CASE NO. 194 CRD-2-83Workers’ Compensation Commission
JANUARY 22, 1987
The claimant appeared pro se on appeal. Claimant did not file a brief but did appear at oral argument. Mr. Robert Parizeau.
The respondent was represented by Robert G. Girard, Esq., Assistant Attorney General. However, respondent did not file a brief.
This Petition For Review From the January 5, 1983 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the District and accompanying’ Memorandum of Decision was heard September 19, 1984 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners Andrew P. Denuzze and Rhoda Loeb.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.
Claimant, a University of Connecticut police sargeant, sustained a broken leg at the end of his work shift while walking from his patrol car to the office where he was to pass on information to the succeeding shift supervisor.
All parties admit claimant sustained a compensable work injury. The only issue is whether the Commissioner below erred as a matter of law in ruling claimant was entitled to full pay provided by Sec. 5-142(a) C.G.S. rather than the sixty-six and two thirds (66 2/3) rate provided by Sec. 31-307 C.G.S.
Sec. 5-142(a) provides, inter alia, “(A)ny member of the police or fire security force of the University of Connecticut. . . sustains any injury while making an arrest or in the actual performance of such police duties . . . the state shall pay all necessary medical and hospital expenses resulting from such injury . . . he shall continue to receive the full salary which he was receiving at the time of injury . . . for a period of two hundred sixty weeks from the date of the beginning of such incapacity.” The appellant in this matter has not filed a brief setting out the legal reasoning and authority on which he bases his argument[1] . We presume then that the respondent appellant appeals because, in appellant’s view, claimant did not sustain his injury “while making an arrest or in the actual performance of such police duties.”
As noted on other occasions, Sec. 1-1 provides that the words and phrases in a statute are to be “construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language.” In the instant matter, if claimant’s return from his patrol car to his office was police duty, Sec. 5-142(a) C.G.S. applies. Thus, we must define duty and determine if claimant’s walk from his police car to his office was a “duty” imposed on him by virtue of his employment as a police officer for the University of Connecticut. If so, then claimant met the requirement of Sec. 5-142(a).
“Where a statute does not define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed in the law and in dictionaries.” Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183 (1981) (Citation omitted). Black’s Law Dictionary defines duty as “A human action which is exactly conformable to the laws which require us to obey them. Legal or moral obligation. Obligatory conduct or service. Mandatory obligation to perform.” Black’s Law Dictionary 72 (5th ed. 1979). The Commissioner’s January 5, 1983 Finding and Award and the accompanying Memorandum citing Department Regulations as well as claimant’s job description describing Job duties “related work as is required,” show claimant had an obligation to perform the act which resulted in his injury.
As we find that the factual conclusions drawn by the Commissioner were not the result of “an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them,” the Commissioner’s finding must stand. Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 118 (1979).
Therefore, the Commissioner’s Finding and Award of January 5, 1983 is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
Commissioners Andrew P. Denuzze and Rhoda Loeb concur.