KELLY v. RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC., 469 CRD-4-86 (4-6-88)


NEIL KELLY, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE vs. RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC., EMPLOYER and GUARANTY FUND MANAGEMENT, SERVICE AND HEISMAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a Designee of IDEAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. in Rehabilitation. INSURER and ALEXIS RISK MANAGEMENT INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS

CASE NO. 469 CRD-4-86Workers’ Compensation Commission
APRIL 6, 1988

The claimant was represented by Robert Carter, Esq., Carter, Rubenstein Civitello.

The respondents Raymark Industries and Alexis Risk Management were represented by Steve Savarese, Esq., and Lewis Lerman, Esq., Bai, Pollock Dunnigan, (Atty. Lerman is now with Carmody Torrance).

The respondent-insurer Guaranty Fund Management and Heisman Management Services, Inc., a designee of Ideal Mutual Insurance Company in Rehabilitation was represented by Kevin Maher, Esq., and Scott Wilson Williams.

This Petition for Review from the March 13, 1986 Ruling on a Motion to Preclude entered by the Commissioner for the Fourth District was heard May 29, 1987 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Robin Waller and Rhoda Loeb.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.

Respondents have appealed the March 13, 1986 Fourth District ruling granting Claimant’s Motion to Preclude defenses under Sec. 31-297 (b), C.G.S. Claimant had sent an initial Notice of Claim by certified mail received by the employer December 6, 1984. On December 12, 1984 the employer filed a disclaimer by ordinary mail, not by certified mail or personal service as required by Sec. 31-321, C.G.S. On March 18, 1985 Claimant filed a Notice of Claim for depression received by the employer March 19, 1985. The employer served a contestment notice April 29, 1985.

As neither the December 12, 1984 nor the April 29, 1985 disclaimer complied with Sec. 31-297 (b) and Sec. 31-321, the trial Commissioner granted Claimant’s Motion to Preclude. There was some reference in paragraph 11 of the Commissioner’s Order that the December disclaimer was not sufficiently specific, and the appellant argues to the contrary. But we need not decide that issue. The December disclaimer fails because it was not served in accordance with Sec. 31-297 (b), Timothy v. Upjohn, 150 CRD-3-82, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1
(1983), appeal dismissed, 3 Conn. App. 162 (1985); Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 338 CRD-3-84, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133 (1985).

Similarly, the April 29, 1985 disclaimer is insufficient because it was not served in accordance with Sec. 31-321 and because it was filed after the twenty-day deadline there set.

For these reasons we dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision below granting the Motion to Preclude defenses.