RAYMOND MERCHANT, CLAIMANT-APPELLANT, CROSS-APPELLEE v. J. S. NASIN COMPANY, EMPLOYER and AETNA CASUALTY SURETY CO., INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES, CROSS-APPELLANTS

CASE NO. 952 CRD-2-89-11Workers’ Compensation Commission
MAY 1, 1991

The claimant was represented by Mark Oberlatz, Esq. O’Brien, Shafner, Bartinik, Stuart Kelly, P.C.

The respondents were represented by Jason Dodge, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.

This Petition for Review from the November 17, 1989 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Second District was heard October 26, 1990 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Andrew Denuzze, and Michael S. Sherman

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

All parties seek review of the Second District’s Finding and Award. The district approved respondent’s Form 36 Notice of Intention to Discontinue Benefits filed February 1, 1988 as of November 1, 1988, nine months later. Claimant’s appeal disputes the commissioner’s ruling that U.S. Social Security Medical Vocational Guidelines were inadmissible.

Claimant sought to introduce into evidence the federal Social Security Medical Vocational Guidelines. Respondent objected to their admission on the basis of hearsay and lack of relevance. The Commissioner sustained the objection as claimant was being paid social security retirement benefits and not social security disability benefits.

Our Supreme Court has held:

The rules for determining the admissibility of evidence are well settled. The trial court has broad discretion to determine both the relevancy and remoteness of evidence. State v. Fritz, 204 Conn. 156, 167, 527 A.2d 1157 (1987); State v. Boucino, 199 Conn. 207, 225, 506 A.2d 125 (1986); Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 273, 460 A.2d 1260
(1983); Hughes v. Contemporary Mission, Inc., 180 Conn. 150, 153, 429 A.2d 827 (1980). Only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion will this court set aside on appeal rulings on evidentiary matters. State v. Fritz, supra, 167-68; State v. Boucino, supra; State v. Falcon, 196 Conn. 557, 566, 494 A.2d 1190 (1985). In considering the relevancy of evidence, we ask whether “it tends to establish the existence of a material fact or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case. State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 659, 491 A.2d 345 (1985); State v. Mastropetre, 175 Conn. 512, 517, 400 A.2d 276 (1978).” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 285, 497 A.2d 35 (1985).

Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 324 (1987). See also, State v. Alvarez, 216 Conn. 301, 309 (1990).

On the basis of these precedents we cannot say that the commissioner abused his discretion in ruling the guidelines inadmissible.

The employer’s cross appeal was not received until November 28, 1989. The district’s decision was rendered November 17, 1989 eleven days before. As the respondents failed to comply with the time requirements of Sec. 31-301 (a), we lack jurisdiction to hear the respondents’ appeal.

We therefore affirm the November 17, 1989 Finding and Award and dismiss the appeal.

Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and Michael S. Sherman concur.

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