CASE NO. 868 CRD-2-89-5Workers’ Compensation Commission
SEPTEMBER 27, 1990
The claimant was represented by Cynthia L. Schwanz, Esq., and Mark Oberlatz, Esq., of both of O’brien, Shafner, Bartinik, Stuart Kelly, P.C.
The respondent was represented by Linda Larson Clark, Esq., Electric Boat-Dept.
This Petition for Review from the May 22, 1989 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Second District was heard April 27, 1990 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr. and James Metro.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.
Claimant sustained a compensable neck injury April 2, 1985. Respondent paid the claimant’s group health insurance policy premiums through April 26, 1985. The Second District ordered the respondent-employer to reinstate claimant’s group health insurance policy premiums and to pay said premiums “for so long as claimant is receiving Workers’ Compensation benefits or is eligible to receive them,” pursuant to Sec. 31-284b. Respondent contests the constitutionality of Sec. 31-284b
and argues that claimant was not receiving benefits under the Connecticut Act but rather under the U.S. Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.
As to respondent’s first contention that Sec. 31-284b is preempted by the federally legislated Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, our recent decision in Hadjuk v. J.C. Penney Company, 818 CRD-1-89-2 (June 19, 1990) is on point. Hadjuk relying on Ferrillo v. O G Industries, Inc. 783 CRD-3-88-10 (February 21, 1990), held that we are a tribunal of limited jurisdiction lacking the plenary authority necessary to decide constitutionality. See also, Tufaro v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc., 802-CRD-7-88-12 (May 25, 1990).
With respect to the second point the parties agree that claimant was receiving Longshore rather than Connecticut benefits. Under Sec. 31-284b claimant must either be receiving benefits under our law or be eligible to receive them. Paragraph #5 of the Finding states “the claimant is receiving compensation benefits” without indicating what benefits were being received. There is no finding specifying that claimant was receiving or was eligible to receive benefits under the Connecticut law.
A trial commissioner’s conclusion must be supported by his factual findings. McQuade v. Town of Ashford, 130 Conn. 478 (1944) and those findings must be supported by evidence. Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988). Our review of the record indicated the employee testified he was not receiving compensation at the time of the hearing. (TR, 3/19/86, p. 6) But the respondents’ brief clearly admits claimant was receiving Longshore benefits. This confusion may be due to the fact that claimant was testifying one year after the date of the injury.
Given this discrepancy and the lack of a specific finding that claimant was receiving or was eligible to receive payments under our act, we must remand the matter for further proceedings below.
We therefore remand the instant matter to the trial Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Commissioners A. Thomas White and James Metro concur.