627 A.2d 951
(11381)Appellate Court of Connecticut
DUPONT, C.J., LAVERY and HEIMAN, Js.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from a decision by the defendant Watertown board of education terminating his employment as a guidance counselor due to a reduction in teaching positions. The plaintiff had sought, pursuant to statute (10-151 [d] [5]) and the collective bargaining agreement, to exercise seniority rights in assuming a position of special education counselor that was held by a counselor with a shorter period of service. He was denied the position because he was not certified in special education, and, although the collective bargaining agreement did not specify special education certification for the position sought by the plaintiff, the job description for that position required certification in both school counseling and special education. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that the board, in considering the job description, had illegally departed from the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement. On the defendants’ appeal to this court, held that the trial court correctly concluded that the board acted illegally; the plain language of 10-151 (d)(5) requires the collective bargaining agreement to spell out the qualifications of the position sought to be assumed, and the collective bargaining agreement here did not specify any certification for the position beyond that held by the plaintiff.
Argued April 30, 1993
Decision released July 13, 1993
Appeal from the decision by the defendant board of education terminating the plaintiffs employment, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the court, Harrigan, J.; judgment sustaining the appeal, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Affirmed.
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Daniel P. Scapellati, with whom, was John W. Lemega, for the appellants (defendants).
Brian A. Doyle, for the appellee (plaintiff).
HEIMAN, J.
The defendants[1] appeal from a judgment of the trial court reversing a decision of the Watertown board of education (board) terminating the plaintiff’s employment. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the board. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff was a tenured teacher employed as a guidance counselor by the Watertown board of education.[2] The plaintiff holds a standard certification issued by the state of Connecticut certifying him as a school guidance counselor for children in kindergarten through grade twelve. This certification also permits him to work with special education students.
On July 17, 1989, the board considered termination of his services, pursuant to General Statutes 10-151 (d)(5),[3] due to a reduction in teaching positions.
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The termination of the plaintiff’s employment is also governed by article XXI of the collective bargaining agreement. Article XXI provides in pertinent part:
“2. Termination of Tenured Teachers
“Subject to the provisions herein set forth, no tenured teacher shall be terminated as the result of the elimination of his or her position unless, at the time of the contemplated termination, there is no other position in the Watertown School System for which the teacher is certified which is occupied by a teacher with a shorter period of service.”
Further, the general provisions of the bargaining agreement provide that “[t]his agreement contains the full and complete agreement between the Board and the Association on all negotiable issues. . . .”
The plaintiff sought to “bump”[4] a teacher with a shorter period of service from a position described as “High School Special Education Counselor.” The job description for this position, issued by the board of education, requires certification in school counseling and special education. The state requires certification only in school counseling to fill the position. The plaintiff lacks certification in special education.
The plaintiff requested a hearing before an impartial panel, pursuant to General Statutes 10-151 (d),[5]
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concerning his termination. The impartial panel recommended, in a two-to-one decision, that the plaintiff’s contract be terminated. The panel stated that “it is found that there is a strong argument for retention of Mr. McKee based on the State’s requirement of only the certification as a School Counselor . . . to be a Guidance Counselor. However, a preponderance of the evidence received . . . dictates that it was the clear intent of the parties to the contract to require that a teacher have the same proper certifications to fill a position when bumping as when the position is originally filled. In the instant matter, it is established that it is necessary to hold certifications in Special Education and as a School Counselor to hold the position at issue of Special Education Counselor at the high school. Alexander McKee does not hold Special Education certification.”
On November 1, 1989, the board accepted the findings and recommendation of the panel and terminated the plaintiff’s employment effective November 2, 1989. On November 28, 1989, the plaintiff appealed the actions of the board to the Superior Court, pursuant to General Statutes 10-151 (f).[6] On April 15, 1992, the trial court reversed the decision of the board finding that the board acted illegally. The basis for the reversal was “that the impartial hearing panel improperly departed from the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement to search improperly for the contracting parties’ intent when the language of the bargaining contract is clear and unambiguous. In
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adding the job description to the collective bargaining agreement, the panel was legally wrong and the board’s reliance thereon was legally wrong.” This appeal followed.
“Our function in reviewing the action of the board pursuant to 10-151 (f) is to determine whether the board has acted illegally and not to substitute our judgment for that of the board.” Rado v. Board of Education, 216 Conn. 541, 555, 583 A.2d 102 (1990).[7]
The determination of the legality of the board’s decision is controlled by statute. General Statutes 10-151 (d)(5) provides a discharge procedure for tenured teachers when the position held by the teacher is eliminated. Theriault v. Board of Education, 31 Conn. App. 690, 694, 626 A.2d 781 (1993). The statute is facially clear and unambiguous. Theriault v. Board of Education, supra. Where “a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for statutory construction.” State v. Cain, 223 Conn. 731, 744, 613 A.2d 804
(1992). The statute is to be applied according to its plain language. Theriault v. Board of Education, supra. The statute provides that if the present position of a teacher is eliminated, “such teacher, if qualified, shall be appointed to a position held by a teacher who has not attained tenure, and provided further that determination of the individual contract . . . of employment to be terminated shall be made in accordance with either (A) a provision for layoff procedure [in the collective bargaining agreement] or (B) in the absence of such agreement, a written policy of the board of education
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. . . .” General Statutes 10-151 (d)(5). Thus, the statute requires that the board satisfy a two part test for a lawful termination of a tenured teacher upon elimination of a position. First, the position must be eliminated. Second, the teacher must not be qualified to be appointed to any position held by a teacher with less service as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement or, in the absence of a collecting bargaining agreement, as provided for in a written policy of the board.[8]
The first part of the test is satisfied. The position of the plaintiff was eliminated. The board has failed, however, to satisfy the second part of the test.
The language of the collective bargaining agreement controls the process for determining the individual to be terminated pursuant to General Statutes 10-151
(d)(5)(A). Theriault v. Board of Education, supra. This procedure allows the plaintiff to be appointed to a position held by a teacher with a shorter period of service.
The collective bargaining agreement provides that “no tenured teacher shall be terminated as the result of the elimination of his or her position unless, at the time of the contemplated termination, there is no other
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position in the Watertown School System for which the teacher is certified which is occupied by a teacher with a shorter period of service.” (Emphasis added.) This provision is clear and unambiguous. As such, “the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. . . . [N]o room exists for construction.” (Citation omitted.) Greenburg v. Greenburg, 26 Conn. App. 591, 596, 602 A.2d 1056 (1992). “The parties’ intent is ascertained by a `fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.'” Harvey v. Daddona, 29 Conn. App. 369, 375, 615 A.2d 177 (1992). Thus, the collective bargaining agreement provides for a tenured teacher to bump a teacher with less service where the tenured teacher is certified for the position. The collective bargaining agreement does not contain specific language sufficient to warn parties to the agreement that any rule other than those set forth in General Statutes 10-151 (d) applies with respect to bumping. In the absence of such a provision in the collective bargaining agreement, the certification required for high school special education counselor is the standard certification only. The plaintiff is certified for the position. He properly should have been appointed to this position to replace a less senior teacher as provided in the collective bargaining agreement. The failure by the board to follow this procedure is a violation of the statute and constitutes an illegal act by the board that cannot stand.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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