LEVESQUE v. STATE, CONNECTICUT VALLEY HOSPITAL, 231 CRD-6-83 (8-8-84)


BERNADETTA LEVESQUE, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE vs. STATE OF CONNECTICUT CONNECTICUT VALLEY HOSPITAL, EMPLOYER, SELF-INSURED, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT

CASE NO. 231 CRD-6-83Workers’ Compensation Commission
AUGUST 8, 1984

The Claimant-Appellee was represented by George D. Royster, Jr., Esq.

The Respondent-Appellant was represented by Robert G. Girard, Esq., Assistant Attorney General.

This Petition for Review from the April 19, 1983 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Sixth District was argued October 28, 1983 before a Compensation Review Division Panel consisting of Commissioners Rhoda Loeb, A. Paul Berte and Frank Verrilli.

OPINION

RHODA LOEB, Commissioner.

The issue in this appeal by respondent is whether claimant sustained a fifty per cent permanent partial impairment of the brain under Section 31-308(d) as awarded by the Commissioner. The further finding of the Commissioner awarding claimant a five per cent permanent partial disability of the cervical spine is not contested.

Claimant was employed by respondent with the Department of Children and Youth Services at Connecticut Valley Hospital, a State of Connecticut institution for the care of mentally ill patients. During her course of employment as a psychiatric aide, which commenced September 26, 1976, claimant suffered a series of physical assaults on her person. From November 5, 1976, through March 19, 1979 there were twelve assaults from which claimant sustained a cervical injury and a disabling mental condition. The Commissioner found that both her cervical injury and mental illness were causally connected to the claimant’s work and compensable under the Act.

Respondent appeals on the basis that the Act does not provide a specific indemnity loss for the brain as an organ and that under Section 31-308(d) the record does not support the finding and award of discretionary benefits made by the Commissioner.

As reviewed in Smith v. United Technologies Corp., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 23 (1983) the finding of the Commissioner should contain only the ultimate relevant and material facts essential to the case in hand and found by him, together with a statement of his conclusions. The ultimate relevant and material facts necessary to a proper finding are those necessary to comply with the statutory requirements set forth in Section 31-308(d).

Under Section 31-308(d) “the Commissioner may award such compensation . . for the loss of use of the function of any organ . . not otherwise provided for herein, taking into account the age and sex of the claimant, the disabling effect of the loss of or loss of function of the organ involved and the necessity of the organ or complete functioning of the organ with respect to the entire body, . . .”

The Commissioner’s finding does not state whether he considered the aforesaid statutory elements that the statute requires him to consider. Balkus v. Terry Steam Turbine Co., 167 Conn. 170 (1974). The Commissioner here did not consider the age and sex of the claimant nor disabling effect or loss of function of her brain nor its complete functioning with respect to her entire body. A finding has to be made by the Commissioner on the loss of function of claimant’s brain with its disabling effect.

The Finding and Award issued by the Commissioner does not contain all the subordinate facts which are relevant to the appeal. Thus, it cannot be determined whether the Commissioner’s ultimate conclusion, the award, is correct. The Commissioner’s ultimate conclusions are tested by the subordinate facts found, and they stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to those facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. Balkus v. Terry Steam Turbine Co., 167 Conn. 170, 174 (1874). McQuade v. Ashford, 130 Conn. 478, 482 (1944). Smith v. United Technologies Corp., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 23 (1983).

This appeal is sustained and the Finding and Award is remanded to the Commissioner for a further finding taking into account the required statutory elements.

Accordingly, the Finding and Award is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings with direction to correct the finding to comply with this remand order and to make an award on the basis of the finding as thus corrected.

Commissioners Berte and Verrilli concur in this opinion.