RADUCHA v. RADUCHA, No. FA 99-0722241S (Aug. 3, 2009)

NANCY RADUCHA v. ALLEN RADUCHA.

2009 Ct. Sup. 1036
No. FA 99-0722241SConnecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
August 3, 2009

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF’S POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR CONTEMPT #130 AND DEFENDANT’S POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR MODIFICATION #131
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The separation agreement incorporated into the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage on January 10, 2000, provided that the defendant would pay alimony of “$40,000 per year for nine years and thereafter in the amount of $20,000 for three years.” It further provided that during the last three years alimony “shall be subject to modification as to amount if Mr. Raducha can show there has been a substantial change in Ms. Raducha’s circumstances so that she no longer requires alimony in the amount of $20,000 per year.” The plaintiff seeks a finding of contempt against the defendant for his having ceased making alimony payments, while the defendant seeks to modify alimony on the grounds that plaintiff no longer needs it. For the reasons stated below, the plaintiff’s motion for contempt is granted, and the defendant’s motion for modification is denied.

The parties appeared with counsel for hearing on these motions on July 6, 2009, at which time both parties testified. The defendant testified that he stopped paying alimony after nine years because he believed that alimony ended automatically and that plaintiff no longer needed alimony because of her standard of living and the fact that she was living with another person. The plaintiff acknowledged sharing a home and expenses with another person, but the evidence shows that, even after subtracting expenses she regularly incurs to meet the needs of her grown children, she still needs at least an additional $20,000 a year to meet her own expenses. She has gross income of $967 per week, and net income after taxes of $654, but her reasonable expenses include mandatory union dues, long-term disability insurance, a mandatory pension contribution, medical and dental insurance totaling another $61 per week, credit card debt of $184 per week, and $866 per week of other personal expenses. She lives modestly and does not display lavish expenses. In view of her marginal tax rate of 25%, the order for defendant to pay her alimony of $20,000 per year will net her only $15,000 after taxes. On these facts, the CT Page 1037 defendant has not shown either a substantial change of circumstances on the plaintiff’s part or that she no longer requires alimony in that amount.

The defendant’s motion for modification is therefore denied. He has not shown any lawful excuse for violating the court order to continue paying plaintiff alimony in the amount of $20,000 per year, and the plaintiff’s motion for contempt is accordingly granted.

Under General Statutes § 46b-87, the prevailing party in a contempt action may be awarded a reasonable attorneys fee, [1] and the plaintiff has requested counsel fees for the contempt motion here.[2] The court has reviewed the attorneys fee affidavit, and finds that the hourly rate charged by plaintiff’s counsel is a reasonable one for matrimonial lawyers practicing in the Judicial District of Hartford. The court finds that the amount of time claimed by her attorney for services rendered and the specific activities conducted by counsel are reasonable. The court orders defendant to pay counsel fees to plaintiff in the amount of $2,071.92.

The defendant is ordered to pay all alimony arrears and counsel fees owed to the plaintiff within 30 days.

[1] General Statutes Section 46b-87 provides in relevant part as follows: “When any person is found in contempt of an order of the Superior Court entered under section 46b-60 to 46b-62, inclusive, 46b-81 to 46b-83, inclusive, or 46b-86, the court may award to the petitioner a reasonable attorneys fee and the fees of the officer serving the contempt citation, such sums to be paid by the person found in contempt, provided if any such person is found not to be in contempt of such order, the court may award a reasonable attorneys fee to such person.”

[2] As our Supreme Court has noted, “Connecticut courts traditionally examine the factors enumerated in rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct in calculating a reasonable attorneys fee award.”Simms v. Chaisson, 277 Conn. 319, 332 (2006). Rule 1.5(a) provides as follows: “A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) The amount involved and the results CT Page 1038 obtained; (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”

CT Page 1036