2005 Ct. Sup. 15201
No. HHB CV05 5000324Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain
November 30, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #102.00
DAN SHABAN, JUDGE.
The defendant Pablo Irrizary, Jr. has filed a Motion to Strike the second count of plaintiff’s complaint. The defendant argues that the allegations of the second count, while claiming recklessness on the part of the defendant, are premised on simple negligence and therefore legally insufficient to support a recklessness claim under General Statute § 14-295. Plaintiff has filed an objection claiming that the allegations as set forth are sufficient and proper for a claim of recklessness and damages under General Statute § 14-295.
The function of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). In considering a motion to strike the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts. Peter Michael Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270 (1998) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283
(2004). The court is not required to make factual findings Vacco v. Microsoft, 260 Conn. 59, 65 (2002). All allegations are to be construed in the light most favorable to the pleader Suffield Development Associates, Limited Partnership v. National Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 772 (2002). Generally, in considering a motion to strike the court is limited to the grounds specified in the motion and cannot consider unspecified grounds. Meredith v. Police Commission, 182 Conn. 138, 140-41
(1980).
There is a split of authority among trial court judges as to the specificity needed to plead a claim under General Statute §14-295. “One line of cases, representing the minority view, holds that a plaintiff must plead the specific facts constituting recklessness, above and beyond the facts constituting mere negligence . . . The majority point of view, on the other hand, is that a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting CT Page 15202 negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in §14-295: that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Donahue v. Lisevick, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 04 4001051 (June 27, 2005, Robinson, J.). Here, the plaintiff has alleged in paragraph five of the second count of the September 13, 2005 complaint that “[s]aid accident was caused by the recklessness and carelessness of the defendant Pablo Irrizary, Jr. in one or more of the following ways”: The plaintiff then references the defendant’s violation of General Statutes §§ 14-218a, 14-222 and 14-230 along with other statutory violations and common-law claims.
General Statute § 14-295 provides in part that: “[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section [14-218a, 14-222, 14-230], and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.” This court abides by the majority view that an injured party’s claims need only recite the general allegations called for by General Statute § 14-295 and that more specific allegations of recklessness are unnecessary to sustain a cause of action under it. Here, a review of the language of the second count of the complaint finds that the plaintiff has failed to substantively and/or expressly adopt the language of the statute. It must be specifically pleaded that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of one of the enumerated statutes and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. There is no allegation by the plaintiff that the defendant’s violation of the statutes enumerated within General Statute § 14-295 was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. Without such language, any claim for double or treble damages cannot be sustained.
For the foregoing reasons the Motion to Strike the second count of the plaintiff’s complaint is granted. CT Page 15203