FRANKLIN v. BERGER, 211 Conn. 591 (1989)

560 A.2d 444

(13450)Supreme Court of Connecticut

HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, Js.

The petitioner, who had been committed to a mental hospital for a maximum term of ten years following his acquittal by reason of insanity of the crime of manslaughter, sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the state’s refusal to credit his pretrial jail time against the length of his commitment violated his equal protection rights. The trial court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court set aside the trial court’s judgment, and, on the granting of certification, the respondent appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court erred in finding an equal protection violation; the discharge from confinement of all insanity acquittees is based on their ability to prove that they are no longer a danger to themselves or others, not on the expiration of a fixed maximum term, and the refusal to credit the petitioner’s pretrial jail time against the fixed maximum term set by the trial court did not cause him to be treated in a way different than are acquittees who, because they were able to post bond, were not confined prior to trial.

Argued January 12, 1989

Decision released June 20, 1989

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex and tried to the court, Koletsky, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, Daly, Norcott and Foti, Js., which set aside the trial court’s decision and remanded the case with direction to credit the petitioner with time spent in confinement prior to trial, and the respondent, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed.

Carl J. Schuman, assistant attorney general, with whom were William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Clarine Nardi Riddle, acting attorney general, for the appellant (respondent).

Allison Rutland Soulen, certified legal intern, with whom were Miriam Berkman and, on the brief, Mary

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McCarthy, Stephen Wizner, J. L. Pottenger, Jr., Robert A. Solomon and Shelley Geballe, for the appellee (petitioner).

Steven M. Sellers, assistant state’s attorney, filed a brief for the chief state’s attorney as amicus curiae.

CALLAHAN, J.

Certification was granted in this case limited to the question: “Did the state violate the guarantees of equal protection contained in the Connecticut and United States constitutions by declining to credit pretrial jail time against the length of an insanity acquittee’s commitment to a mental hospital?” Franklin v. Berger, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 282 (1988). The Appellate Court answered this question in the affirmative. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988). We disagree.

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute and have been set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court; id.; but can be briefly summarized as follows. On March 5, 1976, the petitioner was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-55.[1] Although his bail, initially set at $100,000, was later reduced to $50,000,

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the petitioner was unable to post a bond and was confined in jail for 293 days prior to trial. In addition, he spent 378 days in a mental hospital while his competency to stand trial was determined. Id.

On January 5, 1978, a criminal court adjudged the petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) 53a-47
(repealed and replaced by General Statutes 17-257),[2] the petitioner was sent to Norwich Hospital for a psychiatric examination. On April 27, 1978, the trial court found the petitioner to be a danger to himself or others and ordered him committed to a mental institution for a term of ten years pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) 53a-47 (b). See General Statutes 17-257c(e) (1)(A). Thereafter, the state declined to credit the petitioner’s pretrial jail time against the maximum term of his commitment set by the court.

On March 24, 1987, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the refusal to grant him credit for his pretrial jail time was violative of the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.[3] The habeas court denied his

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petition finding no equal protection violation. On appeal,[4] the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the habeas court and held that the state’s practice of denying jail time credits to insanity acquittees violated the petitioner’s equal protection rights. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988).

At this point we note that “the concept of equal protection [under both the state and federal constitutions[5] ] has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

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Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 578, 512 A.2d 893 (1986). The “equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra, 577-78. Rather, a state may make classifications when enacting or carrying out legislation, but in order to satisfy the equal protection clause the classifications made must be based on some reasonable ground. Ross v. Moffitt, supra; Magoun v. Illinois Trust Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 1037 (1898); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra; State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520, 531, 473 A.2d 775 (1984). To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, the court must consider “the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). Where the classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts upon an “inherently suspect” group, it will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. Id., 342; Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335, 345, 472 A.2d 328 (1984); Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975). On the other hand, where the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group “it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.” Laden v. Warden, supra, 543; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

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To implicate the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constitutions, therefore, it is necessary that the state statute in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently. The petitioner in the instant case argues that by refusing to credit the time he spent in jail prior to his trial against the fixed maximum term of his commitment, the state is treating wealthy and poor insanity acquittees differently. Based on the premise that all acquittees are discharged at the expiration of the fixed maximum term of confinement set by the court at the commencement of commitment to a mental hospital under 17-257c (e)(1)(A), the petitioner maintains that indigent acquittees who are held prior to trial because they are not able to afford bail will be confined for the full duration of the fixed maximum term in addition to the time they spend confined in jail prior to their trial, whereas those acquittees who are able to avoid confinement prior to their trial because they can afford bail will be confined only for the duration of the fixed maximum term set by the court. According to the petitioner, this alleged classification based on wealth that affects his fundamental liberty interest cannot be justified by a compelling state interest and, therefore, violates his guarantees of equal protection of the laws. A review of the statutory framework reveals, however, that the petitioner’s reliance on the fixed maximum term as a measuring point for calculating an insanity acquittee’s date of discharge from confinement is misplaced. When 17-257a et seq. is viewed as a whole, it is clear that the discharge date of insanity acquittees cannot be calculated in days, but rather, is indeterminate, and dependent on the acquittee’s ability to prove that he is no longer a danger to himself or others.[6] This being so, the state’s denial of

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jail time credits to indigent acquittees such as the petitioner does not result in disparate treatment of wealthy and indigent acquittees and, therefore, the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions have not been violated.

General Statutes 17-257a through 17-257w govern the treatment of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes 53a-13.[7] Under 17-257c(a), a person acquitted under 53a-13 is automatically, upon a verdict, committed by the court to the custody of the commissioner of mental health for initial confinement and examination. After a psychiatric examination in a state

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hospital; General Statutes 17-257c (b);[8] the court is required to hold a hearing in order to “make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee.” General Statutes 17-257c (e). On the basis of its findings and, “considering that its primary concern is the protection of society,” the court, under 17-257c (e), has two options. “If the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined, the court shall order the acquittee committed to the jurisdiction of the board and confined in a hospital for mental illness for custody, care and treatment pending a hearing before the board [to review the status of the acquittee].” General Statutes 17-257c (e)(1). If confined, “the court shall fix a maximum term of commitment, not to exceed the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense.” General Statutes 17-257c (e)(1)(A). At this initial hearing, the court may also determine that based on its findings “the acquittee is a person who should be discharged” and, if so, order the acquittee’s discharge. General Statutes 17-257c (e)(2). The acquittee has the “burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a person who should be discharged.” General Statutes 17-257c(f).

If the acquittee is confined, he is under the sole jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board (board). General Statutes 17-257c (h). Although the statute states that the acquittee “shall be immediately discharged at the expiration of the maximum term of commitment”; General Statutes 17-257c (h); he may be confined for either more or less time than that originally Set by the court under 17-257c (e)(1)(A), depending on his dangerousness to himself or others. The acquittee will be discharged before the end of the

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term set by the court if, after periodic status review hearings[9] that are statutorily mandated during the term of the acquittee’s commitment,[10]
the board determines that the acquittee is a “person who should be discharged”[11] and makes application to the court for the discharge of the acquittee from confinement under General Statutes 17-257n (a).[12] The acquittee may, however, also be confined beyond the maximum term originally set by the court if, at least ninety days prior to the expiration of said term, the state’s attorney determines that the acquittee’s discharge would “constitute a danger to himself or others” and petitions the court for an

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order of continued commitment. General Statutes 17-257n (c).[13] In the case of either an application for discharge from custody or a petition for continued commitment, the court is required to conduct a hearing at which it must “make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary concern is the protection of society,” determine whether the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. General Statutes 17-257n (g); see also General Statutes 17-257n (d) and (e).

Under 17-257n, therefore, an acquittee will not be released from confinement until he is no longer a danger to himself or others, regardless of the maximum term originally set by the court under 17-257c (e)(1)(A). Our interpretation of 17-257n is supported by its legislative history. Discussing the discharge of insanity

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acquittees from confinement, Senator Richard B. Johnston stated that “an acquittee might only be finally discharged upon application to the Superior Court, and acting only on the recommendation of the Psychiatric Review Board. I think this is an important piece of legislation, in that I believe the public would find this as a protection of public interest, and it would enhance the public’s confidence in the fact that dangerous, or potentially dangerous mentally ill persons are not, and would not, be discharged in society.” (Emphasis added.) 28 S. Proc., Pt. 15, 1985 Sess., p. 4913.

The date of discharge of an acquittee from confinement is, therefore, not calculated by counting days as if the acquittee were sentenced to prison, but rather, is indeterminate, being totally dependant on the acquittee’s personal mental health. Since the fixed maximum term set by the court does not determine the date an acquittee will be discharged from confinement, the petitioner’s argument that the refusal of the state to credit his jail time against the fixed maximum term creates distinctions in the calculation of confinement time based on wealth is not valid. Subtracting an indigent acquittee’s pretrial jail time from the fixed maximum term will not secure his discharge from confinement any sooner than if he were not credited with jail time. Jail time credit is irrelevant in calculating the release of an insanity acquittee because he is confined or released based on his dangerousness. There is, therefore, no difference in the treatment of wealthy and indigent acquittees under 17-257n. The discharge of all insanity acquittees from confinement, rich or poor, is based on their ability to prove that they are no longer a danger to themselves or others, not on a lapse of time. General Statutes 17-257n (f).

In addition to arguing that the fixed maximum term set by the court at the commencement of an acquittee’s commitment is significant in calculating his discharge

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date, the petitioner maintains that the expiration of said term is important because it shifts the burden to prove dangerousness under 17-257n (f). The petitioner argues that while the acquittee has the burden to prove that he is not a danger to himself or others and that he should be discharged prior to the expiration of the fixed maximum term set by the court, he claims that the burden shifts to the state to prove that he should be retained in confinement after the expiration of the term set by the court.[14] He contends, therefore, that the failure to reduce an indigent acquittee’s fixed maximum term with his pretrial jail time causes the acquittee to be confined for a longer period of time prior to

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the shifting of the burden of proof than wealthier acquittees who make bail. We do not agree.

General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) 17-257n (f), which discusses the need for a hearing prior to a court ruling on all applications for discharge or petitions for continued confinement, states that “the acquittee or the board when applying for an order of discharge, shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.” Although 17-257n (f) appears to be silent on the issue of who bears the burden of proof at hearings for continued commitment, amendments were made to that section in 1987 which place the burden on the acquittee to prove that he is a person who should be discharged at a hearing on an application of discharge and at a hearing on a petition for continued commitment. Public Acts 1987, No. 87-486. The 1987 amendment eliminated the language “when applying for an order of discharge” from 17-257n (f), and the statute now reads: “After receipt of the board’s report and separate examination reports, the court shall promptly commence a hearing on the recommendation or application for discharge or petition for continued commitment. At the hearing, the acquittee shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.” (Emphasis added.) While the 1987 amendment is not controlling in this case,[15] in our opinion the amendment was not intended by the legislature to change the existing law, but rather was meant to clarify it; see 30 H.R. Proc., Pt. 28, 1987 Sess., pp. 10, 183-90; and, therefore, “the amending language `”must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the [pre-amended] act.” Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246, 377 A.2d 305

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(1977); see Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) 22.31, 22.35.’ Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 75, 434 A.2d 333 (1980); see also Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 540, 489 A.2d 363 (1985).” Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 640-41, 513 A.2d 52 (1986). Accordingly, in light of the 1987 amendment to 17-257n (f), the acquittee bears the burden to prove that he is no longer a danger to himself or others when seeking discharge before the expiration of the fixed maximum term and also when contesting a petition by the state seeking continued confinement beyond the fixed maximum term. There is, therefore, no shifting of the burden of proof brought about by the petition for continued confinement at the expiration of an insanity acquittee’s maximum term. The burden remains on the acquittee, either way, to prove that he is not a danger to himself or others before he may be discharged. There is, therefore, nothing that distinguishes insanity acquittees who are unable to make bail from those who are able to make bail.

Accordingly, because confinement of all acquittees under 17-257 et seq. is based on dangerousness, the state’s refusal to credit the petitioner’s pretrial jail time against the fixed maximum term set by the court does not cause him to be confined for a longer period of time than acquittees who were not confined prior to trial because they were able to post a bond. Since the statute treats all acquittees the same, the equal protection clause is not implicated. State ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 465, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422 (1947) (if a “law applies to all alike, the requirements of `equal protection [of the laws]’ are met.”)

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed.

In this opinion COVELLO and HULL, Js., concurred.

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GLASS, J., concurring.

Although I agree with the result, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, under General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) 17-257n (f), “the acquittee bears the burden to prove that he is no longer a danger to himself or others when seeking discharge before the expiration of the fixed maximum term [of commitment] and also when contesting a petition by the state seeking continued confinement beyond the fixed maximum term.”

Section 17-257n (f), as revised to 1987, provides in full: “After receipt of the board’s report and any separate examination reports, the court shall promptly commence a hearing on the application for discharge or petition for continued commitment. At the hearing, the acquittee or the board when applying for an order of discharge, shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.” (Emphasis added.)

The construction given by the majority is, I believe, at variance with the language of 17-257n. By its express terms, subsection (f) fixes the burden of proof on the acquittee or the board only when discharge is sought prior to the expiration of the maximum term. It is silent with regard to the burden of proof on the state’s attorney’s application for continued confinement. It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. Thus, subsection (f)’s limitation to applications for discharge would appear to express the intent that the state’s attorney bears the burden of proving the acquittee’s continued dangerousness when petitioning for a commitment beyond the maximum term. Further, “one seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to it.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).

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Because the version of 17-257n (f) as revised to 1989 is not in issue in this case, I do not find persuasive the majority’s reliance on the subsequent amendment. As revised to 1989, 17-257n (f) provides that “the court shall . . . commence a hearing on the recommendation or application for discharge or petition for continued commitment. At the hearing, the acquittee shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.” Under the majority’s construction of this language, the state’s attorney satisfies his statutory burden in seeking to continue the acquittee’s confinement by performing the ministerial act of filing a petition with the trial court at least ninety days before the completion of the maximum commitment term. At the hearing, the acquittee must prove that he is eligible for discharge, notwithstanding the fact that he has completed his maximum term of commitment ordered by the court. I am not persuaded that the legislature intended this result. Moreover, it is significant that the parties, as well as amicus, agree that 17-257n (f), even as amended, places on the state’s attorney the burden of proof in a hearing on a petition for continued confinement.

It seems to me that, once an acquittee completes the fixed maximum term, he becomes entitled to the same rights as anyone else respecting involuntary commitment to a mental health facility. Those rights include the right not to be committed unless the party seeking the commitment proves the necessity of commitment by clear and convincing evidence. General Statutes 17-178 (c). Moreover, this is not a case in which the statute pertaining to insanity acquittees provides for indefinite commitment without any fixed maximum commitment term. Cf. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983).

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Despite these considerations, I concur in the result reached by the majority. Under our statutory scheme, the acquittee’s confinement in a mental health facility “rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness.” Id., 369. The statutes contemplate that these two considerations must guide the trial court in establishing a maximum commitment term. General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) 17-257c. If, upon reviewing evidence of an acquittee’s past conduct and psychiatric background, the trial court determines that the interests of the acquittee and society are best served by an indefinite commitment term not to exceed a particular number of years, it would make no sense to sever from that commitment time the time the acquittee spent in jail prior to sentencing. During the presentence jail time, of course, a defendant who is subsequently acquitted by reason of insanity is not receiving any therapy designed to eradicate his mental illness. Jail is not a therapeutic milieu. Thus, to credit presentence jail time against the maximum commitment term runs counter to the rationale of the commitment provisions. Accordingly, I concur.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, J., concurring.

I write separately because, in my view, our resolution of this appeal requires us to address directly the issue upon which we granted certification: “Did the state violate the guarantees of equal protection contained in the Connecticut and United States constitutions by declining to credit pretrial jail time against the length of an insanity acquittee’s commitment to a mental hospital?” Franklin v. Berger, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 282 (1988). I believe that we must address this issue regardless of whether the burden of proof is on the acquittee or the state when the state files a petition for continued commitment. Upon analysis, I conclude that the state did

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not violate the equal protection clause by declining to reduce the acquittee’s maximum term of commitment.[1]

Equal protection of the laws requires that similarly situated persons be treated similarly or if persons or classes are treated disparately, that there be a justification for such disparate treatment. Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 321-22 n. 12, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787, reh. denied, 475 U.S. 1061, 106 S.Ct. 1290, 89 L.Ed.2d 597 (1986), citing Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551, 74 S.Ct. 280, 98 L.Ed. 281
(1954), Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 112, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), and Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31, 25 L.Ed. 989 (1880).” “`Equal protection analysis must commence with a determination of whether a legislative classification is invidious, or “inherently suspect,” or whether the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right. Where the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right or creates a suspect classification then it must be struck down unless justified by a compelling state interest. . Where the statute does not involve fundamental rights

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or suspect classifications, the legislation will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.” (Citations omitted.) Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 645, 410 A.2d 475 (1979).

Although I agree with the majority opinion insofar as it says that it is often impossible to reduce commitment periods by jail time because most acquittees are committed to a mental health facility for an indefinite period of time depending on their mental health, this argument does not seem to hold true for those acquittees who serve the definite maximum commitment term as set by the trial court and who are released upon the expiration of that term. This is precisely the claim that the petitioner asserts. For this group of individuals that serves no more or no less than the maximum term of commitment, there necessarily are disparate periods of total confinement (jail time and commitment time) between those who can and those who cannot afford bail. The question presented to this court must be whether this disparate treatment violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.[2]

As stated earlier, we must determine whether the classification of the two groups, i.e., (1) those individuals who are confined in jail before trial and for the maximum term of commitment in a mental health facility, and (2) those who are confined only for the maximum term of commitment in a mental health facility, is “inherently suspect” or whether the legislative scheme impinges on a fundamental right. I conclude that this case involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right.

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According to the parties, the acquittee in this case was indigent and therefore unable to post the pretrial bond and, consequently, spent 293 days in jail prior to trial. Accordingly, the petitioner alleges a classification based on indigency for purposes of equal protection analysis.

Although the petitioner argues that the court’s analysis of this equal protection issue must be guided by the strict scrutiny standard, he does not allege, nor would I find, that his status as an indigent makes him a member of a suspect class. See Petitioner’s Brief, p. 15; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 130, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda J. Young, Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1983) p. 731. Rather, the petitioner claims, as the Appellate Court found, that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review based on the infringement of a fundamental right. The petitioner claims that “[h]ere the refusal to credit petitioner with jail time affects the period of his confinement under the fixed maximum term. His liberty right is impinged upon by the additional 293 days he is confined before the expiration of that term triggers a discharge or a shifting of the burden of proof at a court hearing.”

I disagree with the petitioner’s contention. I am inclined to follow the reasoning of those cases that hold jail time credit to be a matter of legislative grace rather than a constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Manson, supra, 321 n. 12; People v. Turman, 659 P.2d 1368, 1373-74 (Colo. 1983); cf. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1977); King v.

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Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 1971).[3]

Because I consider jail time credit as a matter of legislative grace, and I do not view the denial of such credit as implicating fundamental rights or, in this case,

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affecting a suspect class, the standard of review in an equal protection challenge such as this is whether the denial of jail time credit is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 597, 479 A.2d 793 (1984). I conclude that the statute satisfies this rational basis standard.

Without doubt, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting society from individuals who are mentally disabled and pose a danger to others. Similarly, the state has an interest in protecting mentally disabled persons from harm that they might inflict upon themselves. General Statutes 17-257c provides for this protection by authorizing the commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in our state mental health facilities. While committed, these individuals receive treatment that may eventually enable them to be released from the mental health facilities. See General Statutes 17-257c (e)(1). Undoubtedly, treatment of one’s mental disease or defect is essential.

As Justice Glass states in his concurring opinion, there is no such mental health treatment during pretrial jail time. Accordingly, it is rational not to reduce

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an insanity acquittee’s maximum term of commitment, during which he or she receives such treatment, by the acquittee’s pretrial jail time, during which no such treatment is provided. The goals of each form of confinement are vastly different. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270-71, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973). Therefore, the habeas court did not err in refusing to reduce the petitioner’s maximum commitment term by the amount of time that he spent in jail before sentencing.

Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.