CASE NO. 292 CRD-2-84Workers’ Compensation Commission
MARCH 23, 1988
The claimant was represented by Edmund T. Grady Jr., Esq., Riscassi Davis, P.C.
The respondent was represented by Michael J. Belzer, Esq., Assistant Attorney General.
This Petition for Review from the December 23, 1983 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner for the Second District was heard May 31, 1985 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Rhoda Loeb and Frank Verrilli.
FINDING AND AWARD
The Finding and Award of the Second District Commissioner is affirmed and adopted as the Finding and Award of this Division.
OPINION
RHODA LOEB, Commissioner.
Claimant was an employee of Respondent for the Public Safety Division at the University of Connecticut when he suffered an acute myocardial infarction on May 14, 1979. Claimant then fifty-six years old had been employed by Respondent since February 2, 1964. He was appointed Deputy Chief for the campus fire department in 1972, and was responsible for operations of the department which included scheduling, maintenance, training and inspection.
Claimant, who had no prior history of cardiovascular illness, was hospitalized for two weeks as a result of his myocardial infarction on said May 14, 1979 and returned to work with Respondent in September, 1979. The Commissioner for the Second District dismissed the claim for disability finding that Claimant’s myocardial infarction did not arise during and out of the course of his employment.
Claimant contends that stress and political pressure in his job caused his heart attack. Prior to the heart attack, Claimant smoked two packs of cigarettes a day. For approximately one week prior to May 4, 1979 Claimant felt nausea and gas pains in his stomach and on that day went to the emergency room at the Manchester Hospital where he was diagnosed as suffering from a myocardial infarction.
Claimant’s treating physician was Dr. George Lundberg, an internist, who gave his medical opinion in a report submitted as an exhibit, that “. . . a cardiologist such as Dr. Duke would be much better qualified to comment on this situation than I am as he has more scientific cardiac background. However, with coronary artery disease present, it seems reasonable to assume that stressful situations may precipitate acute heart attacks”. Dr. Duke, who had been called as a cardiac consultant at the time of his infarct, neither testified nor submitted a medical report. Dr. Arnold Ritvo, a cardiologist, examined Claimant at the request of Respondent and found no causal relationship between any job stress and his heart attack.
There is no requirement that a Commissioner must rely solely on the medical opinion of a treating physician as long there is evidence that reasonable medical probability was followed. There was conflicting medical opinion and the Commissioner is the trier of fact and is in the best position to decide whether the medical testimony supports a finding necessary to establish the causal connection between the employment and the injury. A long line of cases establishes that a Commissioner’s conclusions based on conflicting medical opinions will not be disturbed and this Compensation Review Division cannot alter the conclusions of a Commissioner who accepted the opinion of one expert over another. The finding of the Commissioner, if it has an evidentiary basis, is final where testimony is conflicting, Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107 (1979); Damelio v. Anacondas Inc., Case No. 281 CRD-5-83 (March 4, 1987).
Expert medical opinion must be based on reasonable medical probability, Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 443 (1977). There was sufficient expert medical opinion by a cardiologist that Claimant’s myocardial infarction was related to risk factors such as his smoking and high blood pressure for the Commissioner to find no causal relationship between job stress and the heart attack.
The ultimate conclusions of the Commissioner are tested by the finding of subordinate facts and an Award of Dismissal is sustained where the finding does not find elements necessary to sustain Claimant’s burden of proving that his heart attack arose out of and in the course of his employment, Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709, 714 (1926); D’Angelo v. Conn. Light and Power Co., 146 Conn. 505, 507 (1959).
Therefore, this appeal is dismissed and the Commissioner’s Finding and Dismissal is affirmed.
Commissioners Arcudi and Verrilli concur.