LEE McGHEE, CLAIMANT vs. UTC/PRATT WHITNEY DIV., EMPLOYERS and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., INSURER, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE and SECOND INJURY AND COMPENSATION ASSURANCE FUND, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT

CASE NO. 271 CRD-1-83Workers’ Compensation Commission
MAY 6, 1987

At the trial level claimant appeared pro se, Mr. Lee McGhee. No appearance was made on behalf of the claimant at the appellate proceeding.

Respondents employer and insurer were represented by Robert Brennan, Esq.

The Second Injury Fund was represented at the trial level by Jane Comerford, Esq., Assistant Attorney General. On appeal, the Fund was represented by Robert W. Murphy, Esq., Assistant Attorney General.

This Petition for Review from the September 30, 1983 Finding and Award of the Commissioner-at-Large acting for the First District was heard April 26, 1985 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Frank Verrilli.

FINDING AND AWARD

1-6. Paragraphs 1 through 6 of the trial Commissioner’s Finding and Award are affirmed and made paragraphs 1 through 6 of this Division’s Finding and Award.

7. The accident suffered by the claimant occurred when he stepped on a sharp object at work and suffered a puncture wound to his right toe.

8. Paragraph 7 of the trial Commissioner’s Finding and Award is made paragraph 8 of this Division’s Finding and Award.

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AWARDED AND DECREED that the Second Injury Fund reimburse Liberty Mutual for all payments made to and for the benefit of the claimant and assume liability for any additional benefits occurring as a result of the October 3, 1980 injury.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.

Claimant was a diabetic who had executed a Waiver under Sec. 31-325 C.G.S. describing claimant’s physical defect as “Diabetes Mellitus” on October 20, 1978. He sustained a compensable injury to his right great toe October 3, 1980. The trial Commissioner in a September 30, 1983 Finding and Award found, “The consequences of the claimant’s injury of October 3, 1980 were attributable in a material degree to the defect described in the Waiver, namely Diabetes Mellitus” and ordered the Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund to reimburse the insurance carrier and assume liability for all benefits occurring as a result of the October 3, 1980 injury. The Second Injury Fund attacks that Finding on the same grounds as those alleged in Shea v. Cly-Del Manufacturing Co., 390 CRD-5-85 (3/19/87), i.e. that the waived defect must be a causative factor in the accident resulting in the compensable injury. In the instant case, the Fund argues that claimant’s stepping on a sharp object was the actual cause of the accident and not the Diabetes Mellitus condition. We have corrected the Commissioner’s Finding to include that fact. However, our corrections do not affect the ultimate result.

The flaw in the Fund’s position is that it attempts to narrow the discourse by concentrating on the causality of the accident producing the injury. But as Shea, supra, holds, Sec. 31-325 refers to the causes of the “injury.” Injury under our law is a much broader concept than accident, Boutin v. Industrial Components, 237 CRD-6-83 (3/9/87) and the cases there cited.

As in Shea, the acknowledged defect in the instant matter caused the claimant to suffer a greater disability and hence more injury. Thus, the consequences of the October, 1980 injury were greater in a material degree because of the acknowledged defect, i.e. the diabetic condition.

We, therefore, affirm the trial Commissioner’s Finding and Award of September 30, 1983.

Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Frank Verrilli concur.

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