2004 Ct. Sup. 16866
No. CV 02 0346701Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury at Danbury
November 4, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NADEAU, JUDGE.
An accident-injured minor passenger has sued the owner and minor operator of the car he rode in, alleging, inter alia, operation under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff brought a second action (now consolidated with the first) in three counts generally regarding alcohol use and/or provision at a residence prior to the accident.
It is in this second action that “host” defendants seek summary judgment. They are the homeowner and minor son who are said to have been negligent and reckless in serving alcohol to or permitting it to be consumed by defendant auto operator on the premises, and in allowing the allegedly intoxicated minor to drive plaintiff from the home; defendants are also alleged to have failed to properly supervise the gathering or to take adequate safety precautions.
The “hosts” seek summary judgment, which this court feels constrained to deny.
One might well begin by identifying the cast of characters, in order to avoid repetitive usage of clumsy, wordy descriptions.
Reynolds: plaintiff, an attendant at the house party, later a passenger of the allegedly intoxicated Whaley.
Whaley: defendant in the accident case; operator for his passenger, Whaley; attended the house party.
McAvoy: minor resident of his parents’ home and host of the gathering.
McAvoy argues for summary judgment based on testimony that he never personally served his own alcohol to anyone in his house. He indicates that the plaintiff and Whaley originally arrived early in the evening at CT Page 16867 his home, where they were joined by McAvoy’s girlfriend and an additional friend. McAvoy asserts he was the only person consuming alcohol at the time. Later in the evening, McAvoy explains, they were joined by another friend, and left the house as a group in two separate cars to patronize a bar where they met with more friends for drinks. After the bar closed, McAvoy invited the friends to spend the night at his house because his parents were out of town. Before returning to McAvoy’s house, Whaley drove the plaintiff and another friend to New York to purchase a case of beer.
A police report indicates that a total of thirteen people ultimately arrived at McAvoy’s house. As evidence that he never served alcohol to anyone present, McAvoy offers the depositions of Whaley and two other guests who state that people were drinking on the premises but that McAvoy did not supply beer to Whaley or the plaintiff. Although McAvoy consumed his own beer, he asserts that Whaley, Reynolds, and others consumed only the beer that was brought from outside the premises.
In response, the plaintiff points to Whaley’s deposition testimony that alcohol was present in McAvoy’s refrigerator in addition to the beer brought by Whaley and the plaintiff. The plaintiff also produces police reports which contain guests’ statements that no alcohol was present, and argues they are inconsistent with the same guests’ subsequent depositions, which state that beer was readily available and people were drinking in the house. Troopers investigating the scene supply the plaintiff with testimony that they witnessed empty beer cans, beer cases, and garbage bags of empty beer cans surrounding the house and the driveway. The plaintiff, therefore, contends the case is inappropriate for summary judgment because the inconsistent testimony surrounding the availability of alcohol introduce a material question regarding whether McAvoy furnished alcohol on the premises.
“In appropriate circumstances, adults have a duty to refrain from negligently or intentionally supplying alcohol to minors, whether such adults act as social hosts in their homes or as purveyors in a bar, because minors are presumed not to have the capacity to understand fully the risks associated with intoxication.” Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 681, 674 A.2d 839 (1996). “[A] social host or other purveyor of alcohol will be liable, to the minor served or to innocent third parties thereafter injured, if . . . as a matter of fact, a proximate cause relationship between the service of alcohol and the damages ensuing from the minor’s consumption of alcohol.” Id., 677. A minor’s “consumption of alcohol does not, as a matter of law, insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury.” Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88, 95, 540 A.2d 54
(1988). CT Page 16868
Defendant, McAvoy cites Pagan v. Amston Liquor Shoppe, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 01 0511544 (October 15, 2003, Robinson, J.) (“Pagan II“) (35 Conn. L. Rptr. 688), to support his proposition that a host should not be liable for a guest consuming his own alcohol who injures another party after leaving the premises. The plaintiff responds with an earlier companion case, Pagan v. Amston Liquor Shoppe, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 01 0511544 (June 30, 2003, Cohn, J.) (“Pagan I“) (35 Conn. L. Rptr. 231), which, he asserts, supports an argument that a host can be liable when a guest consuming alcohol on the premises subsequently injures a third party.
The Pagan decisions result from the same body of facts. A minor purchased alcohol from a liquor store and proceeded to a party at one residence before leaving to attend a second party at a separate residence. He consumed his own alcohol on both premises. After leaving the second party, the minor was involved in a motor vehicle accident causing injuries to a third party. The court, Cohn, J., denied summary judgment to the host of the first party; the court, Robinson, J, granted summary judgment to the host of the second party.
Comparing Pagan I and II, the principal difference discernible from the text of the opinions is that the host of the first party specifically invited the minor to the party, and although the minor drank his own alcohol, the host made alcohol available to everyone in attendance and actively encouraged the consumption of alcohol. The host of the second party, however, neither made alcohol available to the minor nor even invited the minor to his home.
In the present case, the Pagan decisions incline slightly toward the plaintiff because McAvoy specifically invited Whaley and Reynolds to his home with the knowledge that he was providing a venue for underage drinking.
The evidence submitted by both parties indicates that McAvoy served as a social host for a group of friends whom he allowed to drink on his premises. Although liability may not result from an adult’s mere knowledge that alcohol is stored in a refrigerator accessible to minors, liability may be imposed when a person is a social host to minors and a causal connection exists between tolerated or served consumption and the damages resulting from the minor’s consumption. Compare Rangel v. Parkhurst, 64 Conn.App. 372, 383, 779 A.2d 1277 (2001). Inasmuch as Ely an Bohan do not require the defendant to be an intentional, but only a negligent, purveyor of alcohol, whether Whaley consumed the alcohol stored in the house or the alcohol brought from outside the premises, CT Page 16869 McAvoy, as a social host, must be deemed to have a degree of duty for accommodating widespread underage drinking and providing a venue for it.
The plaintiff also provides sufficient evidence to question whether McAvoy provided appropriate safety measures or supervision for his guests. In the past, summary judgments have been denied for allegations of both negligence; Colabatistto v. Taborsak, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 01 0342268 (November 15, 2001, Radcliffe, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 706, 707); and recklessness; Marinaccio v. Zaczynski, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 96 0565991 (May 14, 1998, Hennessey, J.) (22 Conn. L. Rptr. 159, 162) (when plaintiff provided evidence that the host had knowledge that a guest consumed alcohol and failed to make an effort to control his activities or prevent him from operating a motor vehicle).
The evidence submitted by McAvoy showing that Whaley may have already been intoxicated by the time he arrived at the premises is also unavailing for the purpose of summary judgment. “[A] purveyor who provides alcoholic beverages to an already intoxicated patron . . . [can], as a matter of law, be the proximate cause of subsequent injuries caused by the intoxicated patron.” Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 334, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). In light of the fact that a social host with knowledge that minors are consuming alcohol on his premises shares a duty similar to a purveyor who explicitly serves alcohol to a minor, the court also finds it reasonable to hold a host liable for subsequent injuries if fact finders determine he had knowledge that an already intoxicated guest was consuming alcoholic beverages at his home.
Whether McAvoy’s guests consumed the alcohol stored at McAvoy’s home or only the alcohol brought by themselves or others,[1] a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether McAvoy knowingly or negligently provided a place for his guests to consume or overindulge with alcohol. In addition, a genuine issue exists as to whether McAvoy provided adequate safety precautions for such an activity. As the social host of a party that involved underage drinking, a duty of care exists, and a jury is permitted to determine whether that duty was breached, and if so, whether that breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Practically speaking, lengthy trial experience is very instructive in providing a sense for cases where the skeleton built via snippets of interviews, interrogatories and limited depositions only mildly resembles the fully developed whole body of facts to become visible at trial. Further, this is especially so when the factual setting is one with many participants and passive witnesses regarding facts which are developed or discovered over time.[2]
CT Page 16870
One must appreciate that it is commonplace for a case to clearly suggest almost certain victory and remain one inappropriate for summary judgment. This, of course, may be such a case.
Summary judgment is denied as to all counts.
BY THE COURT
NADEAU, J.
CT Page 16871