506 A.2d 162
(3700) (3701)Appellate Court of Connecticut
HULL, BIELUCH and PICKETT, Js.
The plaintiff in each case sought damages under the Dram Shop Act (30-102) from the defendant owner and the defendant permittee of a cafe located in Hartford. The plaintiffs were injured when S, who was allegedly served alcohol at the cafe while intoxicated, drove his car into the motorcycle on which they were riding. After a consolidated trial, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, and, from the judgments rendered thereon, the defendants appealed. Held: 1. The defendants’ claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jurors that if they disbelieved a witness’ testimony, it “does not mean
Page 492
necessarily that the opposite is true,” was unavailing; the trial court’s charge to the jury was correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury. 2. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that S was intoxicated while at the cafe and that he was served liquor there while intoxicated.
Argued November 25, 1985 —
Decision released March 18, 1986
Action, in each case, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford New Britain at Hartford, where the cases were consolidated and tried to the jury before Hon. Douglass B. Wright, state trial referee; verdicts and judgments for the plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed to this court. No error.
Eugene A. Cooney, for the appellants (defendants in both cases).
Anthony A. Tomaro, for the appellee (plaintiff in the first case).
Richard P. Weinstein, for the appellee (plaintiff in the second case).
PICKETT, J.
The defendants, Thomas B. Sayers and Janet Capasso, have appealed from the judgments rendered for the plaintiffs, Kenneth J. Milano and William J. Drew, on the verdicts entered following a jury trial in these consolidated dram shop cases.[1] The defendants are the owner and the permittee respectively of the
Page 493
Mardi Gras Cafe, formerly known as the Grandfather’s Clock Cafe, located in Hartford.
On the evening of August 11, 1978, Richard Swanson, upon leaving the defendants’ cafe, drove his car into a motorcycle occupied by the two plaintiffs, causing very serious injuries. The main issue at trial was whether Swanson was served alcohol at the defendants’ cafe while he was intoxicated. Both Swanson and the barmaid, Joan Hall, denied that he was so served, although there was evidence that he was intoxicated when he left the cafe. It was conceded that Swanson and Hall had been close friends for a period of years.
Swanson testified that he was sober when he entered the bar. The barmaid testified that Swanson ordered a drink, but was served a soda instead because he appeared intoxicated. It was alleged that Swanson became irate and refused the soda. There was also testimony that Swanson was intoxicated at the time of the accident, of the minutes after leaving the defendants’ bar.
While charging the jury on the issue of inferences based upon disbelieved testimony,[2]
the trial court made the following statement: “Our Supreme Court in Novak versus Anderson [178 Conn. 506, 423 A.2d 147 (1979)]
Page 494
once said this: while it is true that it is within the province of the jury to accept or reject a person’s testimony, a jury in rejecting such testimony cannot conclude the opposite is true. A jury cannot from a disbelief of a person’s testimony infer that the plaintiff’s allegation is correct. In other words, you may disbelieve the testimony of any witness you want in whole or in part, but just disbelieving that witness’ testimony does not mean necessarily that the opposite is true.” The defendants alleged that this statement was contradictory and misleading and requested a clarification, on the issue. The court refused to clarify further its instructions. The jury thereafter found for the plaintiffs. The defendants moved to set aside the verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of the insufficiency of the evidence and the allegedly improper instruction. These motions were denied.[3]
The defendants claim on appeal that it was error to instruct the jury that if they disbelieved a witness’ testimony, it “does not mean necessarily that the opposite is true.”[4] (Emphasis added.) What the defendants seek to do is lift one word from the charge, the term `necessarily,” to establish that the trial court committed error. This they cannot do. Herb v. Kerr, 190 Conn. 136, 138, 459 A.2d 521 (1983); Foote v. Brown, 81 Conn. 218, 226-27, 70 A. 699 (1908). “`[A] charge
Page 495
to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statements but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict in the case; Amato v. Desenti, 117 Conn. 612, 617, 169 A. 611 [1933].’ State v. Harris, 172 Conn. 223, 226, 374 A.2d 203
(1977). The charge should be examined to see whether it fairly presents the case to the jury so that no injustice is done under the rules of law to the legal rights of the defendant.” State v. Williams, 182 Conn. 262, 268, 438 A.2d 80 (1980). An examination of the charge[5] discloses that it was “correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.” Castaldo v. D’Eramo, 140 Conn. 88, 94,
Page 496
98 A.2d 664 (1953); State v. Rodgers, 198 Conn. 53, 56, 502 A.2d 360 (1985); Patrick v. Burns, 5 Conn. App. 663, 671, 502 A.2d 432 (1985). A microscopic examination of a charge is discountenanced by an appellate court. State v. Mastropetre, 175 Conn. 512, 524, 400 A.2d 276
(1978); State v. Lopez, 5 Conn. App. 599, 604, 502 A.2d 418 (1985).
The second claim of error is that the court’s refusal to set aside the judgment and render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was error because there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts. The correctness of the trial court’s action must be tested by the evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Tomczuk v. Alvarez, 184 Conn. 182, 185, 439 A.2d 935 (1981); Feir v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 459, 463, 106 A.2d 723
(1954); Patrick v. Burns, supra, 665.
Viewing the testimony in this light, in support of the verdict as we must, the jury could reasonably have believed Swanson’s testimony that he was not intoxicated when he entered the cafe. There was conflicting evidence as to when Swanson entered the cafe, but the jury could reasonably have believed that he entered as early as 9:30 p.m., in view of the testimony of Joan Hall that he entered anywhere between 9:30 and 10 p.m. Upon leaving the cafe, he got into his car and proceeded down Franklin Avenue. At approximately 10:22 p.m., while only a block or two from the cafe, his vehicle struck the plaintiffs. There was substantial evidence that Swanson was intoxicated at the scene of the accident.
The jury was entitled to draw reasonable inferences in support of its verdict. If they believed Swanson walked into the cafe at 9:30 p.m. and was not intoxicated and emerged at approximately 10:20 p.m. and was intoxicated, they could reasonably have inferred that he had been served alcohol in the defendants’ bar
Page 497
while he was intoxicated. The very nature of the Dram Shop Act is such that in many cases it is difficult to sustain the burden of proof by direct evidence. In most instances, the burden of proof is met by circumstantial evidence. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 256, 129 A.2d 606 (1957). As the court said in Pierce: “To say that the proof must show by direct evidence that [the intoxicated person] ordered the beer and paid for it is to insist upon a refinement which would make the statute practically inoperative under the circumstances.” Id., 258; see Staples v. Lucas, 142 Conn. 452, 457, 115 A.2d 337 (1955). The court went on to state that “it is difficult to establish by direct or testimonial evidence, that is, by witnesses who state facts which came under their personal observation, precisely to whom the intoxicating beverage was sold and that the purchaser of it was already intoxicated when he bought it. See 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) p. 399. . . . Difficulty in securing testimonial evidence does not, however, excuse the necessity of proof sufficient to establish a case. It compels, rather, a resort to the establishment, by direct testimonial evidence, of circumstances from which logical and reasonable inferences of other material facts can be fairly drawn. In a civil case, `proof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact.’ Dickson v. Yale University, 141 Conn. 250, 253, 105 A.2d 463
[1954] . . . .” Pierce v. Albanese, supra, 255-56.
The jury is free to believe a part of what a witness testified and disregard other portions of his testimony. The jury was free to draw logical and reasonable inferences from the evidence. As long as rational minds could draw such inferences, the court cannot upset the
Page 498
verdicts of the jury. Lemmon v. Paterson Construction Co., 137 Conn. 158, 162, 75 A.2d 385
(1950); Ropiak v. O’Leary, 38 Conn. Sup. 597, 599-600, 456 A.2d 1215 (1982). There was evidence to support the conclusion that Swanson was intoxicated while at the cafe and evidence from which the jury could infer that he was served liquor.
In the case of Balboni v. Stonick, 2 Conn. App. 523, 481 A.2d 82 (1984), this court reversed the trial court’s ruling setting aside a verdict and directed judgment for the defendant upon the verdict, stating that, “[i]t is the province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. Trzcinski v. Richey, 190 Conn. 285, 298, 460 A.2d 1269 (1983). Accordingly, the evidence offered at trial must be given the most favorable construction to which it is reasonably entitled in support of the verdict. Herb v. Kerr, 190 Conn. 136, 140, 459 A.2d 521 (1983). While the ruling of the trial court on a motion to set aside a verdict is entitled to great weight because of the court’s familiarity with the facts and circumstances of the case; Nielson v. D’Angelo, 1 Conn. App. 239, 244, 471 A.2d 965 (1984); the parties are entitled to have issues upon which fairminded persons may differ decided by the jury.” Balboni v. Stonick, supra, 529-30; Patrick v. Burns, supra, 666.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.