Sonya Jaudon v. Moshe Hasbani et al.
CV116019058S
Decided: January 13, 2012
FACTS
The plaintiff, Sonya Jaudon, filed a three-count complaint, sounding in a violation of General Statutes ??31?290a, against the defendants, Moshe Hasbani, M.D., M. Joshua Hasbani, M.D., Ph.D. and M.J. Hasbani, M.D., Ph.D., LLC, on March 25, 2011. ? The complaint alleges that on March 19, 2009, while employed as a medical secretary by the defendants, the plaintiff re-injured her left knee during and within the scope of her employment. ? The plaintiff further alleges that she returned to work on March 25, 2009 with a return to work form indicating that she should be placed on light duty until May 26, 2009. ? The plaintiff alleges that on March 27, 2009 the defendants terminated her.
The plaintiff further alleges that her termination was retaliatory and discriminatory in violation of ??31?290a. ? Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants terminated her as a result of: ?(1) the plaintiff notifying the defendants of a work-related injury, (2) suffering a work-related injury and (3) the plaintiff having to work light duty due to her work-related injury. ? The defendants discriminated against the plaintiff: ?(1) for her need to be accommodated at work due to her work-related injury and (2) for her need for light duty, and, additionally, failed to afford the plaintiff time off from work while under a light duty restriction.
The individual defendants, Moshe Hasbani and M. Joshua Hasbani, filed a motion to strike, with an accompanying memorandum of law, the first two counts of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against them, as a matter of law, because they are not employers. ? The plaintiff filed an objection on July 27, 2011. ? The defendants filed a reply on September 29, 2011. ? The matter was heard at short calendar on November 21, 2011. ? The plaintiff did not appear.
DISCUSSION
?The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ? the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [pleading] ? to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.? ?(Internal quotation marks omitted.) ?Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). ??[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ?? (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ? Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252, 990 A.2d 206 (2010). ??Whenever any party wishes to contest ? the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ? that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.? ?Practice Book ??10?39. ??The role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether [the plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.? ?(Internal quotation marks omitted. ?Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
The defendants argue that their motion to strike should be granted because the plaintiff has failed to allege that they are employers who are subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act. They assert that the plaintiff has only alleged that they are individuals, not employers. ? The plaintiff counters that she did allege that the defendants are employers and that individuals who are members of an LLC or officers of a corporation can be held liable under ??31?290a. ? Furthermore, she avers, ?the defendants acted as officers, principals, owners and/or agents of the corporation during their wrongful termination of the plaintiff and therefore can be held individually liable for the acts as the employer.? ? The defendants respond by disputing the relevance of the cases cited by the plaintiff in her objection to the motion to strike.
Section 31?290a?provides, in relevant part: ??No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.? ?General Statutes ??31?275(10) defines an employer as ?any person, corporation, limited liability company, firm, partnership, voluntary association, joint stock association, the state and any public corporation within the state using the services of one or more employees for pay, or the legal representative of any such employer ? A person who is the sole proprietor of a business may accept the provisions of this chapter by notifying the commissioner, in writing, of his intent to do so. ? If such person accepts the provisions of this chapter he shall be considered to be an employer ? Any person who is a partner in a business shall be deemed to have accepted the provisions of this chapter ? unless the partnership elects to be excluded from the provisions of this chapter by notice ??
?[I]n order to state a claim pursuant to ??31?290a, the plaintiff would need to allege (1) that the defendant was an employer as defined, (2) that the employer was subject to the provisions of the compensation act, and (3) that she was an employee as defined in [General Statutes] ??31?275(9). ? Furthermore, because a ?[m]otion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged? ? a mere conclusory statement that a defendant is the plaintiff’s employer, without more, is insufficient.? ?(Citation omitted; ?internal quotation marks omitted.) ? Castelot?Cascone v. Bridgeport Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 05 4007828 (October 18, 2005, Doherty, J.)
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges, in her complaint, that ?[o]n or about November 2, 2006, plaintiff became employed by the defendants.? ? Even though ?what is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged,? Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004), this allegation does not necessarily imply that the individual defendants were employers.
The plaintiff maintains in her opposition to the defendants’ motion that the defendants were ?officers, principals, owners and/or agents of the corporation during their wrongful termination of the plaintiff,? and cites Baton v. Smith Real Estate; ?Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 90 0515081 (October 16, 1990, Leuba, J.); ? and Beriguette v. Innovative Waste Systems, Inc.; ? Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 05 4006895 (July 7, 2009, Elgo, J.) [48 Conn. L. Rptr. 236]; ?to support her position that she has properly pleaded that the defendants are employers. ? Both cases, however, are distinguishable.
In Baton, the plaintiff brought, among others, a claim of a violation of ??31?290a against the company that had formerly employed her and several of its officers. ?Baton v. Smith Real Estate, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 90 0515081. ? The defendants filed a motion to strike the entire complaint. ? Id. In denying the motion, the court found that ?the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a basis for imposing liability on the individual defendants.? ?Id. She alleged in her complaint that the individual defendants were officers of the defendant company and had committed or participated in her wrongful termination. ?Id. In the present case, the plaintiff did not allege that the individual defendants were officers of the company defendant in her complaint. ? Nor did the plaintiff make any allegations regarding the relationship between the individual defendants and company defendant. ? In fact, the first time that the plaintiff raised the argument that the individual defendants are officers of the company defendant was in her opposition to the defendants’ motion.
In Beriguette, the court denied a motion for summary judgment on the count alleging a violation of ??31?290a against an individual defendant who was the owner of the company that had formerly employed the plaintiff. ? Beriguette v. Innovative Waste Systems, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 4006895. ? The plaintiff alleged that the defendant took adverse action against him, namely upholding his termination, after he was placed on light duty for over a year due to a work-related knee injury. ? Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court found that ?a jury could credit the plaintiff’s apparent belief as true that [the defendant], as principal and owner of the company, had the final say as to [the plaintiff’s] employment and was thus a party to the decision to terminate and/or in a position to confirm or vacate his termination.? ?Id. There was no question in that case that the individual defendant was an employer for the purposes of ??31?290a. ? The issue was whether the defendant was involved in the wrongful termination. ?Id. In the present case, however, the individual defendants dispute that they are employers. ? Thus, the plaintiff’s reliance on Beriguette is misplaced.
Since the plaintiff neither sufficiently alleges that the individual defendants are employers pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act nor makes allegations that necessarily imply that the defendants are employers, the defendants’ motion to strike counts one and two of the plaintiff’s complaint is granted.
Wilson, J.
Wilson, Robin L., J.