2005 Ct. Sup. 11768-jo
No. CV 02-038 83 96 SConnecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport
August 30, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Motion #113.00)
DAVID W. SKOLNICK, JUDGE.
Before the court is the defendant Pullman Comley’s, LLC’s motion for summary judgment as to counts one and two on the ground that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The plaintiffs, Deborah Reynolds, Jennifer Connolly and Venezia Van der Zyde, bring the present action against the defendant, Pullman Comley, LLC, for legal malpractice. The following facts are alleged in the complaint. The plaintiffs were employed in various capacities by Donaldson, Lufkin Jenrette Securities Corporation (DLJ). During their employment with DLJ, the plaintiffs allege that they were subject to discrimination based on their gender, and were not compensated equally as their male counterparts. The plaintiffs further allege that they were terminated on the basis of their gender. Shortly after their terminations, the plaintiffs hired the defendant to represent them in a lawsuit against DLJ. The defendant advised the plaintiffs that DLJ had discriminated against them and that they should file a gender discrimination complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant knew that it had to file a claim with the EEOC within 300 days of the plaintiffs’ termination. The defendant, however, filed the complaint one day after this time period and, as a result of the untimely filing, the EEOC dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. Because the EEOC claim was dismissed, the plaintiffs could not pursue their Title VII claim. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs retained a law firm in New York to represent them, which brought an action against DLJ under the applicable New York state and New York city law. The plaintiffs and DLJ ultimately settled the dispute for $650,000 and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs then brought this legal malpractice action against the defendant for filing the EEOC claim late. CT Page 11768-jp
On December 10, 2001, the plaintiffs filed their three-count complaint against the defendant. Each count alleges legal malpractice against the defendant, one count for each plaintiff. On April 27, 2004, the defendant filed its motion for summary judgment along with a supporting memorandum of law, a copy of the deposition of the plaintiffs’ attorney, Anne L. Clark,[1] a copy of the New York City Administrative Code § 8-502, and an unauthenticated copy of a mediation statement, dated November 13, 2000. On April 20, 2005, the plaintiffs filed their objection to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.[2] The defendant filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on May 13, 2005.
“Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 399-400, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). “The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy [its] burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Inst. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 405, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004).
“As the party moving for summary judgment, the [movant] is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits.”Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). “[O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment . . . In fact, [the Appellate Court] has held that Practice Book [§ 17-45], although containing the phrase including but not limited to, contemplates that supporting documents to a motion for summary judgment be made under oath or . . . be otherwise reliable [The] rules would be meaningless if they could be circumvented by filing [unauthenticated documents] in support of or in opposition to summary judgment . . .”
“Therefore, before a document may be considered by the court in support of a motion for summary judgment, there must be a preliminary showing of CT Page 11768-jq [the document’s] genuineness, i.e., that the proffered item of evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. The requirement of authentication applies to all types of evidence, including writings . . . Conn. Code Evid. § 9-1(a), commentary. Documents [submitted] in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be authenticated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, a certified copy of a document or the addition of an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and accurate representation of what its proponent claims it to be.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Pantani, 89 Conn.App. 675, 678-79, 874 A.2d 849 (2005).
In the present case, the evidence submitted by the defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment was neither certified nor authenticated. The defendant has not met its initial burden of submitting any evidence to show that there does not exist a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
SKOLNICK, J.
CT Page 11768-jr