CASE NO. 905 CRD-6-89-8Workers’ Compensation Commission
JANUARY 17, 1991
The claimant was represented by Jonathan Gould, Esq.
The respondents were represented by Lucas Strunk, Esq., Douglas Drayton, Esq., and Jason Dodge, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.
The Second Injury Fund was represented at the trial level by Robin Wilson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General. The Second Injury Fund did not appear or participate in the appellate proceedings.
This Petition for Review from the August 14, 1989 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Eighth District acting for the Sixth District was heard June 29, 1990 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr., and James Metro.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.
Involved in this appeal is a dispute about medical causation. The trial commissioner found that claimant sustained a compensable injury January 17, 1985 when he slipped and fell down a flight of stairs and hit his head. Shortly thereafter he experienced a bad headache and blurred vision; the next morning he could hardly see. He was admitted to the Hartford Hospital and on January 23, 1985 underwent surgery for a craniopharyngioma.
The commissioner found that claimant’s craniopharyngioma pre-existed the claimant’s work-related fall and that the “fall aggravated and accelerated the pre-existing craniopharyngioma by causing it to stretch over the optic nerves, thereby resulting in a visual impairment. . . .” Finding and Award, Paragraph #12. Also, claimant suffered post-surgical medical problems, e.g. endocrine diabetes insipidus and panhypopituitarism. The decision concluded that claimant’s diabetes insipidus was a compensable condition but that the panhypopituitarism and other impairments were not the result of his compensable fall.
Respondents dispute that a causal connection existed between the claimant’s compensable injury and the craniopharyngioma. They contend that the medical evidence was insufficient to establish such a causal connection. Whether the claimant’s disability is causally connected to a work-related incident is a factual question to be determined by the trier. See McDonough v. Connecticut Bank Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987). See also Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 212 Conn. 441 (1989). He will not substitute our conclusion for his, and on review we are limited to determining whether the commissioner’s conclusion was without evidence, contrary to law, or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences. Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).
There was testimony provided by Dr. David Kvam that without the January 17, 1985 fall the claimant would not have suffered any loss of vision. The doctor also testified that the fall contributed to an accelerated course of symptoms by the offending tumor. See Disposition of David A. Kvam, M. D., November 25, 1985 at 10-12. This testimony in addition to the other testimony presented provided evidence from which the trial commissioner could reasonably have concluded a causal connection existed between the claimant’s symptoms and his work related fall.
McDonough, supra, reviewed the law on the issue of causation. While McDonough considered proximate causation in relation to a heart disease claim, its analysis is pertinent to the issues here. McDonough relied on Stier v. Derby, 119 Conn. 44, 52 (1934) which in turn cited Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 90 Conn. 539 (1916). In Hartz, supra at 543, the court held,
Whatever predisposing physical condition may exist, if the employment is the immediate occasion of the injury, it arises out of the employment because it develops within it. When the exertion of the employment acts upon the weakened condition of the body of the employee, or upon an employee predisposed to suffer injury, in such way that a personal injury results, the injury must be said to arise out of the employment. An employee may be suffering from heart disease, aneurysm hernia . . . or other ailment, and the exertion of the employment may develop his condition in such a manner that it becomes a personal injury.
The instant case is consistent with these proximate causation precedents. There is evidence to support the commissioner’s decision. It is not contrary to law or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inference.
We, therefore affirm the August 14, 1989 Finding and Award. Additionally we grant interest at the rate permitted by Sec. 31-301(c) on any amount remaining unpaid during the pendency of this appeal.
Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr. and James Metro concur.