HOUSEKNECHT v. CENTURY BRASS PRODUCTS, 1129 CRD-5-90-11 (4-10-92)


LUCILLE HOUSEKNECHT, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE v. CENTURY BRASS PRODUCTS EMPLOYER and WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES and SECOND INJURY FUND, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT

CASE NO. 1129 CRD-5-90-11Workers’ Compensation Commission
APRIL 10, 1992

The claimant was represented by Edward T. Dodd, Esq.

The respondent employer was not represented at either the trial level or on appeal.

The Second Injury Fund was represented by Avery Brown, Esq., Michael Belzer, Esq., and Brewster Blackall, Esq., Assistant Attorneys General.

This Petition for Review from the November 5, 1990 Finding of the Commissioner for the Fifth District was heard September, 27, 1991 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners George Waldron, and Angelo dos Santos.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

Liability for payment of the claimant’s medical insurance premiums under Sec. 31-284b, C.G.S. and Sec. 31-349(c), C.G.S. is at issue in this appeal from the Fifth District ruling that the Second Injury Fund was liable for that payment while claimant was receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

The claimant sustained a compensable right knee injury September 12, 1985 as recorded in a Voluntary Agreement approved November 18, 1985. At the time of injury the employer was paying health insurance premiums for claimant. But some eight months previously on March 15, 1985 that employer had filed for reorganization under the federal bankruptcy laws. At the time of claimant’s injury the bankruptcy petition was still pending. In August, 1986 the employer ceased paying the claimant’s health insurance premiums. From August, 1986 through January, 1989 the claimant paid her own insurance premiums.

The fifth district commissioner concluded that Sec. 31-349(c) was applicable. That statute provides that where an employer has ceased operations within this state, its 31-284b
obligations were transferable to the Fund. He therefore ordered the Fund to reimburse the claimant for the premiums she paid during that thirty months period. The commissioner noted that the claimant had ceased making health insurance premium payments before the October 1, 1989 effective date of Sec. 31-349(c) and that therefore she could not have known of the notice requirements to the Second Injury Fund contained in that law.

The Fund argues on appeal that it cannot be responsible for premium payments made prior to the date the Fund received notice. Sec. 31-349(c) provides:

On or after January 1, 1985, if an employer removes all or substantially all of its industrial or commercial operations to a location outside the state of Connecticut or permanently shuts down all its operations within a business facility located in this state and fails to comply with the provisions of Sec. 31-284b, the cost of accident and health insurance coverage for any employee receiving workers’ compensation payments pursuant to this chapter shall be paid out of the second injury fund. The employee shall notify the custodian of the second injury fund, by certified mail, that such coverage is needed with due diligence upon notification to the employee of the employer’s failure to comply with said Sec. 31-284b. The fund shall be liable for the cost of insurance coverage which is equivalent to the coverage provided for the employee prior to the relocation or shutdown of the employer’s operations. The fund’s liability for the costs of such coverage shall begin on the date the custodian notified and shall continue as long as the individual receives workers’ compensation payments pursuant to this chapter provided the fund shall not be liable for costs incurred by such individual prior to the date such notice is received. (emphasis ours)

The lines we have underscored constitute the basis of the appeal. They leave no ambiguity needing to be interpreted. They contain no exceptions to the notice provisions. “When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume the words themselves express the intention of the legislature.” Caltabiano v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 666 (1989) (citation omitted). As the costs for the premium payments were incurred prior to the date of notice, the Fund cannot be responsible for them.

We therefore sustain the appeal and reverse the Fifth District decision.

Commissioners George Waldron and Angelo dos Santos concur.