2006 Ct. Sup. 8851
No. HDSP-135899Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
May 11, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
JAMES M. BENTIVEGNA, JUDGE.
This is a summary process action based on violation of lease. A pretermination notice was delivered to the defendant on or around July 13, 2005.[1] The Notice to Quit was served on August 25, 2005.[2]
The defendant moves to dismiss the case on the grounds that the pretermination (KAPA) notice and the notice to quit are impermissibly vague and lack specificity as required under General Statutes § 47a-15. The plaintiff objects on the grounds that the notice to quit is sufficiently specific and complies with the requirements of state law, and the termination notice complies because it provided the defendant with an opportunity for a hearing before commencing the summary process action.
DISCUSSION
General Statute § 47a-15 provides in relevant part: “Prior to the commencement of a summary process action, except in the case in which the landlord elects to proceed under sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, to evict based on nonpayment of rent, on conduct by the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance or on a violation of subsection (h) of section 47a-11, if there is a material noncompliance with section 47a-11 which materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants or materially affects the physical condition of the premises, or if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncompliance with the rules and regulations adopted in accordance with section 47a-9, and the landlord chooses to evict based on such noncompliance, the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of the notice. If such breach can be remedied by repair by the CT Page 8852 tenant or payment of damages by the tenant to the landlord, and such breach is not so remedied within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall terminate except that (1) if the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages and the tenant adequately remedies the breach within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall not terminate; or (2) if substantially the same act or omission for which notice was given recurs within six months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive . . .”
In certain residential summary process actions, including breach cases, General Statute § 47a-15 requires a landlord to “deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of the notice.” This pretermination or KAPA notice is intended to provide a tenant with notice of the breach and to allow the tenant an opportunity to cure the breach in order to avoid eviction. “The legislative purpose of the statute is manifest on its face. It is to discourage and foreclose evictions against `first offenders.’ . . . Upon remedy of the breach by the tenant within the statutory time framework, the rental agreement remains in effect. The statutory right to this remedy is available to tenants under both written and oral leases. The condition precedent to a remedy of the breach by the tenant is the receipt of a `written notice . . . specifying the acts or omissions.'” KAPA Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn.Sup. 274, 278
(1979).
“In order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly . . . Strict construction does not, however, require ritualistic compliance with statutory or regulatory mandates . . . As we have held in other contexts, in which regulatory and constitutional rights were also implicated; . . . not every deviation from the strict requirements of either statutes or regulations warrants dismissal of an action for summary process. When good cause for termination of a lease has clearly been shown, and when notices of termination have been sent in strict compliance with statutory timetables, a landlord should not be precluded from pursuing CT Page 8853 summary eviction proceedings because of hypertechnical dissection of the wording of the notices that he has sent . . .” (Citations omitted.) Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 143-45, 520 A.2d 173 (1987). The Supreme Court concluded i Jefferson Garden Associates, that the plaintiff’s notices “sufficiently established the preconditions for its action for summary process.”[3] Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 145.
“[T]he specificity of the notice goes directly to the purpose of the notice. The purpose of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 47a-15 is to allow the tenant an opportunity to correct alleged violations of the lease agreement. Kapa Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn.App. 274, 278 (1979). Similarly, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 47a-23 requires notice detailed enough to provide the tenant with information to prepare a defense to a summary process action. Jefferson Garden Associates, supra, 143. Accordingly, the notice must be specific enough to allow a tenant to recognize his violations and either cure or defend against them.” Barkan Management Co., Inc. v. Artis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. SPNH 951145269 (Jones, J.; February 16, 1996) (1996 Ct.Sup. 1420, 1423-424.)
The defendant cited a number of Superior Court decisions in support of his motion. Housing Authority of the City of Ansonia v. Lula McDonald, Superior court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV5-3381 (Sequino, J.; January 5, 1989); Housing Authority of the City of Danbury v. Maria Albarran, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV93-5282 (McGrath, J.; September 17, 1993) Parkridge Apartments v. Thomas McGann, et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. SPH-8408-24518 (Aronson, J; September 26, 1984); Alicia Almagro v. Danita Jackson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. SPH 9003-54901 (Berger, J.; September 28, 1990). This court is not sufficiently persuaded by the reasoning in these decisions given the Supreme Court’s holding in Jefferson Garden Associates. “See Tanis v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 134702 (September 24, 1996, Maloney, J.) (noting that superior court decisions are not binding upon each other); Farnsworth v. North Branford Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 377477 (February 26, 1996, Booth, J.) (16 Conn. L. Rptr. 238) (noting that, while CT Page 8854 due deference is owed by one superior court judge to the decision of another, the decision is not stare decisis binding upon the court).” Field v. PZ Board, The City, Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 970060710 (Sylvester, J.; September 30, 1998) (1998 Ct.Sup. 11011).
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
“The giving of a sufficient notice is a condition precedent to bringing action . . . The inquiry always is: Does the notice reasonably protect the interests of the defendant under the particular circumstances of the case?” (Citations omitted.)Schapp v. Meriden, 139 Conn. 254, 256, 93 A.2d 152 (1952). The Supreme Court held in Jefferson Garden Associates, that, in a summary process action, “[i]n order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction . . . Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 143.
Under the particular circumstances of this case, the court finds that the language of the pretermination (KAPA) notice and notice to quit are specific enough and comply with General Statutes §§ 47a-15 and 47a-23. The notices used by the plaintiff are similar to the notices in Jefferson Garden Associates. The notices sufficiently apprised the defendant of the information needed to protect himself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. Accordingly, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.
You are hereby notified that you have failed to comply with the provisions of your lease and, specifically, that you have committed the following acts which are prohibited by your lease, and/or the rules and regulations that are a part of your lease.
Material noncompliance with the terms of the lease you signed:
(1) Failure to keep the apartment and such other areas as may be assigned to you in a clean and safe CT Page 8855 condition in violation of Article IX.C.6 of the lease; (2) Failure to dispose of all garbage, rubbish, and other wastes from the premises in a sanitary and safe manner in violation of Article IX.C.7 of the lease.
Your lease shall terminate on July 31, 2005, which is more than fifteen (15) days from the date that you will receive this notice unless these actions or their results can be and are corrected by you within fifteen (15) days.
You are requested to attend a two-way conference at the Property Manager’s office at 11 Grove Street, West Hartford, Connecticut on Friday, July 29, 2005 at 3:00 p.m. (Emphasis added.)
NOTICE TO QUIT POSSESSION
The Housing Authority of the Town of West Hartford hereby gives notices that you are to quit possession of the premises now occupied by you at 11 Grove Street. #37. West Hartford, Connecticut 06110 on or before September 23, 2005 for the following reasons:
You are in material noncompliance with your lease for (1) Failure to keep the apartment and such other areas as may be assigned to you in a clean and safe condition in violation of Article IX.C.6 of the lease; and (2) Failure to dispose of all garbage, rubbish, and other wastes from the premises in a sanitary and safe manner in violation of Article IX.C.7 of your lease.
You have the right to make such reply as you wish and the right to examine any documents directly relevant to this eviction. You also may request a grievance hearing stating the reasons why the Authority should not terminate your lease for material noncompliance with your lease provided you present your written grievance to the Authority’s main office at 80 Shield Street, West Hartford, Connecticut by the close of business on the 9th day of September 2005.
Any payments tendered after the date specified to quit CT Page 8856 possession or occupancy, or the date of the completion of the grievance hearing if that is later, will be accepted for use and occupancy only and not for rent, with full reservation of rights to continue with the eviction action. (Emphasis added.)
“NOTICE OF GOOD CAUSE
“To: Doris Greene 87F Michael Rd. New London, CT 06320
“You are hereby notified that the following conduct on your part shall henceforth constitute good cause for termination of your occupancy at the above premises:
“violation of Lease Article 11g `To have no animals or pets of any kind on the premises . . .‘
“Your failure to remedy the above situation shall henceforth constitute cause for termination of occupancy at the above premises.
“Dated at New London, Connecticut this 12th day of April 1983.
“/s/ Arlene Davis”
[9] Exhibit C reads as follows:“NOTICE PURSUANT TO CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES SEC. 47a-15
“To: Doris Greene 87F Michael Rd. New London, CT 06320
“You are hereby notified that the following conduct on your part constitutes a material non-compliance with an obligation primarily imposed upon tenants by CT Page 8857 law which materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants or materially affects the physical condition of the premises, is a violation of the rental agreement, or a violation of the adopted rules and regulations concerning your use and occupancy of the premises, to-wit:
“Violation of Lease Article 11g `To have no animals or pets of any kind on the premises . . .‘
“This rental agreement shall terminate May 12, 1983 unless such a breach can be and is remedied by repair or payment of damages on your part within twenty-one days from the date hereof.
“Dated at New London, Connecticut this 12th day of April 1983.
“/s/ Arlene Davis”
[10] Exhibit D reads as follows:“May 12, 1983 “Doris Greene 87F Michael Rd. New London, CT 06320
“Dear Ms. Greene:
“This letter is to advise you that it is our intention to terminate your tenancy at the above premises on June 12, 1983.
“The reason for this termination is as follows:
“Violation of Lease Article 11g `To have no animals or pets of any kind on the premises . . .’
“If you do not voluntarily vacate the premises on or before the above termination date, it is our intention to commence eviction proceedings against you to recover possession of the premises. In the event that such an eviction proceeding is commenced you will receive notice and be given an opportunity to present a defense.
CT Page 8858
“If you have any objections which you desire to present to Management, you mail [sic] call Anthony Associates at 442-3094 in order to make an appointment for a meeting at which you may present these objections. “If you have objections which you desire to present in writing you may state them in the space provided below and mail or deliver those objections to the following address:
“Anthony Associates Management 7A Michael Rd. New London, CT 06320 “151 Arlene Davis Arlene Davis Authorized Agent
“I/We object to the commencement of eviction proceedings because:
“______________________________________” Date
_______________________________________ Tenant’s Signature
CT Page 8859