2004 Ct. Sup. 11096, 37 CLR 501
No. CV 02 0820189Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
July 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS (# 103)
HENNESSEY, JUDGE.
The defendants move to dismiss on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On October 10, 2002, the plaintiff, the New York state department of taxation, filed the complaint in this action on a New York judgment against the defendants, Michael Buenaventura and Susanne Buenaventura. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On or about November 4, 1992, the deputy tax commissioner of New York executed and issued a tax warrant for income taxes due from the defendants in the amount of $25,461.34. On November 12, 1992, the tax warrant was entered into the judgment docket of the office of the clerk of Albany County, New York. Despite being provided with written notice and demand, the defendants have failed to pay the judgment. The plaintiff now seeks the sum of $58,059.14, together with interest from September 11, 2002. A certified copy of the tax warrant bearing the November 12, 1992 stamp of the Albany County clerk’s office is attached to the complaint.
On October 30, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because “it does not raise a question under the common law, constitutional law or Connecticut statutory law, but rather is based solely on an alleged violation of a New York statute or statutes, and/or an unregistered ten-year-old tax warrant that has not been adjudicated by a court.” In support of the motion, the defendants filed a memorandum of law and the affidavit of Susanne Buenaventura in which she states that she has never appeared in any New York lawsuit concerning taxes owed to the state and has never been served with process for any such lawsuits. In opposition, the plaintiff also filed a memorandum of law as well as another certified copy of the tax warrant and a copy of a certified “Transcript of Judgment” indicating that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants was rendered on November 12, 1992.
“A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert lack of jurisdiction over CT Page 11097 the subject matter, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc., 260 Conn. 46, 51, 794 A.2d 498 (2002). “A motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. Meriden, 72 Conn. App. 766, 769, 806 A.2d 585 (2002).
“As a matter of federal law, the full faith and credit clause requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it.” Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 214 Conn. 52, 56, 570 A.2d 687
(1990). The defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in the present case because the plaintiffs are simply seeking to enforce a New York tax warrant in this court, rather than seeking to enforce a New York court judgment. The defendants’ argument overlooks the language of N.Y. Tax Law § 692(e), which provides: “When a warrant has been filed with the county clerk the tax commission shall, in the right of the people of the state of New York, be deemed to have obtained judgment against the taxpayer for the tax or other amounts.”
The plaintiff has alleged that the tax warrant in the present case was entered into the judgment docket of the office of the clerk of Albany County. The plaintiff has also submitted proof that the warrant was filed with the clerk on November 12, 1992. The defendants have not placed those facts in dispute. The record presently before the court establishes that the plaintiff, pursuant to N.Y. Tax Law § 692(e), has a valid New York judgment against the defendants.
Nevertheless, the defendants have submitted Susanne Buenaventura’s affidavit indicating that she has never appeared in any New York lawsuit concerning taxes owed to the state and has never been served with process for any such lawsuits. While those facts are not disputed by the plaintiff, they are not relevant to the issue of whether there is a valid New York judgment based on the tax warrant. Under N.Y. Tax Law § 692, the plaintiff was not required to take the defendants to court in order to obtain a judgment. The statute requires the plaintiff to “give notice to each person liable for any amount of tax . . . which has been assessed but remains unpaid, stating the amount and demanding payment thereof.” N.Y. Tax Law § 692(b). The statute further provides that the plaintiff may issue a tax warrant if those liable for the tax refuse to pay the tax within twenty-one days after such notice. N.Y. Tax Law § 692(c). The statute does not require service of process or appearance of the taxpayer in court as a prerequisite to the plaintiff obtaining a judgment by CT Page 11098 filing a tax warrant with the county clerk.
The defendants further argue that the plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), General Statutes § 52-604 et seq. “Our courts have concluded, despite the language of § 52-605(a) providing that a foreign judgment creditor `shall file’ a foreign judgment in the court in which enforcement is sought, that the provisions of the UEFJA are not exclusive, and a judgment creditor still may seek recognition of a foreign judgment by way of a common-law action on the judgment.” Moasser v. Becker, 78 Conn. App. 305, 312, 828 A.2d 116, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 910, 832 A.2d 70 (2003); see also Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 268 Conn. 264, 274 n. 10, 842 A.2d 1113 (2004). Moreover, General Statutes § 52-607 states in relevant part that “[t]he right of a judgment creditor to proceed by an action on the judgment . . . instead of proceeding under Sections 52-604 to 52-609, inclusive, remains unimpaired.” In the present action, there is no indication that the plaintiff is proceeding under the UEFJA, rather than a common-law action on the judgment. Accordingly, the plaintiff was not required to comply with the provisions of the UEFJA.
For the reasons stated, the motion to dismiss is denied.
Hennessey, J. CT Page 11099