2003 Ct. Sup. 8894-aw, 35 CLR 365
No. CV 02 0188873Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford
August 8, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
LEWIS, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
The defendant, Ginsburg Development, LLC, moves (#123) this court to strike the substitute complaint filed by the plaintiff, Roger I. Parker, on February 13, 2003. The plaintiff filed the substitute complaint as a result of the defendant’s motion (#116) to strike the original complaint, which was granted by this court on February 3, 2003. Se Parker v. Ginsburg Development, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 02 0188873 (February 3, 2003, Lewis, J.T.R.) (34 Conn.L.Rptr. 55) (hereinafter the February 3, 2003, decision).
The substitute complaint consists of seven counts and asserts causes of action for breach of an express contract, breach of an implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, misrepresentation, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and violation of Connecticut public policy. The following allegations are contained in the substitute complaint. While employed by Marcon Group, not a party to this action, the plaintiff engaged in discussions with three employees and agents of the defendant regarding becoming a sales agent with the defendant. It was known that in order to pursue this new employment, the plaintiff would be required to terminate his employment with Marcon Group. The prospective employment discussions among the plaintiff and the defendant’s agents focused on a project that contemplated the sale of 264 townhouses for which the plaintiff would be the sole sales agent and would receive a salary, commission and employee benefits.[1] According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s representatives “expressly promised without ambiguity” that the plaintiff’s employment would not be terminated until the subject 264 townhouses were sold.
Based on the defendant’s representations, the plaintiff resigned from his position with Marcon Group and the defendant hired him on or about June 12, 2001. Approximately five days later and before his first actual day of work, on or about June 18, 2001, the defendant terminated the CT Page 8894-ax plaintiff’s employment. Despite searching for comparable employment, the plaintiff remained unemployed until October 5, 2001.
The defendant moves to strike each count of the substitute complaint for failure to state of claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant’s arguments on which it bases its motion to strike will be explained fully below.
“A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003). The trial court must “take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and . . . construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “For the purpose of ruling upon a motion to strike, the facts alleged in a complaint, though not the legal conclusions it may contain, are deemed to be admitted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Assn., Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 476, 823 A.2d 1202
(2003).
In count one, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached an express employment contract, while count two contains allegations that the defendant breached an implied employment contract. “A plaintiff may, with reasonable cause, raise alternative and inconsistent claims in the same case.” Danko v. Redway Enterprises, Inc., 254 Conn. 369, 381, 757 A.2d 1064 (2000). In count one, the plaintiff alleges that through its agents’ statements, the defendant “promised and agreed that Plaintiff’s employment would not be terminated until all 264 townhouses” were sold. In count two, the plaintiff alleges that through its agents’ conduct, the defendant “agreed and promised that Plaintiff’s employment would not be terminated until all 264 townhouses” were sold. Because the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment, the plaintiff maintains, in the alternative, that the defendant breached either an express or implied contract.
“[I]t is a general proposition that contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burnham v. Karl Gelb, P.C., 252 Conn. 153, 158-59, 745 A.2d 178 (2000). “In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. CT Page 8894-ay Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697-98, 802 A.2d 731
(2002). Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant agreed that his employment would continue until the plaintiff sold all 264 townhouses. Even viewing the substitute complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations, again, “do not give rise to anything but an at-will employment contract terminable at will.” Parker v. Ginsburg Development, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0188873. Deeming the facts contained in the complaint as admitted, the defendant hired the plaintiff to sell the townhouses and when all of the townhouses were sold, the plaintiff’s employment with the defendant would terminate. These facts do not set forth a contract for a definite term. As alleged, the number of townhouses to be sold was a job responsibility rather than an indication of the duration of employment so as to create a contract of employment other than one at-will.
Our Supreme Court has recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. As the court has explained, “[b]eginning in the late 1950s . . . courts began to carve out certain exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, thereby giving rise to tort claims for wrongful discharge. Certain employer practices provoked public disfavor, and unlimited employer discretion to fire employees eventually yielded to a more limited rule.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 260 Conn. 691, 698. “Following that trend, this court, in Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), sanctioned a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in situations in which the reason for the discharge involved impropriety derived from some important violation of public policy In doing so, we recognized a public policy limitation on the traditional employment at-will doctrine in an effort to balance the competing interests of employers and employees.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court has “recognized the inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy and the difficulty encountered when attempting to define precisely the contours of the public policy exception.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 698-99. “In evaluating claims,” the trial court must “look to see whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 699.
As opposed to the original complaint, the substitute complaint contains one count, count seven, alleging a violation of Connecticut public policy. Therefore this court must decide whether, as alleged, the reason for the plaintiff’s discharge “involved impropriety derived from some important violation of public policy.” Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 260 Conn. 698. The substitute complaint, CT Page 8894-bz however, contains no allegation regarding the reason for the plaintiff’s discharge, only that the plaintiff was discharged. Without such an allegation, there can be no determination of whether the discharge was wrongful.
Furthermore, in count seven, the plaintiff essentially claims that although the defendant’s standard employment application contains language that the potential employee is an employee at-will, the defendant did not bring the plaintiff’s attention to said language. The plaintiff concludes that, because the defendant’s agents assured the plaintiff that he would be employed until he sold all of the townhouses, the defendant “contracted out” of the at-will employment relationship. Our Supreme Court, however, has “repeatedly . . . underscored our adherence to the principle that the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 701, 802 A.2d 731 (2002). These allegations do not fall within the ambit of such a narrow exception. Therefore, counts one, two and seven are stricken.
Because the plaintiff has not adequately alleged that his discharge was in violation of public policy, count three, which asserts a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, is also stricken. The rational for such a decision was explained in the court’s February 3, 2003, decision, and this court adopts the same reasoning therein.
Count four, in which the plaintiff asserts a claim of promissory estoppel, fails for the same reasons articulated in the decision of February 3, 2003, and this court adopts the same reasoning therein.
Count six, in which the plaintiff asserts a claim of tortious interference with a contractual relationship, also fails for the same reasons articulated in the court’s February 3, 2003, decision, and this court adopts the same reasoning therein.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s substitute complaint is stricken in its entirety.
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 8th day of August 2003.
William B. Lewis, Judge CT Page 8894-ba
CT Page 8894-bb