2004 Ct. Sup. 17751
No. 477451Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
November 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (No. 104)
BLUE, JUDGE.
The motion for summary judgment now before the court presents, in a confusing procedural context, an issue concerning the relief available in a municipal tax appeal brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 12-177a 12-119.
The plaintiff owns real property in Branford. The Branford assessor reassessed the property as of October 1, 2002. The plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (Board), claiming that the value determined by the assessor was excessive. The Board heard the appeal in a meeting held on March 24, 2003. The Board subsequently denied the appeal.
The plaintiff’s appeal to this court was commenced by service of process on May 12, 2003. The Town of Branford is the sole defendant. The plaintiff’s complaint “applies for relief pursuant to C.G.S. § 12-117a and C.G.S. § 12-119.” The complaint consists of two counts. The First Count claims “excessive valuation” pursuant to § 12-117a. The Second Count claims a “manifestly excessive” tax pursuant to § 12-119.
The motion for summary judgment now before the court was filed on November 1, 2004. The motion claims that, “The defendant is bound by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” It specifically contends that the meeting of the Board on March 24, 2003, violated the public meeting requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-225(a). The motion is accompanied by documentary evidence that, on September 10, 2003, the Freedom of Information Commission held, in an administrative action brought by an unrelated complainant, that the March 24, 2003 meeting violated the statutory public meeting requirement. Zimmerman v. Chairman, Board of Assessment Appeals, No. FIC 2003-133 (Freedom of Information Commission, September 10, 2003). The Zimmerman
CT Page 17752 decision was not appealed to the Superior Court. Based on what the plaintiff views as the preclusive effect of the Zimmerman
decision, the motion asserts that, “The assessment which was in place before the 2002 revaluation should remain in effect.” The motion was argued on November 22, 2004.
The plaintiff’s argument that the defendant Town is bound by the holding of the Freedom of Information Commission’ Zimmerman decision is forceful. The doctrine of collateral estoppel “applies to issues litigated in administrative proceedings.” Town of East Lyme v. Waddington, 4 Conn.App. 252, 255, 493 A.2d 903, cert. dismissed, 197 Conn. 811, 499 A.2d 61
(1985). Although the plaintiff was not a party to the Zimmerman litigation, the mutuality requirement of the collateral estoppel doctrine has “been widely abandoned as an ironclad rule.” Labbe v. Pension Commission, 239 Conn. 168, 186, 682 A.2d 490 (1996). The question is whether the party claimed to be estopped “lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording [it] an opportunity to relitigate the issue.” Id. at 187 n. 10 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1982)). The plaintiff’s problem is that even if the defendant is estopped by th Zimmerman decision, the consequences of estoppel do not entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought here.
The complaint, filed prior to the Freedom of Information Commission’s decision in Zimmerman, makes no mention of the closed nature of the Board’s March 24, 2003 meeting. Rather, as mentioned, the complaint consists of two counts. The First Count alleges excessive valuation pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §12-117a. The Second Count alleges a manifestly excessive tax pursuant to § 12-119. The limited relief available in municipal tax appeals brought pursuant to the statutes on which these counts rely is well established. “In § 12-117a tax appeals, the trial court tries the matter de novo and the ultimate question is the ascertainment of the true and actual value of the [taxpayer’s] property.” United Technologies Corp. v. Town of East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 22, 807 A.2d 955 (2002). (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Similarly, in order to prevail on a claim under § 12-119, the plaintiff “must demonstrate both a `manifestly excessive’ assessment and
disregard of the statutes in arriving at that assessment.”MacLean v. Town of Darien, 43 Conn.App. 169, 173, 682 A.2d 1064, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 943, 686 A.2d 122 (1996). (Emphasis in original.) CT Page 17753
These authorities make it clear that even if the plaintiff establishes, through collateral estoppel or otherwise, that the defendant disregarded the statutes in arriving at the assessment in question, the plaintiff must additionally establish that the property in question was excessively valued. The motion now before the court does not make this latter showing.
Given the established illegality of the Board’s March 24, 2003 meeting, the plaintiff could make a forceful policy argument, at least in an appropriate procedural context, that the case should be remanded to the Board for consideration of the original assessment appeal in a legal manner. See Commission on Human Rights v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665, 679, 855 A.2d 212
(2004). At the hearing on the motion, however, the plaintiff expressly disclaimed interest in any such procedural remedy.
The plaintiff instead maintains that the former assessment of the property in question should be reinstated by the court and should stand indefinitely. The plaintiff concedes that, absent an act of the legislature, the defendant would have no means of correcting an undervaluation resulting from such an order. A remedy of this description, bestowing an unearned and uncorrectable windfall on the plaintiff would be shockingly inequitable and hardly the sort of remedy envisioned by the tax appeal statutes which form the entire basis for the causes of action asserted in the complaint and which proceed on the clear premise that property valuations should be true and accurate.
Waterbury Equity Hotel, LLC v. City of Waterbury, 85 Conn.App. 480 (2004), heavily relied upon by the plaintiff in argument, is not to the contrary. Waterbury Equity Hotel holds that, notwithstanding an earlier stipulated judgment of assessed valuation, “the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with its appeal of tax assessments made on its property.” Id. at 482-83. This is the precise remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled here. The plaintiff is entitled to proceed with the appeal and obtain a de novo ascertainment of the true and actual value of the property in question. That ascertainment cannot be accomplished in the context of the motion now before the court.
The motion for summary judgment is denied.
Jon C. Blue CT Page 17754
Judge of the Superior Court CT Page 17755