2010 Ct. Sup. 8069
No. FA 09 4045259Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
April 8, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
MARK H. TAYLOR.
I. BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS OF FACT
This is an action to dissolve a 28-year marriage between the plaintiff, Maria R. Lucarz, and the defendant, Dariusz J. Lucarz, who were married in Hartford on February 27, 1982. Three children were born issue of the marriage, all of whom have reached the age of majority: Christopher, born September 6, 1982, Michael, born August 26, 1983, and Derek, born January 6, 1988. Two sons are still attending college and post-graduate studies and the defendant is voluntarily paying tuition and living expenses for both.
The parties are 55 years old and are in relatively good health. Before her marriage to the defendant, the plaintiff was known by her family name of Maria R. Szewc. Although she was trained in Poland as a surgical nurse, she is unemployed and has been the family homemaker throughout the marriage. The defendant is a successful owner of a small business, located in Windsor, specializing in manufacturing aerospace parts. Until February 2010, both parties continuously resided together for many years in the marital family home located at 112 Pierce Boulevard in Windsor. By agreement of the parties, the plaintiff recently moved into a condominium, also located in Windsor at 419 Tributary Lane, purchased for $260,000.00 with marital assets. There are no premarital assets of any significant value owned by either party.
This dissolution action was filed by the plaintiff on July 8, 2009, and was tried to the court on March 25, 2010. After reviewing the evidence and hearing the testimony of the parties, the court makes the following findings. The court has jurisdiction in this case. The marriage has broken down irretrievably with no reasonable expectation of reconciliation. Further, neither of the parties nor their children has received state or municipal assistance. Based upon these findings, the CT Page 8070 marriage of the parties is dissolved, effective this date of judgment, and the court issues the following orders.
II DISCUSSION AND ORDERS
The disputed issues in this dissolution action involve the amount and duration of alimony to be paid to the plaintiff and the equitable division of the parties’ marital property. The court will begin its discussion with the division of marital property.
A. Marital Property
“The purpose of a dissolution action is to sever the marital relationship . . . [and] to divide the marital estate . . . The trial court is empowered to deal broadly with the equitable division of property incident to a dissolution proceeding, and, consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally, the term property should be interpreted broadly as well . . . General Statutes § 46b-81
confers broad powers upon the court in the assignment of property, and the allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court’s broad authority in the assignment of property.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Roos v. Roos, 84 Conn.App. 415, 420, 853 A.2d 642, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 936, 861 A.2d 510 (2004); see Clark v. Clark, 115 Conn.App. 500, 505, 974 A.2d 33 (2009); also see General Statutes § 46b-81.[1] “The purpose of dividing marital property is to preserve, as much as possible, the parties’ existing standard of living, not to award property to one spouse to the complete exclusion of the other.” Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 356, 880 A.2d 872 (2005).
I. Real Property
The marital abode is located at 112 Pierce Boulevard in Windsor, where the defendant continues to reside. The parties have stipulated to its value of $400,000. With a mortgage balance of approximately $190,000, there is equity of $210,000 in this single-family home. The court orders that the defendant shall refinance the mortgage and any other liens on the property within 120 days, whereupon the plaintiff shall quit claim all of her right, title and interest in the property to the defendant. The plaintiff shall retain exclusive title to her condominium located at 419 Tributary Lane in Windsor, recently purchased by the parties with marital assets for $260,000.
The parties also jointly own real property housing the defendant’s CT Page 8071 manufacturing business. This commercial property is located at 875 Marshal Phelps Road in Windsor.
The parties dispute the value of this unencumbered property. The plaintiff claims that it has a current value of $600,000. The defendant claims it has a current value of between $450,000 and $480,000, and requires $50,000 to $60,000 in repairs to the roof and miscellaneous masonry. The defendant testified that he purchased the property for $417,000 ten years ago and that the building is over thirty years old. According to the information provided to the court in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, the real property was built in 1988 and was purchased in 1998 for $420,000. The building is 15,590 sq. feet and sits on 1.69 acres of land. The court finds the reasonable value of the property to be $480,000. The court considers this to be the reasonable value of the property, taking into account the unsubstantiated assertion that repairs are needed, for which there are no appraisals or contracts in place. Assuming that repairs of $60,000 are necessary, with a renovated value of $520,000, this figure is the mid-point between the plaintiff’s estimated value and the highest value estimated by the defendant.[2] Moreover, whatever repairs may be necessary to properly maintain this business property are reasonably accounted for in the modest increase in property value assigned by the court, compared with the original purchase price in 1998.
The plaintiff asserts she is entitled to 55% of the value of this property, which can be refinanced to pay her share of this real property. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff is entitled to half of the value after reducing it by $50,000 for her additional equity in their respective homes and an additional $50,000 in repairs required for the maintenance of this business property. The court agrees with the plaintiff in light of her more limited ability to accumulate assets and income. Furthermore, although the defendant has worked very hard to preserve this asset, his extraordinarily hard work schedule and success was facilitated by the plaintiff’s efforts in maintaining their home and family. Based upon a value of $480,000, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $264,000 within 120 days, whereupon the plaintiff shall convey all of her right title and interest in this real property to the defendant.
The parties also own a time share in Vermont, with a total value of $30,000. The court orders that the plaintiff shall convey her interest in the time share to the defendant or his designee(s) within 120 days.
The defendant owns a partial interest in an apartment unit in Poland with other family members, with his interest valued at $17,500. The CT Page 8072 plaintiff similarly owns a partial interest in an unoccupied family property in Poland. Although this property was not identified in the plaintiff’s financial affidavit, the value is nonetheless unknown to her. The court orders that the parties shall retain their individual interests in these real properties located in Poland.
2. The Family Business
The defendant is the sole proprietor of Rapidex, a manufacturing business servicing the aerospace industry. Although the business has not been valued by an expert, it owns equipment valued at $463,400 and has generated gross income of just less than $1,000,000 annually, averaged over the past four years, yielding net annual profits of approximately $320,000, averaged over the same period. The court notes, however, that these net annual profits have declined over the past two years, averaging approximately $230,000. The defendant has proposed to the court that, in exchange for the plaintiff relinquishing all her right, title and interest in Rapidex, he pay to the plaintiff $1,000 per month as an additional property settlement for a period of five years.
The court orders that the plaintiff relinquish all right or interest in Rapidex. Although the value of this business may be substantially higher than the value of the business equipment, and may legitimately include good will, accounts receivable and other measures of value, it would be speculative for the court to assign a higher value than the personal property owned by Rapidex.
The ongoing value of this business is largely dependent upon the defendant’s continued hard work and strength of the business. Therefore, the court will not divide the value of the business between the parties. Instead, the court orders the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $1,000 per month for ten years as a property settlement for her marital interest in Rapidex. A five-year payment of $1,000 per month was proposed by the defendant and the court therefore concludes that a monthly payment of $1,000 will not substantially interfere with the liquidity and continued success of the corporation. Furthermore, if Rapidex remains financially strong and is able to capitalize upon its future, and hopefully substantially increased, business activity, resulting in increased corporate income to the defendant, the plaintiff may seek a modification of her alimony.
The court acknowledges it has doubled the length, and therefore the amount, of the payout of this asset. During the course of ten years, $120,000 shall be paid to the plaintiff. The payments shall be accelerated upon default of sixty days or upon the sale of the CT Page 8073 business or its property, or any substantial portion thereof, with the remaining amount due immediately.
3. Bank Accounts.
In light of the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s ability to accumulate assets and to generate income is far more limited than the defendant’s, all personal bank accounts shall be divided as follows: 55% to the plaintiff and 45% to the defendant.
4. Stocks, Bonds, Mutual Funds and Deferred Compensation.
In addition and in light of the court’s previous finding that the plaintiff’s ability to accumulate assets and to generate income is far more limited than the defendant’s, the court orders all stocks, bonds, mutual funds and deferred compensation accounts and investments to be divided as follows: 55% to the plaintiff and 45% to the defendant.
All accounts shall be valued as of the date of dissolution. Any Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) necessary to effectuate transfers of retirement funds shall be drafted and processed by an attorney agreed to by the parties. If there is an impasse after considering each other’s proposed attorney or after thirty days, which ever occurs sooner, the defendant may unilaterally select a qualified attorney to draft and process any QDROs necessary to effectuate this order, the cost of which shall be shared equally by the parties including any administrative fees from the institutions. The court shall retain jurisdiction over this provision.
5. Life Insurance.
The plaintiff owns a Sun Life insurance policy on the defendant’s life, currently valued at $110,501, with a face amount of $379,000. The defendant is ordered to maintain any payments on this policy necessary to maintain its face value.
6. Motor Vehicles.
Each party shall retain their respective vehicles and title to any such automobiles shall be transferred to the primary driver. Any automobile loans shall be paid by the primary driver and each party shall indemnify and hold the other harmless from any personal debts relating to these automobiles and loans.
B. Alimony CT Page 8074
Plaintiff seeks lifetime alimony of $1,500.00 per week, based upon the defendant’s net weekly income of $3,344, as reflected on his financial affidavit of August 12, 2009. These income figures were based upon the defendant’s 2008 tax return. The defendant proposes rehabilitative alimony in the monthly sum of $2,500, equaling $581 weekly, for a period of 13 1/2 years, non-modifiable as to term except upon death, remarriage or cohabitation as defined by statute. The court notes that alimony is being paid in the amount of $500 per week, pendente lite. Other than the defendant’s mortgage on the marital abode, the parties have no other substantial liabilities.
The defendant claims that the plaintiff is in good health and was employed as a nurse while in Poland. He therefore submits that although she has not worked outside the home since joining him in the United States some 30 years ago, she has the ability and intelligence to be gainfully employed. Although the court generally agrees with this assessment of the plaintiff, the court cannot find an earning capacity based upon professional or high paying work at this stage of her life.
“[T]he purpose of both periodic and lump sum alimony is to provide continuing support.” Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005). The statutory authorization for the award of alimony in dissolution cases is provided in General Statutes § 46b-82.[3] “That section requires the trial court to consider `the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to [General Statutes § ]46b-81 . . . In particular rehabilitative alimony, or time limited alimony, is alimony that is awarded primarily for the purpose of allowing the spouse who receives it to obtain further education, training, or other skills necessary to attain self-sufficiency . . . Rehabilitative alimony is not limited to that purpose, however, and there may be other valid reasons for awarding it.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn.App. 631, 638-39, 963 A.2d 1049 (2009).
The defendant’s current financial affidavit claims substantially less net weekly income than the $3,344 he claimed on his August 11, 2009 financial affidavit, based upon his 2008 tax return. He now claims $1,260 in net weekly income. Annualized, this figure would reflect a drop in net income of approximately $108,000. Based upon his 2009 tax return, the defendant’s gross personal income from all sources was $231,088 in 2009, compared with $280,786 in 2008, with an adjusted gross income of $188,357 CT Page 8075 in 2009, compared with $213,142 in 2008. After all deductions were claimed, including itemized deductions, the defendant’s resulting taxable income was $143,784 in 2009, compared with $161,253 in 2008. After taxes were imposed, his remaining income was approximately $99,000 in 2009, compared with $105,000 in 2008.
Coincidentally, the $99,000 after tax income in 2009 results in a net weekly income of approximately $1,900, which equals the gross weekly income figure used on his current financial affidavit. In his current financial affidavit, this gross weekly wage of $1,900 is further subjected to reductions for taxes, previously accounted for in the court’s calculation of $1,900, yielding him net weekly income of $1,260. The court finds this number to be incredible. Although the defendant’s net profits from the Rapidex business have gone from $247,531 in 2008 to $211,313 in 2009, this nearly 15% drop of $36,000 in net annual business income cannot explain a 62% drop of $108,000 in net annual personal income, as apparently claimed by the defendant in his most recent financial affidavit. For the purposes of this order of alimony, the court will use the defendant’s 2008 net weekly income figure of $3,344, reduced by 15% to $2,843, to reflect the corresponding drop in his 2009 business income.
Based upon these facts, and having considered all the statutory factors pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82, weekly alimony of $1,000 shall be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff for a period of 10 years, after which either party shall have the right to a de novo review. In making this determination, the court notes that this order of alimony is not limited to 10 years and this initial 10-year period is intended to coincide with both parties having reached the age of 65 and the property distribution of the business having concluded. The alimony award shall be modifiable as to both term and amount; however, it shall continue for the plaintiff’s lifetime if not reviewed and modified by the court. Alimony shall be terminated upon the death of either party, or the plaintiff’s remarriage or cohabitation as defined by statute.
C. Health Insurance
Defendant shall pay an additional sum of alimony for the plaintiff’s COBRA health insurance benefits, currently in the monthly amount of $1,027 for a 55-year-old female (Exhibit F), until she is employed with reasonable health insurance benefits, or until COBRA benefits expire, whichever comes first. Grounds for modification of alimony, as ordered above, shall include the conclusion of the plaintiff’s health insurance benefits pursuant to COBRA.
CT Page 8076 D. Health Related Expenses
The court incorporates into the judgment an agreement of the parties dated September 9, 2009, for the defendant to pay for the plaintiff’s continuing dental procedure, with an approximate cost of $50,000, ordered by the court pendente lite.
SO ORDERED.
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