division),[1]
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appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, James Fetter, and vacating the division’s decision revoking the plaintiff’s temporary license to play jai alai at licensed jai alai frontons in Connecticut. The division claims that the trial court improperly (1) applied the incorrect standard of review to the division’s decision to revoke the plaintiff’s license to play jai alai, (2) determined that a statement made by an absent third party was unreliable hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible, and (3) held that a specific regulation prohibiting a player from wagering on the results of jai alai games could not provide the basis for the suspension or revocation of the plaintiff’s license.
The following facts are relevant to this case. In the fall of 1990, the legalized gambling investigation unit (LGIU) of the state police initiated an investigation of possible illegal gambling activities of certain licensed jai alai players in Connecticut. The LGIU received information that Scott Hyatt, a jai alai game announcer, was involved in illegal bookmaking. The investigators seized garbage from outside of Hyatt’s residence. A search of the garbage produced three documents resembling gambling records that referred to the plaintiff. The LGIU then procured a search warrant of Hyatt’s residence; this search yielded additional documents that resembled gambling records with the name of the plaintiff written on them. At the time of the search, Hyatt told the investigating officer, Detective Richard Zaccagnino, that he operated a sports betting operation during the 1990 football season for which he charged a fee for the placement of wagers, and that the plaintiff had placed wagers with him during that time. The
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plaintiff was licensed to play jai alai at the jai alai frontons in the state.
After a hearing, the division of special revenue found that the plaintiff had engaged in unlawful professional gambling activities while licensed as a jai alai player. Such activity, the division held, rendered the plaintiff’s “continued participation in jai alai inconsistent with the public interest and with the best interest of jai alai generally pursuant to 12-574-D9a (d)[2] of the Administrative Regulations [of Connecticut State Agencies], Operation of Jai Alai.” On this basis, the division revoked the plaintiff’s license to play jai alai, and denied him admission to and attendance at all facilities licensed by the gaming policy board and operated by the division of special revenue.
The plaintiff filed an appeal challenging the division’s decision in the Superior Court. The trial court vacated the decision of the division on the grounds that the evidence consisted of unreliable hearsay statements. The trial court also concluded, in the alternative, that even if the evidence supported the division’s conclusion that the plaintiff engaged in illegal gambling, such conduct could not constitute grounds for license revocation under 12-574-D26(k) of the regulations.[3] The division filed this appeal.
The division claims that the trial court improperly found that 12-574-D26(k) of the regulations, which
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prohibits players from wagering on the results of jai alai games, cannot form the basis of the plaintiff’s license revocation.[4] We agree.
The trial court stated in its memorandum of decision that the plaintiff’s “license was not revoked pursuant to [12-574-D26(k)] but, rather, pursuant to 12-574-D9a and 12-574-E6(d)(B) (iii) of the division’s regulations.” Yet, the court concluded that because 12-574-D26(k) itemized specifically prohibited conduct — wagering by players on the results of the jai alai games — itemization should be deemed exclusive. The trial court held that because the regulations relied on by the division in revoking the plaintiff’s license refer generally to licensees, as opposed to players, the statute containing the specific references to players’ conduct should prevail over the general. The trial court then concluded that the plaintiff’s conduct did not violate the specific regulation prohibiting wagering by jai alia players, and that, even if his conduct had violated General Statutes 53-278b,[5] “such conduct would not constitute grounds for a license revocation under the division of special revenue’s own regulations.”
Judicial review of the division’s decision is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes 4-166 through 4-189. “With regard to
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questions of fact, it is neither the function of the trial court nor of this court `to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.’ . . . `Judicial review of conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion . . . .'” (Citations omitted.) Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986). “[T]he court may not substitute its own balance of the regulatory considerations for that of the agency . . . .” Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 51, 58, 591 A.2d 1231 (1991).
Applying the appropriate standard of review to the trial court’s actions, we conclude that the trial court exceeded its restricted power. The court was required to determine whether, in light of the evidence adduced at the hearing, the division acted reasonably, objectively and within its discretion in revoking the plaintiff’s license. Nevertheless, not only did the trial court weigh the evidence presented to the gaming board, and rule on it, but it also entertained new arguments from the plaintiff and applied a new regulatory scheme to the facts of this case. The gaming board did not base its decision to revoke the plaintiff’s license on a violation of 12-574-D26(k) of the regulations. In fact, the board’s decision makes no mention of this regulation. Therefore, for the court to hold, as it did, that the specificity of this regulation precludes the division from revoking the plaintiff’s license because of his illegal gambling activities was an abuse of its discretion.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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